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ABSTRACT 
The focus of strategy research in recent years has moved beyond examining 
resources as the building blocks of competitive advantage and has instead proposed 
more complex, esoteric theories to explain firms’ performance. While each of these 
theories is valuable independently, none offer a ‘root-cause’ analysis of competitive 
advantage. To provide this, strategy scholars should consider revisiting the importance 
of individual firm-level resources. The purpose of this document is to more thoroughly 
map out the resource space using several prominent strategy perspectives as a guide and 
to test the competitive potential of multiple resource typologies. This document is 
organized into five Chapters. In Chapter I, a conceptual argument is developed that 
outlines a complete model of strategic resource utility. The complete model is designed 
to help managers and scholars identify which resources are most likely to generate 
competitive advantage for a firm, and to propose several ways to move forward 
empirically. Chapter II is an investigation of the relationships between resource 
in/tangibility and firm performance. Chapters III and IV test the utility of two sub-
typologies of intangible resources. Together, the results from Chapters I-IV indicate that 
intangible resources—especially those that are easily communicable—are indicative of 
competitive advantage. Last, Chapter V outlines an agenda for future research based on 
these results. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO A COMPLETE MODEL OF STRATEGIC RESOURCE 
UTILITY 
Synopsis 
As a discipline, strategic management has focused much of its time and effort 
attempting to identify the source(s) of competitive advantage. The complexity and 
multifaceted nature of this objective has produced several insightful perspectives as 
strategic management has evolved. Some of the discussion in this regard has focused on 
identifying categories and characteristics of resources that are indicative of competitive 
advantage. Despite this discussion, some of the field’s most prominent scholars have 
called for a more thorough mapping of the resource landscape. Therefore, this 
manuscript is intended to offer one potential avenue by which to do just that. In this 
chapter, I condense and arrange the most prominent strategy literature under one 
conceptual umbrella. The ultimate purpose of doing so is to help managers and scholars 
identify which resources will be most important for a given firm. The result of these 
efforts is a three-dimensional array with eight elements that correspond to the eight 
categories of resources available to a firm. I then provide several testable propositions 
and outline some methodologies and analytical techniques that managers and scholars 
might use to begin the process of testing the model. 
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Introduction 
 Strategic management, in its quest to explain firm performance, has enjoyed the 
contributions of several insightful perspectives over the years. In the early days, the 
majority of research focused on examining an industry’s effects on performance 
(Hoskisson, Wan, Yu, & Hitt, 1999). Despite subsequent shifts away from the industry 
as the level of analysis (Porter, 1981), the role of industry effects on performance is still 
quite obviously apparent. Wernerfelt (1984) was responsible for spurring this shift, 
effectively making the case that firm-level characteristics (i.e., ‘resources’) are more 
prophetic of performance than industry effects. The shift in attention to firm-level 
resources necessitated that managers and scholars be able to identify the resources that 
would most likely lead to competitive advantage. A number of scholars undertook this 
discussion in the years that followed (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996a; Hall, 1992). Most 
recently, other scholars asserted that firms’ ability to combine or reconfigure the 
resources in its resource bundle over time is most associated with competitive advantage 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece & Pisano, 1994; Winter, 2003). Independently, these 
multiple perspectives of performance have provided fruitful opportunities for research 
over the years. 
 However, strategic management is still in need of a model of firm performance 
that links these perspectives more thoroughly to one another. Adopting and testing any 
one of the previous viewpoints in isolation can lead to a wide array of explanations for 
firm performance that are not mutually exclusive or comprehensively exhaustive. Even 
Wernerfelt (1995) himself called for a more thorough mapping of the resource space, as 
“[resources] remain an amorphous heap to most of us” (p. 172). Therefore, the purpose 
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of this paper is to propose a complete model of resource utility. The model’s intention is 
to help managers and scholars identify which resources are most likely to generate 
competitive advantage for a firm. 
 The paper is organized as follows. First, I provide a brief literature review which 
covers the aforementioned strategic perspectives in greater detail. Then, I integrate the 
perspectives together into one model. Last, I propose several accompanying hypotheses 
and discuss the tools and methodologies available to help advance this research agenda. 
Literature Review  
The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 
Porter (1980, 1981, 1985) played a large part in resurrecting Bain’s (1956, 1968) 
and Mason’s (1939) early teachings, which collectively adopted the Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm (SCP). This perspective asserted that the Structure of an industry 
influenced the Conduct of firms in that industry, which in turn influenced their collective 
Performance. Therefore, in order to understand firm performance, one needed merely to 
assess the structure of the industry in which it competes. During the early and middle 
twentieth century, the United States’ economy was sustained by the production of 
tangible goods from raw materials. Given the lack of market segmentation and product 
differentiation needed in this type of economy, it is easy to see how institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) created industries made up of analogous 
firms.  
Porter (1980) offers what is perhaps the most significant contribution to strategic 
management from this early era, outlining the five forces that shape industry 
attractiveness. He asserts that status quo competition, the bargaining power of buyers, 
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the bargaining power of suppliers, the threat of new entrants, and the threat of 
substitutability cooperatively influence how firms in that industry are likely to perform. 
Porter (1980, 1985) specifies that the purpose of outlining the five forces of industry 
attractiveness was to help firms cope with and shift the arrangement of these forces in 
their favor. These early theories of performance (Bain, 1956, Mason, 1939; Porter, 1979, 
1980, 1981, 1985, 1996) were influenced heavily by Industrial Organizational (I/O) 
economics. I/O economics’ impact on the methodologies undertaken in strategic 
management research was just as notable. Strategy was, from this point onward, 
forevermore a ‘scientific’ discipline. The proposing of formal hypotheses and testing of 
them using large-sample data analysis became the norm. Schendel and Hatten’s (1972) 
avocations for empirical research in strategic management were being realized, as more 
authors adopted a positivistic, deductive approach to research that focused on formally 
testing relationships between variables (Hoskisson et al., 1999). 
The Resource Based View (RBV) of the Firm  
While undoubtedly a useful viewpoint when forecasting firm profitability, the 
SCP and I/O Economics paradigms lacked a certain component of specificity. 
Wernerfelt (1984) successfully filled this void by recruiting the input of previous authors 
(Ansoff, 1965; Chandler, 1965; Penrose, 1959; Selznick, 1957) who took an internal 
approach to explaining firm performance. Wernerfelt (1984) made the argument that 
firms should be viewed as collections of resources. Furthermore, he clarified that these 
resources are (a) heterogeneously distributed across firms in an industry and (b) not 
perfectly mobile between firms. Therefore, a firm in possession of larger quantities of a 
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resource than its competitors could be said to be enjoying a resource position barrier—
the foundation of superior performance.  
Several authors would subsequently extend Wernerfelt’s (1984) work. Barney 
(1986a) suggested that some resources are inherently more tradable than others. 
Tradable resources, he surmised, could be easily tracked and their monetary value 
determined in a ‘strategic factor market’. Dierickx and Cool (1989) added that resources 
do not merely appear out of thin air and are not instantly lost when operationalized. They 
used the metaphor of a bathtub to illustrate how resources must be acquired over time 
(like turning on a faucet), and how a firm must simultaneously monitor its resource 
operationalization (water exiting through the drain) with the goal of maintaining a 
healthy resource stock (the level of the water in the bathtub). Barney (1991) undertook 
the job of helping managers delineate which resources are inherently more likely to 
generate competitive advantage. He proposed that if a resource was Valuable, Rare, 
Inimitable, and Non-Substitutable (VRIS), it should be associated with competitive 
advantage. Despite a well-documented set of limitations (Black & Boal, 1994; Hayduk 
& Walker, 2017) and several subsequent modifications (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993; 
Black & Boal, 1994; Grant, 1991; Robins, 1992), the VRIS framework still represents 
the focal node around which resource ‘importance’ is assessed. 
Further Specialization of the RBV 
 In the years since the RBV began to unify strategy research, some scholars have 
taken to delineating the individual resources or characteristics of resources that might 
lead to competitive advantage. Wernerfelt (1984) initially defined resources as both 
tangible and intangible assets that a firm possesses semi-permanently. Since that time, 
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many researchers have investigated how resource tangibility/intangibility affects 
performance (Galbreath, 2005; Godfrey & Hill, 1995; Hall, 1992, 1993; Villalonga, 
2004). The general conclusion in this line of research is that intangible resources are 
more likely than tangible resources to be associated with competitive advantage, because 
their intangibility makes them abstruse and difficult to transfer between firms. 
For other researchers, one specific resource commanded the majority of 
attention. The knowledge-based view of the firm (KBV) could best be described as an 
offshoot of the RBV in which knowledge is regarded as the origin of all other resources. 
Polanyi (1966) initially sparked this discussion, classifying knowledge into two groups: 
tacit and explicit. Tacit knowledge is enigmatic and therefore difficult to transfer and 
formalize. Explicit knowledge is teachable, easily communicated and documented, and 
is often developed using systematic, consistent language. Kogut and Zander (1992) 
position knowledge as the most essential resource by presenting a view of the firm that 
ran contrary to the traditional agency-based model (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Kogut 
and Zander’s (1992, 1996) new perspective positioned firms not as a “nexus of 
contracts” (Hoskisson et. al, 1999: p. 435), but as a storehouse for information, know-
how, and capabilities. They specify that employees consciously and subconsciously 
contribute to the stock of organizational knowledge by engaging in mutually beneficial 
activities with the firm and with their colleagues. At its core, the KBV is a behavioral 
theory of firm competition and performance (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1945; 
Nonka, Byosiere, Borucki, & Konno, 1994). 
 Recently, some scholars proposed the notion that the RBV does not entirely 
capture firm performance because the bulk of work in this area concentrated on cross-
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sectional evaluations of the determinants of performance (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). 
In other words, finding the predictors of performance at one point in time effectively 
thwarts our ability to think about performance over time. Teese and colleagues (1997) 
propose that in all markets, but especially in ones that shift and evolve rapidly, the firm’s 
ability to combine, reconfigure, and integrate resources in its resource bundle is an 
important indicator of performance. The processes and routines that allowed for such a 
capacity have been termed ‘dynamic capabilities’. In addition to its intuitive appeal, the 
dynamic capabilities literature offers an agreeable counterpoise to some previous work 
asserting that some firm resources may possess negative value by creating rigidities 
within the firm (Leonard-Barton, 1992) that hinder performance. 
Conceptual Incorporation 
 Having outlined the basic perspectives guiding strategic management research, I 
now move to incorporate these perspectives into a complete model. To enhance the 
clarity of the overall model, I incorporate the preceding perspectives in stages and offer 
an explanation for each stage. First and most importantly, performance has been guided 
by a confluence of internal and external influences (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2008). 
This is represented by the complementary relationship between the RBV and the SCP 
paradigm (Hoskisson et al., 1999). Moreover, the very crux of contingency theory 
(Chandler, 1962; Kim & Lim, 1988) necessitates that any model of performance needs to 
delineate that performance outcomes are contingent upon both internal and external 
factors. This is depicted in Figure 1.1, where the internal firm environment resides inside 
the dotted line, and the external industry environment resides outside of the dotted line. 
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Second, I need to represent the relationship between two of the major 
perspectives outlined previously: resource tangibility/intangibility and knowledge 
tacitness/explicitly. Wright (1994) correctly surmised that resources are not merely 
tangible or intangible, and that knowledge is not merely tacit or explicit. Rather, 
resources and knowledge are continuous rather than dichotomous in nature. Hayduk and 
Walker (2018) furthers this line of thinking by proposing that certain types of resources 
are best operationalized using explicit knowledge, and that others require tacit 
knowledge. For example, teasing the best content out of a creative staff is most 
dependent upon tacit knowledge, while constructing a new warehouse relies mostly on 
explicit knowledge. In this way, the value generative ability of a resource is dependent 
upon both of these resource characteristics. I overlay this relationship onto Figure 1.1, 
resulting in Figure 1.2. Making sense of Figure 1.2 entails asking two sequential 
questions about a given resource. First, how tangible is this resource? The answer to this 
question conveys the location of the resource on the x-axis. Resources with a high 
degree of tangibility (e.g. physical infrastructure such as warehouses) fall somewhere on 
the far right end of the x-axis, while an intangible resource (e.g. reputation) is placed on 
the far left end. Second, what type of knowledge is required for operational deployment 
of this resource? Answering this question places the location of the resource on the y-
axis. A resource requiring mostly tacit knowledge has a high y-value (e.g. artistic and/or 
creative talent), while a resource requiring explicit knowledge has a low y-value below 
the x-axis (e.g. machinery, assembly lines, physical infrastructure). A resource’s 
placement on both the x and y axes should be done in as close to an interval-scaled 
manner as possible. This means that coordinates close to the origin are minimally 
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characteristic of the two criteria while coordinates further away from the origin are more 
distinguishingly endowed with one or both criteria. 
I now incorporate the last of the aforementioned strategy perspectives by 
introducing a third axis. Like tangibility/intangibility and tacitness/explicitness, the 
ability of a resource to be combined or reconfigured with other resources falls on a 
spectrum. Intuitively, a resource cannot be entirely dynamic or entirely rigid. Therefore, 
the third question is: With what degree of ease can this resource (i.e., given its 
tangibility and knowledge requirements) be altered, re-configured, or combined with 
other resources in the firm’s resource bundle over time? A resource with a high degree 
of dynamism falls closer on the third axis (e.g., a convoy of mobile production and 
broadcast trucks), and a resource with a low degree of dynamism (e.g., brick and mortar 
production and broadcast structures) falls farther away. Thus, a full model that displays 
the dependencies between a resource’s tangibility, knowledge requirements, and 
dynamism is presented in Figure 1.3. The full model is a three dimensional array made 
up of eight elements. These eight elements represent the eight categories of resources 
available to a firm. Each category’s ability to generate economic rents is influenced by 
the firm’s competitive positioning and the external conditions of the market in which it 
competes. 
Towards a Research Agenda 
Testable Propositions 
 Proposing a complete model of resource utility is only helpful if the model can 
be verified or denied with empirical techniques. Otherwise, I would simply be adding to 
the list of strategy perspectives struggling to gain quantifiable validation (Hoskisson et 
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al., 1999; Schendel and Hatten 1972; Stonehouse & Snowdon, 2007). Therefore, the 
following section is dedicated to suggesting several propositions that aim to test parts of 
the complete model. Then, I discuss some of the tools and techniques researchers could 
use in order to test the propositions. 
First, it should be noted that the list of propositions in this manuscript is by no 
means exhaustive. When formulating hypotheses about the eight resource types, brevity 
and clarity necessitate that I focus on two that are quite different from each other: 
intangible, tacitly-operationalized, dynamic (ITD) resources and tangible, explicitly-
operationalized, rigid resources (TER). Because these two resource categories are 
conceptual opposites, they offer the best chance to illustrate the relationships between 
them. However, scholars could easily formulate hypotheses about any of the eight 
resource types. 
 When thinking about ITD resources, it becomes apparent that in some situations, 
an intangible resource that is also tacitly operationalized and highly dynamic commands 
a strong reputation as a value-generative asset to the firm. Resources that are difficult to 
see, touch, or otherwise account for are much more difficult to emulate or find 
substitutes for. Furthermore, even if a competitor acquires a comparable intangible asset, 
operationalizing it without the required tacit knowledge represents a sizable hurdle. Last, 
the fact that these resources are dynamic means that their lifespan is short and highly 
evolutionary, making them difficult to replicate.  
Overall, it becomes easy to see why ITD resources are very desirable in some 
situations. Their characteristics help them to meet and exceed Peteraf’s (1993) ex ante 
and ex post limits to competition. However, in order to fully understand the role of ITD 
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resources, I must consider the intra-firm characteristics and market environment in 
which they are deployed. In some markets and for firms that have adopted certain 
business-level strategies, ITD resources may be less essential for success. When a firm is 
pursuing a cost-leadership strategy (Porter, 1980), its focus is on lowering per-unit cost 
and in doing so, establishing economies of scale and/or scope (Amit, 1986). Therefore, 
that firm may find explicitly outlined, regimented routines and precise, reliable 
machinery more suitable to its needs. Likewise, in new, rapidly growing markets, ITD 
resources may be less essential because during these early periods, firms often need to 
focus more on accomplishing essential business functions than on the esoteric functions 
associated with developing and exploiting intangible resources. Given this foundation, I 
submit the following set of testable propositions: 
 ITD resources will be most associated with competitive advantage for firms in 
mature and specialty markets. 
 ITD resources will be most predictive of firm success for differentiated firms. 
 ITD resources will be least homogeneously distributed throughout firms in an 
industry. 
 ITD resources will make up the smallest proportion of resources available to firms in 
an industry. 
 As ITD resources become more rigid (ITR), their likelihood of generating 
competitive advantage will decrease for firms competing in fast-paced industries and 
firms competing as differentiators. 
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Next, I turn the focus to TER resources. Tangible resources have long been 
described as having less potential to generate competitive advantage than intangible 
resources (Galbreath, 2005; Godfrey & Hill, 1995; Hall, 1992, 1993; Villalonga, 2004). 
Furthermore, the explicit nature of the knowledge required to operationalize them is 
seemingly another disadvantage. Knowledge that can be documented and communicated 
can thus be transferred between firms with ease. Last, a rigid resource is one that has 
difficulty being integrated with the other resources available to the firm. This prevents 
the attainment of synergies necessary to attain economies of scale and scope. All told, it 
is apparent that in many situations TER resources may not be particularly helpful 
towards generating competitive advantage. 
However, while classifying a resource in the above manner has ostensibly 
negative connotations, there are in fact instances where TER resources have benefits. 
After all, some aspects of TER resources have conceptual parallels with the notions of 
stability, consistency, and replicability. The trick, of course, is guarding against these 
resources becoming too rigid, beyond the point of justifiable utility. In many instances, 
TER resources constitute an industry’s entry barriers, especially in developed and 
commoditized markets.  
Overall, while the successful acquisition and utilization of TER resources is 
necessary to maintain status-quo competitive levels, they may only narrowly meet 
Peteraf’s (1993) requirements of ex post and ex ante limitations in well-developed 
markets and for specialty firms. Therefore, I submit the following set of propositions: 
 TER resources will be most associated with competitive advantage for firms in 
developing and commoditized markets. 
13 
 
 
 TER resources will be most predictive of firm success for cost-leaders. 
 TER resources will make up the largest proportion of resources available to firms in 
a slow-moving industry and in commoditized industries. 
 TER resources will be most homogeneously distributed throughout firms in an 
industry. 
 As TER resources become more dynamic (TED), their likelihood of generating 
competitive advantage will increase. 
Methodologies for Testing Propositions 
 Some of the statistical methodologies needed to test some of the propositions in 
this manuscript are well-known in the management sciences, and would certainly help 
refine some of the arguably broad relationships proposed here. For example, scholars 
have routinely quantified a firm’s intangible resources using a handful of approaches 
such as human resource accounting (HRA), economic value-added (EVA), the balanced 
scorecard, intellectual capital audits (Bontis, 1998; Bontis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen, & 
Roos, 1999), and Tobin’s q Ratio (Villalonga, 2004), McDougall and Snetsinger’s 
(1990) tangibility scale, and Kaplan and Norton’s (2004) Strategic Readiness Report for 
Intangible Resources. Another approach entails the examination of firm financial data in 
order to assess the proportion of assets listed in the ‘intangible assets’ and ‘goodwill’ 
line item categories. Additionally, Albino, Garavelli, and Schiuma (2001) provides some 
direction for measuring tacit and explicit knowledge with their knowledge codification 
metric.  
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 Some scholarship has provided initial insight about the nature of resource 
dynamism. Sanchez (1995; 1997), for example, proposes and discusses the construct of 
resource flexibility. Furthermore, Latane, Nowak, and Liu’s (1994) mathematical 
representation of dynamism as a rate of change and Agarwal, Grassl, and Pahl’s (2012) 
evaluation of dynamic environments can certainly be of help when attempting to 
quantify a resource’s dynamic or rigid qualities. Last, stochastic frontier analysis 
(Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2003) might represent a way to capture a resource’s efficiency of 
utility, which has conceptual similarities with dynamism.  
As of yet, these metrics and others like them have not been used in conjunction 
with one another in a fashion that addresses the three questions posed in this manuscript. 
Furthermore, scholars have also provided additional insights regarding how I might 
organize and classify these resource elements. Thibault, Slack, and Hinings (1993) and 
Slack and Hinings (1994), for example, employ the empirical derivation of taxonomies 
using factor analysis in order to classify organizational design types, which is a 
methodology favored by other scholars as well (Haas et all, 1966; Aldrich & Mueller, 
1981; Hambrick, 1984; Miller & Friesen, 1984). A similar method of systematic factor 
arrangement is of definitive importance to this research agenda. While proximate in 
nature, these measures and factor arrangements can provide a foundation for 
modification and verification of the included proposition statements. These tools may 
not be readymade for deployment in our complete model, but they certainly should incite 
debate as to how they can be better optimized. 
Alternatively, it is important to note that for the field – one in which human 
behavioral idiosyncrasies are the root of both headaches and triumphs – some of the 
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propositions will induce difficulties as I begin the process of trying to attribute causality. 
Therefore, it is doubtful that this research agenda can progress very far without the 
recruiting of material and methodologies from neighboring and tangential disciplines 
such as behavioral economics, organizational behavior, psychology, marketing, and 
sociology. Even more pertinent is the need to recognize the benefits of aggressively 
harvesting the input of practitioners. 
To that point, research is also needed that defines our proposed relationships at 
the micro-level. I may assume, for example, that psychometric interpretations of a 
resource’s ‘tangibility’ or ‘dynamism’ may vary by a host of micro-level antecedents. A 
study that explores these interpretive differences between functional units would make 
for a promising line of inquiry, the results of which would help managers understand 
how and why different employees value certain aspects of a resource over its other 
characteristics. Likewise, it would be interesting to investigate how top management 
teams (TMTs) assess resources relative to their subordinates. This research would aim to 
assess whether or not TMTs place the same emphasis on certain resources or certain 
aspects of resources as the rest of the firm, the ownership, or other stakeholder groups. 
This will help TMTs chart and compare stakeholder groups’ cognitive maps of 
resources. Alignment of priorities certainly seems like a fruitful endeavor for a firm, the 
quantification of which could be evaluated using our approach. It may also be beneficial 
to track resources’ perceived qualities over time. Scholars may, for example, administer 
psychometric evaluations of resources’ tangibility, knowledge requirements, and 
dynamism at multiple time intervals. Further delineating the mediating and moderating 
factors contributing to the resources’ perceptual shifts would generate a sundry array of 
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insights. Furthermore, this would allow for researchers to apprehend the isomorphic or 
fragmenting nature of resource traits over time 
As this line of research advances, so too is expected of the complete model itself. 
It is in itself a re-conceptualization of Barney’s (1991) musings, and I hope that other 
scholars will award this perspective its due consideration. In that vein, it is understood 
that this model does not represent a finished product, but rather a starting line. Therefore, 
it is anticipated that the continual use of this model will refine its generalizability and 
therefore further define its practical applicability. Assuming the “… store of energy and 
enthusiasm” (p. 475) for new directions in strategy research referenced by Whittington, 
Pettigrew, and Thomas (2002) is indeed present in the academy, this paper seeks to 
contribute one such direction. Like a blank canvas, the proposed model awaits the artful 
contributions of both skeptics and advocates alike. 
Acceptance of the Null 
Of course, one point of contention worth mentioning is the possibility of non-
findings. In the unlikely event that such a consistent trend begins to emerge in the data, 
the fruits of our exploration will be nonetheless realized. For starters, I will have 
explored an avenue that could then be deemed unwarranted of further exploration. The 
ability to provide such a label in any definitive way is more than I have ex ante. I must 
know what does not work in order to further hone in on the penultimate goal: knowing 
what does work. Second, if nothing else, it is our hope that this paper reignites the 
resource-worthiness discussion. This topic has not been given much undertaking since 
Peteraf (1993). As McCloskey (1985) aptly surmised, good science is good 
conversation. These sentiments reverberate throughout the prose of our field’s most 
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heralded scholars, including Mintzberg (2005), who elucidates that “… I need more 
theories – the more the better. As researchers, scholars, and teachers, our obligation is to 
stimulate thinking, and a good way to do that is to offer alternate theories – multiple 
explanations of the same phenomena” (p. 365). What I mean to say is, perhaps resource 
characteristics other than the three I identify here (or newly reimagined relationships 
between them) will be recognized by conducting this research. The contribution to our 
body of knowledge will thus be positive, regardless of what our p-values suggest. 
Conclusion 
 In this manuscript, I contend that it is time for strategic management to 
reinvigorate the resource worthiness discussion. Guiding our opinion is the idea that 
managers need to be better equipped when deciding which resources are most essential 
for exceeding their firm’s performance objectives. I thoroughly map out the resource 
space using several of the most prominent perspectives in strategy research, creating a 
complete model of resource utility. Then, I make several propositions about our new 
resource categories in regards to their potential to generate competitive advantage. Last, 
I provide an overview of the tools and methods currently available to authors who want 
to test our propositions and propositions like them. 
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Figure 1.2 Tangibility and knowledge spectrums 
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Figure 1.3 Complete model of resource utility 
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CHAPTER II 
INTANGIBLE RESOURCES IN PARTICIPATORY SPORT AND LEISURE 
 
Synopsis 
 Intangible resources have been discussed as important predictors of success for 
professional sport franchises and collegiate athletic programs. However, less is known 
about whether intangibles can sustain firms competing in ancillary sport sectors that rely 
on participatory as opposed to passive consumption modes. As such, this manuscript 
investigates the roles of intangible resources, competitive positioning, and the external 
environment in predicting performance for a group of understudied sport sectors. Using 
accounting data from 243 sport and leisure firms between 1993 and 2015, the results 
indicated that intangible resources had a positive and significant effect on performance, 
tangible resources did not. While the moderating effects of competing as a differentiator 
were not significant and thus did not predict performance, it was noted that when firms 
increased their tangible resource base during a time of sector growth, performance 
suffered. These results are discussed and their implications for researchers and 
practitioners outlined.
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Introduction 
 Wernerfelt (1984) argued that firms should be viewed as collections of resources 
possessing the following two characteristics: (a) they are heterogeneously distributed 
across firms in an industry, and (b) they are not perfectly mobile between firms. 
Subsequent work has focused on identifying characteristics of resources that generate 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1986a, Barney, 1991). Barney (1986a) highlighted how 
more tradable resources can be tracked and valued in a formal market environment. 
Later on, Barney (1991) also suggested that valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable resources were especially indicative of competitive advantage. Adding to 
this, Hall (1992; 1993) espoused that resource tangibility or intangibility can be a 
decisive factor in how a competitive advantage materializes for the firm. Whereas 
tangible resources can be seen, intangibles can remain nascent, secretive, and difficult-
to-reproduce (Hall, 1992). This line of thinking has been applied in recent years to sport 
management (Gerrard, 2003; 2005; Smart & Wolfe, 2000; Walker & Mercado, 2013; 
Won & Chelladurai, 2016), whereby scholars have collectively articulated the 
importance of intangible resources to professional sport teams and collegiate programs. 
 However, adopting a narrow view of ‘sport’ hinders sport management’s ability 
to build generalizable sport theory, because sectors of the sport industry are highly 
diverse (Pitts, Fielding, & Miller, 1994). Passive sport consumption (i.e., professional 
and collegiate organizations) is only one part of the sport consumption equation, and 
sector-based analyses on active sport consumption are generally absent from the finance 
and economics literature. Sectorial lines in the sport industry have been drawn in prior 
research (Pitts, 1988; Pitts, Fielding, & Miller, 1991; 1994), but little direction has been 
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given regarding the applicability of sport management theories across these sectors. 
Active sport consumption sectors operate under a different set of industry standards and 
regulations than passive sport consumption sectors, so treating the two as one large 
‘sport industry’ runs the risk of over-generalizing academic theories. Therefore, it is 
critical to assess whether sport brands that procure active sport consumption products 
can enjoy the same performance advantages attributable to intangible resources as their 
passive sport consumption counterparts. Another benefit of adopting this approach is the 
availability of public company financial data, which can help researchers gain objective 
and consistent insights about firms’ resource bundles across multiple sub-sectors. Most 
professional teams in North America are privately owned, making comparable data 
about passive sport consumption brands is virtually nonexistent.  
 Based on the foregoing assessment, the purpose of this manuscript is to 
investigate whether intangible resources are as strongly associated with performance 
advantages for firms that provide active sport consumption products as they are for 
passive sport consumption brands. In so doing, the manuscript deepens the discussion of 
intangibles in sport by assessing their effects within an understudied sport sector, which 
in turn stresses the importance of developing sector-specific sport theories. 
 The manuscript is organized as follows. First, a literature review is provided that 
discusses the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) and its application to sport 
management. Following this, six hypotheses are developed based on the extant literature. 
Next, the methodological aspects of the analysis are described. After this, the results are 
documented, discussed, and their implications for academics and practitioners are 
outlined. Finally, the limitations of the study are acknowledged.  
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Literature Review  
The Resource Based View (RBV) of the Firm  
Wernerfelt (1984) successfully resurrected the views of previous authors who 
assumed an internal approach to explaining firm performance (Ansoff, 1969; Chandler, 
1962; Penrose, 1959; Selznick, 1957). He argued that firms should be viewed as 
collections of resources that are heterogeneously distributed between firms and 
imperfectly mobile – meaning that firms are incentivized to defend the resources they 
possess. Therefore, a firm in possession of larger quantities of a resource than its 
competitors could be said to be enjoying a resource position barrier. This idea constitutes 
the foundation for superior firm performance.  
Several authors extended Wernerfelt’s (1984) work. For example, Barney 
(1986a) suggested that some resources are inherently more tradable than others. 
Tradable resources, he surmised, could be easily tracked and their monetary value 
determined in a ‘strategic factor market’. Dierickx and Cool (1989) later added that 
resources do not merely appear out of thin air and are not instantly lost when 
operationalized. The authors used the metaphor of a bathtub to illustrate how resources 
must be acquired over time (i.e., turning on a faucet), and how a firm must 
simultaneously monitor its resource deployment (i.e., water exiting through the drain) 
with the goal of maintaining a healthy resource stock (i.e., level of the water in the 
bathtub). Adding to this logic, Barney (1991) delineated which resources are inherently 
more likely to generate competitive advantage. He proposed that if a resource was 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable, it should be associated with the ability 
to generate competitive advantage. Hall (1992; 1993) supported this idea and added that 
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resource tangibility or intangibility contributes to the ability of the resource to generate 
competitive advantage. Whereas tangible resources can be seen or touched—and thus 
more easily replicated—intangibles are often secretive and difficult to replicate (Hall, 
1992). Undergirding the resources themselves, Barney (2002) also highlights the 
importance of a firm’s organizational structure in leveraging potentially valuable 
resources. 
Resources in Sport, Entertainment, & Leisure 
 The RBV and the processes of resource classification have garnered significant 
attention in sport management, and their importance to the field has been well 
documented (Gerrard, 2003; 2005). Amis, Pant, and Slack (1997) made the first direct 
advocacy for the use of the RBV in sport sponsorship research and provided a theoretical 
framework for this process. Gerrard (2003; 2005) lobbied for the importance of 
resource-based thinking in sport management, with a few notable investigators heeding 
this advice. First, Smart and Wolfe (2000) highlighted the role of intangible resources 
like history, relationships, trust, and culture in the generation of competitive advantage 
for NCAA programs. The authors concluded that it was intangible resources that enabled 
the existence of tangible resources like new stadiums, state-of-the-art workout facilities, 
and updated athletic dormitories. Amis (2003) further accentuated the importance of 
intangible resources, documenting how non-sport businesses can strategically manage 
intangible resources like reputation and image by partnering with prominent sport 
organizations. Walker and Mercado (2016) investigated whether a professional sport 
organization’s commitment to environmental responsibility (ER) could be an intangible 
resource generative of competitive advantage. Their analysis concluded that ER was 
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likely not regarded as a valuable intangible resource by stadium managers. 
Andrikopolulos and Kaimenakis (2009) created an intellectual capital map of a football 
club’s value-creating intangible resources such as talent, fan base involvement, and team 
performance. This approach is poignant given the multidimensional nature of intangible 
resources. Finally, results from Won and Chelladurai (2016) showed that collegiate 
athletic departments’ intangible resources enable the creation of tangible resources. 
 While these investigations of intangible resources in sport have helped guide 
theoretical advancement for the field, questions naturally remain as to the 
generalizability of these works. While these works have demonstrated support for the 
idea that intangibles are important for sport organizations (i.e., either professional or 
collegiate), they adopted a narrow view of ‘sport’, which inhibits researchers’ ability to 
build generalizable theory. It would be interesting to investigate whether the same 
intangible resources that are integral for passively-consumed sport products (i.e., 
professional and collegiate organizations) also help other sport sectors gain a 
performance advantage. Golf courses, ski lodges, campgrounds and RV parks, sport 
equipment manufacturers, athletic apparel and sneaker manufacturers, digital sport 
content producers, and many other subsectors of sport could benefit from a more 
generalized investigation of intangible resources in the sport industry. Another benefit of 
adopting this approach is the availability of public company financial data, which can 
help researchers gain objective and consistent insights about firms’ resource bundles 
across multiple sub-sectors. 
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Hypothesis Development 
 Management scholars (Galbreath, 2005; Godfrey & Hill, 1995; Hall, 1992; 
Villalonga, 2004) and some sport management scholars (Andrikopolulos & Kaimenakis, 
2009; Amis, 2003; Smart & Wolfe, 2000; Walker & Mercado, 2013; Won & 
Chelladurai, 2016) have documented a positive relationship between intangible 
resources and performance-related outcomes. For passive sport consumption products, 
many theoretical frameworks and empirical analyses (see Funk, 2017; Gladden, Irwin, & 
Sutton, 2001) have emphasized the importance of intangibles like brand equity and 
consumer relationships for modern sport organizations. However, much less is known 
about other sectors of sport, which can vary considerably in terms of product type and 
value proposition (Pitts, Fielding, & Miller, 1994). 
 Tong and Hawley (2009) provide some direction in their analysis of brand 
loyalty’s effect on brand equity for athletic apparel manufacturers. In this analysis, the 
authors documented a significant and positive association between the two constructs. 
While brand equity is not in and of itself a measure of financial performance, brand 
equity has been shown to be an important predictor of firm financial performance (Kim 
& Kim, 2004). However, the goal of this analysis is to draw a more direct linkage 
between intangible resources and sport firm performance. Thus, the baseline hypothesis 
proposed in this manuscript appears below: 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of intangible resources on firm performance will be positive. 
However, there is a conceptual issue associated with investigating Hypothesis 1. 
Investigating such a relationship in isolation would preclude researchers’ ability to make 
comparative judgments about a sport firms’ intangible resources. In other words, there 
36 
 
 
might be a positive relationship documented, but how does that influence compare to 
other resources the firm has at its disposal? Perhaps there are other resource categories 
that contribute more strongly to performance than intangibles. If that were the case, 
devoting attention to the acquisition of intangibles at the expense of other types of 
resources would not be in the firm’s best interest. To address this, there is a need to 
hypothesize about the nature of tangible resources in relation to intangible resources in 
order to provide academicians and practitioners a basis for comparison. Wernerfelt 
(1984) and other scholars (Hall, 1993) have speculated that intangible resources are 
likely more generative of competitive advantage than tangible resources because they are 
not as easily transferrable between firms. However, tangible resources are still a source 
of value for all firms – both financially and strategically (Galbreath, 2005; Knight & 
Cavusgil, 2004). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of tangible resources on firm performance will be positive, but 
not as strong as the effect of intangible resources. 
While the types of resources a firm possesses are important predictors of 
performance, the management literature has highlighted other internal and external 
factors that affect firm level outcomes. The things firms do internally to position 
themselves strategically while considering the external competitive environment is 
referred to as the contingency perspective of organizations (Donaldson, 2001). This 
‘matching’ of internal and external environments has been shown to impact 
performance in some contexts (Donaldson, 2001; Hofer, 1975). Therefore, investigating 
the roles of: (a) competitive positioning and (b) market environment, as these represent 
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the influence of a firm’s internal and external environments, is critical to a thorough 
investigation of resource deployment.  
Internally, firms adopt one of two generic strategies: (1) cost leadership and (2) 
differentiation (Porter, 1980). Cost leadership entails providing a product to consumers 
at a reasonable price while minimizing costs, and differentiation entails passing costs 
associated with production of a premiere product along to the consumer (Porter, 1980). 
Sport consumers have high bargaining power thanks to an innumerable number of 
substitutes for allocation of their discretionary income and leisure time (Amis, 2003). 
Options for leisure activities are numerous and can include any activity a person can 
engage in outside of compulsory time demands. Examples include traveling, playing 
sports, watching television, surfing the internet, learning a new hobby, going to dinner 
with friends and family, and volunteering. Moreover, consumers engage in these 
activities with the intent of finding relaxation, eustress, excitement, and emotional 
fulfillment (Fink & Trail, 2002; Trail & James, 2001). The expressed intent of adopting 
a differentiation strategy is to creatively produce strong emotional responses like those 
aforementioned (Porter, 1980; Animesh & Viswanathan, 2011) – so it is natural to 
assume that cost leadership should not be as effective a strategy as differentiation. 
Firms that are differentiated in ways that are perceived as valuable should see greater 
success in this particular set of industries. Therefore, Hypotheses 3 and 4 are proposed: 
Hypothesis 3: Competing as a cost leader will moderate (weaken) the relationship in 
H1. 
Hypothesis 4: Competing as a cost leader will moderate (weaken) the relationship in 
H2. 
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Last, it is important to consider the role of the firm’s external environment. There 
is a consensus in the strategic management literature regarding the co-dependence of 
firms’ strategies, performance, and the cyclical nature of market environments 
(Bamiatzi & Kirchmaier, 2014). In fact, a firm’s market environment has been shown to 
predict as much as 20% of its performance (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2008). Market 
environment is certainly a nebulous concept that can take on a multitude of meanings. 
In this analysis, it is operationalized using the logic of industry life cycles. For example, 
growth, maturation, and decline are the three main stages industries experience 
(Audretsch & Feldman, 1996), and these stages can influence firms’ performance 
(Klepper, 1997). Firms competing in high-growth industries can perform well 
financially even when internal mechanisms are awry, and a lukewarm or declining 
industry can hinder firms with even the very best internal environments (Slater & 
Narver, 1994; McDougall, Covin, Robinson, & Herron, 1994). Using this logic, the 
analysis proposes: 
Hypothesis 5: A high-growth market will moderate (strengthen) the relationship in H1. 
Hypothesis 6: A high-growth market will moderate (strengthen) the relationship in H2. 
Method 
Sample 
The unbalanced panel dataset was obtained by gathering publically available 
accounting data from the Compustat database. The search process generated a sample of 
N=2,708 firm-year observations tied to 243 firms in five sport subsectors between 1993 
and 2015. These subsectors were identified using four-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes. All subsectors fell under the two-digit SIC code 79, which is 
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classified as “Amusement and Recreation Products/Services”. Examples of firms in 
these five subsectors include camp grounds and RV parks, sports marketing and 
promotions firms, event management and operations entities, athlete 
representation/agents, golf courses and country clubs, winter sport lodges, and athletic 
clubs and gyms. These specific sectors were chosen because they are all actively-
consumed products and services that fit Pitts (1988) description of ‘sport’ as “any 
activity, experience, or enterprise for which the primary focus is fitness, recreation, 
athletics, and leisure related” (p. 18). 
Base Function 
 Scores on the left hand side dependent variable are hypothesized to be a function 
of a vector of control variables, a firm’s intangible resources, tangible resources, internal 
competitive positioning, and the external environment it competes in. This relationship is 
depicted in Equation (2.1) below: 
(2.1) Yjit = β0 + [βkControlsjit] + β1Intangiblesjit + β2Tangiblesjit + β3CPjit + 
β4EEit + ejit + ųit  
 Where Yjit is the dependent variable, β0 is a constant term, βkControlsji are the beta 
coefficients for a vector of control variables, e jit is a panel-level disturbance term, and ų 
it is a sector-level disturbance term. 
Empirical Approach 
The dual influence of firm- and industry-level effects on firm performance 
imbedded in the hypotheses requires the use of a multilevel modeling approach. Dixon 
and Cunningham (2006) pointed to the benefits of this class of statistical approaches in 
sport management research specifically. In this instance, Allison’s (2005) ‘hybrid 
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approach’ was utilized. Due to the nature of panel data, the variance in an outcome 
variable can theoretically stem from multiple sources. The first source of variance comes 
from changes in firms’ internal environments over time. An example of this would be a 
Firm A implementing a corporate strategy that necessitated an increase in their 
intellectual property investments relative to previous years. The other source of variance 
in panel data is sourced from baseline heterogeneities in one firm with respect to other 
firms. In keeping with the prior example, perhaps Firm A’s competitor, Firm B, has 
always invested more in intellectual property than Firm A, and likely will continue to do 
so for the foreseeable future. In this way, a ‘high’ degree of intellectual property 
investment for Firm A might be a relatively ‘low’ amount of intellectual property 
investment for Firm B. 
Traditional methods to investigate panel data have trouble disentangling these 
two sources of variance. Fixed-effects models generate estimates based only on within-
firm variance over time, and random-effects models generate estimates based on the 
combined within- and between-firm variance. Accordingly, the hybrid approach 
partitions the within- and between-firm variance into two independent coefficients 
(Certo, Withers, & Semadeni, 2017). This is especially important for the empirical 
investigation of theories that are multilevel by nature, such as contingency theory in 
strategy and sport management. 
To isolate variance stemming from heterogeneities between firms, the hybrid 
approach entails cluster-mean centering each variable and then computing deviation 
scores for each observation. In this case, a ‘cluster’ is a group of firms with the same 
four-digit SIC code. In this way, the approach can compare a focal firm’s score on a 
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given variable to the sector’s mean in that year, producing a measure of how far away 
from the sector average a focal firm was. Then, the same process is executed at the panel 
level (i.e., at the firm level over time). A mean score for each firm over the entire time 
frame is computed, and a given variable’s score in a focal year can be compared via 
deviation score to the firm’s average over time. 
In this way, individually gauging the influence of firm- and sector-level effects 
on the outcome variable is viable. When computing interactions, the recommendations 
of Schunk (2013) were followed by generating the interaction terms before cluster- and 
panel-mean centering the interaction variables. Last, robust standard errors are specified, 
which are intended to account for heteroskedasticity in longitudinal datasets 
(Wooldridge, 2010). 
Measurement 
For transparency, all variables included in the models are provided in Table 2.1. 
However, some of the more poignant variables require additional explanation here. The 
outcome variable, performance, was measured by calculating a firms’ return on assets 
(ROA) in each year (i.e., ROA= Net Income/Total Assets). This is a commonly used 
performance metric in strategy, accounting, and other branches of management 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).  
The first independent variable, intangible resources, was measured as a ratio of a 
firms’ intangible resources to the firm’s total assets in that year. To compute this 
measure, the line items for ‘intangible resources’ and ‘goodwill’ are first summed, and 
then that total is divided by the ‘total current assets’ line item. Intangible resources and 
goodwill are two line items included in firms’ balance sheets that account for value that 
42 
 
 
is not directly observable or separately identifiable. To calculate goodwill, firms 
typically subtract the fair market value of identifiable assets and liabilities attached to a 
newly-purchased assets from the actual purchase price. Intangibles, similarly, can 
include non-observable value attributed to intellectual property, brand awareness, market 
share, supply chain relationships, artistic talent, and proprietary technology. Together, 
these two line items encompass all of a firm’s intangible assets. 
The second independent variable, tangible resources, was computed in a similar 
fashion by summing the firm’s ‘cash’, ‘cash equivalents’, ‘invested capital’, ‘retained 
earnings’, ‘inventories’, ‘receivables’, and ‘property/plant/land/equipment’ line items, 
and dividing by ‘total current assets’. ‘Total current assets’ was used as a denominator in 
these two measures because it best captures the sum total of resources that are available 
to a firm in the short term (i.e., <18 months). The focus, therefore, is on the relatively 
short-term availability of resources when calculating these measures. 
The first moderator, competitive positioning, refers to a firm’s intent to compete 
as a cost leader or a differentiator. Cost leaders attempt to reduce costs in order to 
produce acceptable products at a reasonable price (Porter, 1980). By contrast, 
differentiators aim to produce high-quality products and in turn, tend to offer products at 
a comparatively higher price point than their competitors. A firm’s competitive 
positioning is measured using each firm’s equity turnover in a given year. Equity 
turnover is computed by dividing sales by average stockholders’ equity and has been 
regarded as an indication of what type of business a firm is engaged in (Little & Rhodes, 
2010). Further, Little and Rhodes (2010) claimed that firms with high equity turnover 
tend to have low margins, and firms with low equity turnover tend to have high margins. 
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Using Porter’s (1980) logic that cost leaders typically have low margins and 
differentiators have high margins, it was deduced that differentiators will tend to have 
low equity turnover, and cost leaders will have high equity turnover. 
As a caveat to this measurement strategy, it is important to keep in mind that two 
accounting metrics in particular can influence the amount of equity turnover a firm 
reports. The first is the proportion of debt carried by the firm, alternatively referred to as 
‘leverage’. Some firms prefer to carry greater portions of debt, while others refrain from 
this practice. The second is the firm’s ratio of current assets to current liabilities (i.e., 
current ratio), which also varies within and between firms for a number of reasons. Both 
of these ratios likely affect equity turnover because both of them impact how much 
equity a firm has that can be devoted to the purpose of generating revenue. Therefore, to 
control for these two influences, the firms’ debt to equity ratio as well as the firms’ 
current ratio are included as a control in the analysis. 
The second moderator, external environment, was measured in accordance with 
prior studies investigating the same phenomena (Karniouchina, Carson, Short, & 
Ketchen, 2013). This approach first requires the specification of a latent-state Markov 
switching model that classifies each subsector (i.e., each 4-digit SIC code) into one of 
two industry stages: (1) growth phase or (2) non-growth phase. These measures are 
based on aggregate yearly sales data for that subsector. These models, first articulated by 
Hamilton (1989), allow for industries to experience ‘bumps’ and ‘recycles’ that are 
typical of real-world industry life cycles. The measure is a coefficient bounded between 
0 and 1 and represents the likelihood that the subsector is in a growth phase in that year. 
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As for other controls not mentioned earlier, a list of variables are included in the 
partial model. They are designed to help increase the validity and reliability of results, 
whereby concerns have been raised related to: (a) the use of ratio variables in strategic 
management research (Wiseman, 2009) and (b) the analysis of panel data (Wooldridge, 
2010) that can be addressed by including certain variables in a first-stage model. First, 
there are mathematical issues associated with using ratios in many statistical analyses 
(Kronmal, 1993). Recent contributions have suggested that the inclusion of the ratio’s 
numerator and denominator in the model as individual terms is the best way to handle 
this issue (Wiseman, 2009). Therefore, the control model includes debt, stockholder’s 
equity (SEQ), D/E ratio, net income, total assets, total current assets, the summed value 
of tangible resources, and the summed value of intangible resources. Last, to account for 
autoregression-induced endogeneity common in panel data (Wooldridge, 2010), one-
year lagged values of ROA are included in the model. 
Results 
 Bivariate correlations are presented in Table 2.2 and summary statistics for all 
the variables are presented in Table 2.3. Correlations between theoretically-relevant 
variables are all low. Subsequent examination of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
revealed that none of them exceeded a value of 10, and the mean of the complete set was 
1.01, well below the recommended upper limit of 5 (Hair et al., 1998). Based on these 
preliminary tests, there is little reason to suspect collinearty issues with the data. 
 Table 2.4 depicts the results from the hybrid model. First, the results of Model 1 
indicate that the control variables predict proportion of variance in the outcome variable 
that is statistically significant from zero (R2 = .338; F(18, 1586) = .453; p = .000). 
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Therefore, it was concluded that the control variables were able to parse out a decent 
proportion of variance un-attributable to the variables of interest. Thus, attention is given 
to Models 2 and 3. Model 2, which includes the predictors of interest, accounted for 
49.6% of the variance in firm performance (R2 Overall= .496, F(30,1574)=52.127, 
p=.0000). Additionally, Model 3 was helpful in predicting additional variance in ROA 
beyond that of Model 2 (ΔR2 = .003; F(34,1570) = 46.5; p = .031). Therefore, the 
coefficients in Model 2 are suitable for the investigation of Hypotheses 1 and 2, and the 
coefficients in Model 3 are suitable for the investigation of the interaction terms in 
Hypotheses 3-6. 
 In Hypothesis 1, the analysis was designed to predict a firm’s performance from 
its intangible resource base. The coefficient for within-firm intangible resources was 
positive and significant (β=.022, t=13.28, p=.000). This means that, holding all else 
constant, when a firm increased its intangible resources proportion by 1%, it was 
associated with, on average, .02% greater ROA. Examination of the coefficient for 
between-firm intangible resources depicts a similar trend. The coefficient was also 
positive and significant (β=.014, t=17.03, p=.000). This implies that given two firms that 
differed by 1% on intangible resources ratio, the one with the greater intangible resource 
ratio was associated with, on average, .014% more ROA, ceteris paribus. Therefore, 
both coefficients support Hypothesis 1.  
Second, Hypothesis 2 was designed to examine (a) whether tangible resources 
had a positive effect on firm performance, and (b) whether the effect was smaller in 
magnitude than that of intangibles. The coefficients for within-firm tangible resources 
and between-firm tangible resources were not statistically significant (β=1.9, t=.63, 
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p=.529 and β=-.849, t=-.21, p=.837, respectively). Moreover, their opposite signs 
indicate the lack of a consistent trend for intra- and inter-firm effects. Because there was 
not a positive relationship documented between tangible resources and performance, the 
first requirement of Hypothesis 2 was not supported. However, implicit in the lack of a 
relationship is the conclusion that intangible resources still had a documentable positive 
effect on performance relative to tangibles. Therefore, there is guarded support for the 
second stipulation in Hypothesis 2. 
Hypotheses 3 was designed to examine whether competing as a cost leader 
would weaken the positive relationship in H1. The full model containing the interaction 
effects will help assess this. The coefficients for the interaction terms relating to 
intangible resources and competitive positioning were both examined. Recall that the 
competitive positioning variable was calculated such that lower values connoted 
differentiation, and higher values connoted cost leadership. Neither of these coefficients 
were significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
Hypotheses 4 was designed to examine whether competing as a cost leader 
would weaken the positive relationship in H2. To investigate this, the pair of coefficients 
for the interaction between tangible resources and competitive positioning was 
examined. Like the coefficients in Hypothesis 3, neither of these was statistically 
significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was not supported. Taken together, the results of the 
investigation of competitive positioning appeared to show that the effect of competitive 
positioning on firm performance is not present at all in this sample. 
Hypothesis 5 was designed to examine the influence of a firm’s external 
environment on firm performance. Specifically, it was proposed that sector-level growth 
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would strengthen the relationship in H1. Both coefficients relating to the interaction 
effect of intangible resources and sector growth were not significant, so it was concluded 
that hypothesis 5 was not supported by this analysis. 
Last, Hypothesis 6 was designed to examine whether sector growth would 
strengthen the relationship in H2. That is, it set out to examine whether increasing a 
firm’s proportion of tangible resources would experience better performance during a 
growth phase than during a stagnation phase. Of the pair of interactions investigating 
this, only the ‘within’ partition was significant (β= -.164, z= -3.04, p=.002), which 
suggests that if a firm amassed 1% more tangible resources during a period of sector 
growth, performance decreased by .164% on average, ceteris paribus. This is the 
opposite of what was hypothesized in H6, so support for Hypothesis 6 was not found. 
Discussion and Implications 
The results generate three discussion points. First, the investigation successfully 
showed that the importance of intangible resources in sport can be generalized beyond 
the professional sport organization and collegiate sport contexts. Sport consumers in 
these ancillary subsectors allocate discretionary spending to leisure activities that 
generate feelings of relaxation, eustress, comradery, and excitement (Fink & Trail, 2002; 
Trail & James, 2001). In this way, the products and services offered by the leisure 
industry and its subsidiaries are experiential and nonessential. This discussion point has 
implications for the theory of sport consumer behavior. In the most recent addition to 
this body of literature, Funk (2017) outlined a model of sport consumer behavior that is 
predicated on sport managers’ ability to think of the sport landscape as a series of 
managed experiences. Pine and Gilmore’s (1999) notion of the experience economy 
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inspires much of this perspective, specifying how experiences are as different from 
services as services are from products. A consumer’s experience with a brand refers to 
their entire brand journey, beginning with the first exposure. This timeline can be years 
or decades long. Moreover, consumer adoption of digital technologies means that more 
frequent, diverse, and subtle touch points exist, which provide additional avenues for 
sport consumer interactions. 
Funk (2017) speaks to the importance of managing experiences in sport in a 
digital age. However, the theoretical focus in this piece—and in much of the sport 
consumer behavior literature—is on professional sport and collegiate athletic programs. 
This investigation, by contrast, highlighted the need to propose sector-specific theories 
and hypothesis-testing of resource deployment for other sport sectors. Intuitively, some 
of this academic work will be applicable across sectors, while other theories and 
analyses will only apply to specific sport sectors. In the case of Hypothesis 1, the 
analysis revealed that Funk’s (2017) sport experience model can be applied across sport 
sectors. Future work in active sport consumption can investigate the specific extent to 
which intangibles influence consumer perceptions for this sport sector, as well as 
uncover the degree to which consumers actively consider intangibles when they 
participate in active sport consumption. 
Because sport sectors that do not have much to do with the professional and 
collegiate sport ecosystem have been shown to be affected similarly by intangible 
resources, those responsible for providing active sport consumption products should 
begin to think more critically about managing their consumers’ brand journey. In other 
words, engendering a strong emotional response from consumers should not be reserved 
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for passively-consumed sport products and brands, although it is perhaps easier in these 
segments. Rather, golf courses, gyms, campgrounds, hiking trails, RV parks, recreation 
leagues, and the like can find benefit by devoting attention to intangible resources such 
as intellectual property, brand enhancement efforts, supplier and buyer relationships, 
leadership and human resources development, and corporate culture. 
 The importance of intangibles for these ancillary sport sectors has implications 
for the world of sport entrepreneurship as well. Sport entrepreneurship is a line of 
scholarly research that positions sport as a catalyst for entrepreneurial activity (Ratten, 
2011).  
 In non-sport industries, entrepreneurship is difficult and risky due to startups’ 
relative inability to compete with incumbents due to a lack of important intangible 
resources like brand awareness, consumer confidence, and brand equity (Morris, 
Schindehutte, & LaForge, 2002). Developing these intangibles is difficult because 
business sectors like manufacturing, logistics and distribution, and retail have trouble 
integrating with social and cultural structures.  
 However, sport enjoys the advantage of being interwoven into the tapestry of 
many cultures and societies (Smith & Westerbeek, 2007). As such, sport can be a 
powerful vehicle for deploying entrepreneurial endeavors that seek financial success and 
social change simultaneously (Ratten, 2010). Porter and Kramer (2011) refer to meeting 
these dual objectives in a business environment as the shared value perspective. This 
makes sport-related startups a particularly interesting class of ventures for investors and 
entrepreneurs looking to achieve scalability while generating social capital. In such a 
case, the social component imbedded in many sport startups can be the driving force that 
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generates intangible resources that in turn enable the startup to disrupt the status quo in 
an industry. 
  Future research in sport entrepreneurship can benefit from investigating how 
sport startups generate and deploy intangibles in an effort to compete and grow. First, 
research could examine whether sport entrepreneurs acknowledge and attempt to 
interweave social components into their venture’s value propositions. Second, this 
research could disentangle the importance of resource categories for sport startups. As 
important as intangibles were for this sample of established firms, perhaps other classes 
of resources – like office space, technology systems, and financial capital – are more 
indicative of success for sport startups. From this research, sport entrepreneurs can learn 
how to optimally cultivate and deploy these highly-valued resources. This research 
would also benefit venture capitalists looking to make investments in sport startups, 
because investing in these sectors requires unique considerations not innate to non-sport 
investments (Ratten, 2014). 
The second discussion point relates to the fact that the results suggest that 
differentiation in these sport sectors is less important than for mainstream (i.e., passively 
consumed) sport sectors. Recall that firms saw no increases in performance when they 
increased their tangible or intangible resources while competing as differentiators. The 
lack of a significant and positive interaction with differentiation strategies is consistent 
with the nature of these ancillary sport sectors. In traditional sport sectors, differentiation 
is important because experiences must stand out in many ways in order to compete for 
consumers’ attention spans. In order to increase fans’ experiential value in traditional 
sport sectors, firms must provide and actively manage an experience that is truly rare 
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(Funk, 2016). In those sectors, committing to a differentiation strategy via a strong 
market orientation is an important factor in sowing performance advantages. However, 
in this sample, the effects of differentiation were nonexistent, both as an individual 
predictor in Model 2 and as an interaction component in Model 3. This suggests that 
sport consumers desire different brand and product attributes based on the type of sport 
activity being consumed. For passive consumption modes, such as watching or listening 
to a golf broadcast, a differentiated experience is foremost in their minds. But, for active 
consumption modes—such as playing a round of golf—more traditional market 
dynamics like price and convenience likely matter more. 
The intersection of passive versus active sport consumption is an area of future 
research that can be informed by the results of this study. In general, consumers’ 
coupling of passive consumption modes with active consumption modes can enhance 
personal ownership of a sport property and entrench feelings of brand loyalty (Wheaton, 
2004). Passively-consumed and actively-consumed sport products are joined by their 
ability to evoke similar sets of emotions in consumers. Having similar objectives means 
that both sets of sectors could augment performance by introducing a set of products that 
are the opposite of their established product typology.  This means that passive sport 
products could introduce a complementary set of active sport products—for example, the 
NBA could introduce franchise-branded recreation basketball leagues in its major 
metropolitan areas. These could be designed to parlay NBA fans’ love for watching elite 
players into an exciting, competitive participatory atmosphere that also seeks to address 
the United States’ obesity epidemic. Based on the finding that competing as a 
differentiator was not generative of performance advantages, sport firms looking to 
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expand in this fashion can likely do so without overinvesting in a differentiation 
strategy. Competing on cost enabled by savvy brand extensions, economies of scale, and 
other operational synergies is likely a viable approach. 
Third, the results of the analysis will require a re-examination of the influence of 
sector growth on firm performance for these sectors. The results of the hybrid regression 
implied that amassing more tangible resources during a time of sector growth negatively 
impacted performance. This was the opposite of the effect outlined in H6. While the 
presence of a low growth sector does flatten the slope slightly, a subsequent test for the 
significance of the slope differential revealed that the slopes were not statistically 
different from one another (t (3206) =.07, p=.937). Therefore, the analysis did not provide 
strong evidence for the existence of an effect of sector growth on performance in any 
capacity. 
Notably, the general trend exhibited in this analysis between sector growth and 
performance is not inconsistent with some prior research. Despite the nature of 
contingency theories of the firm, some empirical investigations have found little support 
for the proposition that a firm’s competitive environment has an effect on the 
relationship between firms’ internal environment and performance. In other words, while 
sector-level factors should help predict firm performance theoretically, empirical studies 
have tempered that idea somewhat (Bahadir, Bharadwaj, & Parzen, 2009; Jaworski and 
Kohli, 1992; Pelham, 2000; Slater and Narver, 1994). These authors argue that firms 
cannot be expected to adjust operational components based on external factors that they 
cannot control or forecast with consistency. Even if business leaders could forecast the 
future of an industry with certainty, altering operations is a time consuming and costly 
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process (Slater & Narver, 1994). In that respect, the analysis conducted here produced 
results that are consistent with this prior research. 
On the other hand, another potential explanation for the negative moderating 
impact of sector growth is consistent with contingency theory. Perhaps firms invest more 
aggressively in organic growth when their sector is cash flow positive. Firms engage in 
organic growth when they reinvest earned capital back into the business by enhancing 
buildings and infrastructure, acquiring new intellectual property, advancing their 
approach to human resources, and synergizing operational processes. Increasing the 
value of a firm’s assets in these ways would drive down the firm’s ROA, even if net 
income grew over the same time period. Understanding and documenting how business 
leaders in these sectors respond to sector-level influences may constitute a significant 
avenue of future research. In traditional sport sectors, performance indices are driven by 
television viewership—the revenues from which are distributed evenly to teams in a 
division or league (Miller, 2016). This creates a natural up swell in the financial health 
and wealth of professional sport organizations and collegiate programs that can 
counteract otherwise poor performance. In the sectors examined here, though, revenue 
sharing is not an industry practice, so other theories of sector-level influence need to be 
considered. 
Limitations 
 This study contained limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results. First, while there are many benefits to using accounting data to generate 
proxies for theoretical constructs, there are also some natural shortcomings. There are 
notable differences between the ways firms decide to record different types of financial 
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data. What qualifies as ‘intangibles and goodwill’ in one firm’s accounting methods 
might not qualify in a competitor’s methods. Moreover, financial statements tend to 
include footnotes that serve to modify the meaning and financial implications of certain 
line items. Given the database’s limitations, the impact of these data’s footnotes is 
impossible to know and thus cannot be accounted for. 
 Second, there are some limitations related to the proxy for competitive 
positioning. First, the amount of equity turnover a firm records on the balance sheet is 
typically the result of dozens of factors in addition to the firm’s leverage and current 
ratio, which are likely unique to each firm and cannot be modeled without a degree of 
error. While this analysis did control for debt, current ratio, and firm-level 
heterogeneities with the use of a hybrid model, these techniques do not likely eliminate 
the reservations around using equity turnover as a measure of competitive strategy. 
 Specifically, there are likely other ways of measuring how firms’ decide to 
compete that could be integrated into an econometric approach. The construct of a firm’s 
business strategy is in and of itself multifaceted. Thus, certain psychometric approaches 
could potentially capture the construct more robustly. A line of scholarship has provided 
avenues forward in this regard (Hillman & Kaliappen, 2014). However, gaining access 
to a suitable sample of executives with working knowledge of a firm’s overall business 
strategy remains an obstacle to this approach. 
Conclusion 
 This manuscript investigated the role of tangible and intangible resources, 
competitive positioning, and the external environment in predicting performance for 
non-traditional sport sectors. Using the accounting data from 243 firms between 1993 
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and 2015, the results indicated that intangible resources have a positive and significant 
effect on performance. Moreover, this effect was stronger in magnitude than that of 
tangible resources. Second, the moderating effects of competing as a differentiator were 
not significant and thus did not predict performance for this sample of firms. But, it was 
noted that when firms increased their tangible resource base during a time of sector 
growth, performance suffered. These results were discussed and their implications for 
researchers and practitioners outlined. Last, the manuscript documents two challenges 
that were faced, stemming from the nature of accounting data. 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 2.1. Variable names, abbreviations, and descriptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviation Description
1 Return on Assets ROA Net Income divided by total current assets
2 Debt to Equity Ratio D/E Total Debt divided by Stockholder's Equity
3 Current Ratio CR Current Assets dividded by Current Liabilities (CL)
3 Net Income NI Revenues less costs of doing business
4 Total Assets Total Assets Sum of all current and noncurrent assets
5 Total Current Assets TCA Sum of all current assets
6 Lagged ROA Lagged ROA Net Income divided by total current assets in year t-1
7 Growth Growth Lilliehood that a subsector is in a growth stage based on aggregate yearly sales activity
8 Competative Positioning CP Equity turnover; deviation score within firm
9 Ingangible Resource Ratio Intangibles (Goodwill + Intangibles) / Total Curent Assets
10 Tangible Resource Ratio Tangibles
(Cash + Cash Equivalents + Invested Capital + Retained Earnings + Inventories + 
Recievables + Property/Plant/Land/Equipment) / Total Current Assets
Variable
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Table 2.2. Bivariate Correlations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
1 ROA 1.00
2 Debt within 0.00 1.00
3 Debt between 0.03 0.05 1.00
4 SEQ within 0.00 0.25 0.05 1.00
5 SEQ between 0.03 0.05 0.78 0.06 1.00
6 D/E within 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.00
7 D/E between 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.08 1.00
8 Current Liabilities within 0.00 0.23 0.02 -0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.00 1.00
9 Current Liabilities between 0.03 0.04 0.89 0.04 0.79 0.00 -0.01 0.02 1.00
10 Current Ratio within 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 1.00
11 Current Ratio between 0.04 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.09 1.00
12 Net Income within 0.00 -0.29 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.20 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00
13 Net Income between 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.02 1.00
14 Total Assets within 0.00 0.92 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.16 0.05 1.00
15 Total Assets between 0.03 0.05 0.98 0.05 0.87 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.92 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.26 0.06 1.00
16 TCA within 0.00 0.64 0.05 0.38 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.77 0.05 1.00
17 TCA between 0.03 0.04 0.77 0.05 0.90 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.90 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.51 0.05 0.85 0.06 1.00
18 Tangibles within 0.00 0.78 0.06 0.74 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.87 0.07 0.75 0.06 1.00
19 Tangibles between 0.03 0.05 0.92 0.06 0.95 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.88 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.47 0.07 0.97 0.06 0.91 0.08 1.00
20 Intangibles within 0.00 0.71 0.02 0.26 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.29 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.22 0.00 0.76 0.02 0.47 0.01 0.59 0.02 1.00
21 Intangibles between 0.03 0.02 0.78 0.02 0.53 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.83 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.22 0.02 0.77 0.01 0.58 0.02 0.64 0.02 1.00
22 Lagged ROA within 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
23 Lagged ROA between 0.37 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00
24 Growth within 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.00 0.03 1.00
25 Growth between 0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.12 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.04 1.00
26 CP within 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
27 CP between 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.30 -0.04 1.00
28 IRR within 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00
29 IRR between 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.02 1.00
30 TRR within 0.39 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 -0.02 1.00
31 TRR between 0.32 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.10 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.16 0.10 1.00
32 IRR*CP within 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.85 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
33 IRR*CP between 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.03 0.88 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 1.00
34 TRR*CP within -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.15 0.80 0.02 1.00
35 TRR*CP between 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.46 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.23 0.01 0.51 -0.43 1.00
36 IRR*Growth within 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00
37 IRR*Growth between 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.58 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00
38 TRR*Growth within 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.03 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.11 -0.17 0.04 0.00 1.00
39 TRR*Growth between 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.58 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Variable
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Table 2.3. Summary Statistics 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 ROA 2200 -1.80 25.28 -759.33 5.75
2 Debt within 1810 0.00 1032.62 -8911.29 13287.61
3 Debt between 1810 572.94 1537.18 0.00 9835.69
4 SEQ within 1810 0.00 469.32 -6402.53 5221.37
5 SEQ between 1810 293.17 662.47 -309.72 4741.53
6 D/E within 1810 0.00 3.67 -35.12 90.92
7 D/E between 1810 0.54 2.59 0.00 35.12
8 Current Liabilities within 1810 0.00 435.33 -2031.32 16037.73
9 Current Liabilities between 1810 156.33 355.79 0.12 2242.27
10 Current Ratio within 1810 0.00 3.42 -22.33 95.90
11 Current Ratio between 1810 1.77 1.95 0.00 24.12
12 Net Income within 1810 0.00 265.00 -4912.15 6205.05
13 Net Income between 1810 7.19 92.51 -306.55 859.66
14 Total Assets within 1810 0.00 1671.11 -15761.97 15182.10
15 Total Assets between 1810 1151.63 2819.12 0.03 16902.72
16 TCA within 1810 0.00 281.89 -2958.23 2453.20
17 TCA between 1810 178.28 433.51 0.00 3170.47
18 Tangibles within 1810 0.00 1719.21 -17688.64 13790.22
19 Tangibles between 1810 1144.13 2811.41 -1452.22 19387.66
20 Intangibles within 1810 0.00 755.84 -6042.05 8983.53
21 Intangibles between 1810 323.00 927.05 0.00 17495.21
22 Lagged ROA within 1605 0.00 9.60 -209.93 108.57
23 Lagged ROA between 1789 -1.20 9.13 -109.40 0.62
24 Growth within 1810 0.00 0.12 -0.65 0.61
25 Growth between 1810 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.98
26 CP within 1810 0.00 72.80 -594.44 2242.93
27 CP between 1810 5.14 34.34 -128.91 346.81
28 IRR within 1810 0.00 7.02 -41.68 245.78
29 IRR between 1810 1.83 3.96 0.00 41.68
30 TRR within 1810 0.00 572.15 -14564.94 3337.90
31 TRR between 1810 -67.27 353.96 -3872.50 1764.04
32 IRR*CP within 1810 0.00 228.03 -1094.65 9130.02
33 IRR*CP between 1810 10.19 80.89 -184.90 950.82
34 TRR*CP within 1810 0.00 1082.50 -21022.62 30597.28
35 TRR*CP between 1810 14.87 769.54 -21022.62 3644.38
36 IRR*Growth within 1810 8E-10 0.532226 -2.251505 13.91141
37 IRR*Growth between 1810 0.1281 0.416022 0 8.375921
38 TRR*Growth within 1810 7E-08 19.84571 -431.535 159.225
39 TRR*Growth between 1810 0.1281 0.416022 0 8.375921
Variable
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Table 2.4. Results of the hierarchical linear regression predicting ROA 
 
 
 
 
β SE t p
Debt within 9E-05 0.002 0.04 0.968
Debt between -0.002 0.004 -0.53 0.596
SEQ within -4E-06 0.003 0 0.999
SEQ between -0.002 0.005 -0.43 0.669
D/E within -0.145 0.13 -1.12 0.263
D/E between 0.266 0.194 1.37 0.171
CL within 3E-05 0.003 0.01 0.992
CL between -0.002 0.011 -0.24 0.813
CR within 0.018 0.139 0.13 0.895
CR between -0.106 0.278 -0.38 0.702
Net Income within 0.000 0.00 0.13 0.900
Net Income between 0.004 0.01 0.27 0.784
Total Assets within 0.000 0.00 -0.01 0.994
Total Assets between 0.002 0.00 0.75 0.454
TCA within 0.000 0.00 -0.01 0.993
TCA between 0.001 0.00 0.24 0.809
Tangibles within 0.000 0.00 -0.03 0.975
Tangibles between -0.001 0.00 -0.35 0.729
Intangibles within 0.000 0.00 0.07 0.947
Intangibles between -0.001 0.00 -0.97 0.333
Lagged ROA within 1.196 0.05 23.26 0.000
Lagged ROA between 1.216 0.07 16.58 0.000
Growth within 0.017 0.03 0.54 0.588
Growth between 0.000 0.01 -0.04 0.972
CP within 0.486 0.14 3.43 0.001
CP between -0.103 0.07 -1.52 0.128
IRR within 0.022 0.00 13.28 0.000
IRR between 0.014 0.00 17.03 0.000
TRR within 1.907 3.03 0.63 0.529
TRR between -0.849 4.14 -0.21 0.837
IRR*CP within 0.002 0.01 0.15 0.882
IRR*CP between -0.003 0.01 -0.51 0.612
TRR*CP within -0.002 0.00 -1.39 0.166
TRR*CP between 0.001 0.00 0.64 0.521
IRR*Growth within -0.686 1.49 -0.46 0.645
IRR*Growth between 0.206 0.92 0.22 0.824
TRR*Growth within -0.164 0.05 -3.04 0.002
TRR*Growth between -0.024 0.03 -0.97 0.334
Constant -0.479 0.69 -0.69 0.49
Block Statistics Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
N 1605 1605 1605
F(18, 1586) 45.3
F(30, 1574) 52.127
F(34, 1570) 46.5
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.338 0.496 0.5018
ΔR2 0.159 0.003
ΔR2 p-value 0.000 0.031
Note: Each block entered heirarchically
Model Estimates
Block 2
Block 1
Block 3
Variable
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CHAPTER III 
EXPLICITLY-OPERATIONALIZED INTANGIBLE RESOURCES:  
LEARNED CAREER EXPERIENCES 
 
Synopsis 
 This manuscript expands the discussion of upper echelon theory (UET) in sport 
by assessing the role of ownership’s functional background in generating firm level 
outcomes. To date, UET research in sport has focused on assessing characteristics of 
head coaches and general managers, and outcomes include those that are observable on 
the field of play. Investigating the characteristics of ownership allows for a broader 
discussion of TMTs’ functional background as well as the examination of important firm 
level outcomes that occur off the field. As such, this approach generates a more 
complete understanding of TMTs in sport as well as the strategic outcomes they can 
generate. In an academic context, exploring the owner-manager dynamic in more detail 
has significant implications for management theories relating to agency theory. Results 
of the empirical investigation indicate that owners with functional backgrounds in 
marketing are associated with positive marketing-related outcomes, such as attendance 
and the consumption of team-specific digital media content. From these results, 
implications are outlined and future research is suggested. 
. 
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Introduction 
 In their quest to explain firm performance, strategic management scholars have 
proposed many important frameworks and perspectives (Hoskisson, Wan, Yiu, & Hitt, 
1999). Among these, Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Hambrick (2007) have 
highlighted that firms’ owners and top management teams (TMT)—collectively, the 
‘upper echelon’—are responsible for the formulation and execution of all strategic 
initiatives. In this way, these authors asserted that investigating the demographic and 
psychometric characteristics of a firm’s upper echelon can be useful in predicting firm-
level outcomes. This perspective has been adopted formally and informally in the 
context of sport. Recent findings indicate that in some situations, demographic and 
personal characteristics of a professional sport franchise’s (PSF) upper echelon can 
impact firm-level outcomes. 
 However, there are two limitations to the extant research in this area worth 
noting. First, research on PSF TMTs to date focus entirely on assessing the 
characteristics of general managers (GM) and head coaches. Correspondingly, the firm-
level performance outcomes investigated are limited in that they are only related to on-
field performance. This is conceptually accurate because GMs and head coaches do not 
make decisions about a broad range of other strategic initiatives unrelated to wins and 
losses. Expectedly, though, this approach is also practically narrow in applicability. 
Second, research has often discussed the prior experience of these TMT members in the 
context of prior job-specific roles. For example, Juravich, Salaga, and Babiak (2017) and 
Peeters, Salaga, and Juravich (2015) only discuss career experience as it relates to 
having held prior front-office roles for GMs and having professional playing experience 
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for head coaches. Again, this is conceptually poignant, but delimits the investigation of 
the many other types of career backgrounds that are represented in a PSF’s boardroom, 
such as experience in finance, marketing, logistics, and law. 
 The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to highlight the nature of the relationships 
between PSF owners’ functional career experience and pertinent firm-level outcomes. 
Through this investigation, the paper makes a number of contributions. First, it expands 
the discussion of upper echelons in sport by investigating the role and influence of 
ownership. Second, the operationalization of the functional background construct in a 
more detailed manner than before will allow for current and future research to 
investigate a comprehensive range of strategic outcomes beyond the field of play. The 
third contribution is an outgrowth of the first two: this paper opens up many avenues for 
the practical applicability of this line of research, as it represents an examination of the 
PSF TMT members with the broadest jurisdiction over strategic initiatives. Governing 
bodies, strategic investors, municipalities, and citizens all have a vested interest in being 
able to predict how an owner will manage a PSF’s strategic initiatives and how those 
initiatives will affect the region’s broader landscape. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, a literature review is provided 
that covers the relevant contributions of upper echelon theory (UET) and how it has been 
applied in a sport setting to date. Then, two hypotheses are developed based on the 
extant literature and the gaps therein. Next, a discussion of the empirical approach used 
in the analysis is presented, and the results are outlined. Then, the implications of those 
results are discussed. Last, the project’s limitations are underlined, and avenues for 
future research are suggested. 
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Literature Review 
Upper Echelon Theory (UET) 
 In attempting to explain firm-level outcomes, management scholars have offered 
more than a few perspectives over the years (for an overview, see Hoskisson et al., 
1999). Within this body of work, agency theorists have argued that the formation and 
execution of strategic moves is tied to the pending approval of ownership (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). This led to Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) and Hambrick’s (2007) 
postulation that a firm’s TMT is the mechanism by which firms decide to enact all of 
their strategic choices. This line of research has proposed that upper echelons are 
responsible for strategy formulation, implementation, and financing, and can therefore 
be associated with firm-level outcomes. Empirical investigations have been robust, and 
collectively support a clear link. For example, investigations have shown that certain 
elements of a TMT such as demographics (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), level of 
heterogeneity (Carpenter, 2002; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996), political affiliation 
(Christensen, Mackey, & Whetten, 2014), and previous experience (Carpenter, Sanders, 
& Gregerson, 2001) all influence firm performance. On an individual level, some have 
studied how CEO traits relate to strategy implementation and corporate performance. 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) demonstrated how CEO narcissism may contribute to 
strategic dynamism and thus highly variable firm performance outcomes. Additionally, 
Taylor, Machado and Peterson (2008) and Nadkarni and Herrmann (2010) empirically 
confirmed that positive psychological CEO traits (i.e., hope, optimism, and resiliency) 
correlate with strategic flexibility. 
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UET in Sport Management 
 UET research has been adopted in sport directly and indirectly. Indirect 
examinations do not formally ground investigations in UET, but do examine head coach 
characteristics such as race and ethnicity (Berri & Simmons, 2009; Goff & Tollison, 
2009; Jewell & Molina, 2005; Kahn, 2006; Longley, 2003; Madden, 2004; Volz, 2013), 
leadership behavior (Weiss & Friedrichs, 1986), as well as psychological attributes 
(MacNamara, Button, & Collins, 2010) on team-level outcomes. Recently, scholars in 
sport management have used UET in a more structured way to investigate and predict 
organization-level outcomes. Wong and Deubert (2010) first provide an exploratory 
overview of the role of general managers (GMs) in professional baseball. Building on 
this, Peeters, Salaga, and Juravich (2015) investigate the role of upper and middle level 
managers on MLB team performance. These authors found that middle managers (head 
coaches) and upper level managers (general managers) both have modest impacts on 
team performance. For middle managers, a deep working knowledge of the team 
members is important, while education from a top tier university was most impactful for 
upper level managers. These findings are consistent with the ideas that middle managers 
need to know more about the personnel they are directly responsible for, while upper-
level managers are more concerned with forming and implementing strategic initiatives. 
A follow up examination by Peters, Salaga, and Juravich (2015) added that accounting 
for organization-person match quality is important when predicting managerial impact. 
Specifically, these authors’ results reinforced the idea that better managers tend to work 
at more efficient firms. Moreover, they found that more talented managers tend to work 
with other high quality managers and be more cooperative. Last, they documented that 
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when upper level managers’ are much more educated than their midlevel counterparts, 
firm performance suffers. Thus, communication might be especially difficult in these 
situations. In the most recent addition to this line of research in sport, Juravich, Salaga, 
and Babiak (2017) found similar trends in a sample of National Basketball Association 
teams and general managers. These studies have been helpful in building a bridge 
between sport management and the upper echelons perspective.  
 Despite the contributory nature of this research, there are two related 
considerations that require more attention in order for this line of research to continue to 
develop. First, these studies neglect to consider the influence of ownership, a group that 
ultimately edicts all resource allocation decisions – on the field of play and otherwise. 
PSF ownership has risen to new levels of popularity in the press, scrutiny in the eyes of 
the public, and general visibility (Blair, 2012). Without a doubt, the public nature and 
cultural prominence of professional sport has awarded a noteworthy amount of celebrity 
to many owners and their families, friends, business partners, and other ventures (Blair, 
2012). An investigation focused on ownership’s role in organization-level outcomes 
would help generate a broader understanding of a franchise’s business-level strategy 
beyond what is observed on the field of play. Second, a focus on ownership would allow 
for an expanded discussion regarding the influence of TMTs’ prior experience on firm 
performance. The referenced studies in this line of work collectively agree that TMT 
members’ experience is important to organization-level outcomes. However, these 
studies often discuss experience in the context of prior job-specific roles. For example, 
Juravich et al. (2017) and Peeters et al. (2015) only discuss career experience as it relates 
to prior front-office roles and professional playing experience (or a lack thereof). 
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 While front office experience and professional playing experience are certainly 
meaningful for GMs and coaches, ownership groups in professional sports are 
susceptible to a broader range of prior career experience as it relates to industries, market 
conditions, firms, and functional roles. A cursory investigation shows that majority 
owners of MLB franchises have backgrounds in a diverse range of industries including 
energy, software development, property development, retail grocery, and art dealing, 
among others. Moreover, these owners have experience working in a range of functional 
categories such as marketing, information technology (IT), operations and logistics, and 
finance (see Table 3.1). In order to form a more robust understanding of how TMTs 
affect performance, it is therefore beneficial to (a) examine ownership characteristics, 
and (b) broaden the way ‘prior experience’ is operationalized. 
Hypothesis Development 
 As mentioned above, prior investigations of TMTs in professional sport consider 
only the role of GMs and head coaches. This view in turn limits the discussion 
surrounding the power of prior career experience to predict organization level outcomes. 
To rectify these two limitations, this section advances the discussion by proposing two 
hypotheses about the impact of ownership career experience on organization level 
outcomes. 
 In this study, career experience is defined as each owners’ functional background 
prior to owning the team. Functional experience pertains to the nature of positions held 
regardless of industry, and refers specifically to functional tracks like marketing, 
finance, operations/logistics, etc. TMT functional experience has been investigated 
thoroughly in other areas of management, and has been found to impact a number of 
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firm level outcomes. For example, Wang, Ma, and Wang (2015) showed that TMTs 
dominated by members with a ‘throughput’ related background (i.e., logistics and 
operations) were positively associated with short- and long-term performance, 
innovation, and overseas performance. Similarly, Bermiss and Murmann (2015) describe 
how firms’ loss of a TMT member with internal processes functional experience is more 
detrimental to firm survival than the loss of a TMT member with external-facing 
functional experience. Likewise, Kim and Rasheed (2014) describe how functional 
heterogeneity among TMT members is associated with positive outcomes for highly 
diversified firms, emphasizing the importance of fit between TMT heterogeneity and 
strategic orientation of the firm. To that end, it is believed that the functional background 
of franchise owners will contribute, at least in part, to organization level outcomes. The 
next task, however, concerns isolating the functional area that is of particular importance 
to PSFs. 
 The basic sport product is athletic competition (Blair, 2012). Revenue generation 
is accomplished through a number of processes. First, PSFs may license their 
trademarks, copyrights, symbols, and player-likenesses to manufacturers and 
merchandisers. Second, game content is licensed to television, radio, and internet 
distributors for mass consumption. Finally, the product itself and the accompanying 
brand materials are marketed to fans, which generates gate receipts and other revenues 
associated with game-day operations. Because revenue sharing tends to wash out PSF-
level differences related to the licensing of merchandise and game content distribution 
(Blair, 2012; Fort, 2006), individual PSFs have an incentive to drive local revenues via 
attendance and other game-day consumer behaviors. Therefore, marketing, specifically 
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at the regional level, constitutes an essential function for PSFs. Marketers, moreover, are 
characterized by a focus on top-line growth, an aptitude for comprehending consumers’ 
inclinations, and the ability to generate and digest market insights. These characteristics 
make them valuable members of TMTs (Whitler, Krause, & Lehmann, 2015). Based on 
the documented associations between TMT functional background and performance, and 
on the importance of regional marketing-related functions to professional sport in 
particular, it is first hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 1: PSFs with owners who have significant functional experience in 
marketing will have greater attendance. 
 As mentioned above, attendance is but one driver of revenue at the local level. 
Another important source of revenue for PSFs depends on fans consuming content and 
PSF-specific media on the internet. This has been an essential business level function for 
PSFs ever since the introduction and mass acceptance of the internet. Technological 
revolution and increasing globalization are creating a new competitive landscape that 
requires managers to effectively use new technologies in order to generate strategic 
flexibility and competitive advantage (Hitt, Keats, & DeMarie, 1998). As digital 
marketing and ‘traditional’ marketing continue to become more synonymous (Abeza, 
O’Reilly, Seguin, & Nzindukiyimana, 2015), and as digital content becomes ever more 
ubiquitous, digital media represent an increasingly lucrative avenue for PSFs to 
communicate with and leverage their fan base. 
 A great example can be observed in MLB Advanced Media (MLBAM). 
MLBAM began in 2000 as an effort to consolidate online media rights and ticket sales 
for the 30 MLB PSFs. It was funded with $120 million contributed from each of the 30 
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MLB PSFs ($1 million per club per year for 4 years). Recently, MLB spun off a piece of 
MLBAM called BAMTech for $1 billion. This was followed closely by MLB selling 
85% of its ownership stake in MLBAM to the Walt Disney Company for $2.58 billion 
(Brown, 2017). The rise in value of online digital media is still growing for MLB and its 
ownership. Because of the importance of digital media consumption to the revenue 
generating potential of MLB PSFs, the second Hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: PSFs with owners who have significant functional experience in 
marketing will have more fan digital media consumption 
Method 
Sample and Data 
 Secondary data was collected on the N=30 PSFs that comprise MLB during the 
ten-season period from 2006-2015.  While other leagues in North America pursue a 
strategy of product consistency via aggressive revenue sharing strategies, the MLB’s 
revenue sharing practices are regarded as less stringent (Blair, 2012). That is, MLB’s 
PSF owners have allowed for more regional and local differences between PSFs in terms 
of revenue generation, which results in more variable firm performance. For clarity, a 
complete list of variables and their descriptions appear in Table 3.2. Variables were 
gathered from publically-available credible sources, and were collected at four levels of 
analysis: the owner, the PSF, the PSF’s Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and the 
league. While Table 3.2 was produced in the interest of brevity, more detailed 
explanations and justifications for each variable are discussed after the base model is 
specified below. 
 
 78 
 
 
Base Model Specification 
  Scores on the left-hand side of Equation 3.1 (i.e., the dependent variable) are 
modeled as a function of the set of independent variables on the right hand side of the 
equation. 
(3.1) Yjt = β0 + β1marketingjt + βk[OWNERjt] +βk[PSFjt] +  
βk[MSAt] t + βk[LEAGUEt] + εjt 
Where Yjt is the outcome of interest, β0 is a constant term, and β1marketingjt is 
the indicator variable for a marketing-based functional background. OWNERjt represents 
the vector of owner-level control variables for PSF j in year t, PSFjt is the vector of PSF-
level control variables for PSF j in year t, MSAt is the vector of variables corresponding 
to each PSF’s Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), LEAGUEt is the vector of league-
level control variables in year t, and εjt is a random disturbance term. 
Functional Experience 
 This aspect of the project necessitated classifying owners’ prior experience into 
one of several categories. In order to adopt a rigorous methodology for this process, a 
prior classification process used by Canella, Park, & Lee (2008) was adapted for this 
study, with several notable enhancements to ensure reliability and validity. First, 
anonymized career synopses for all 42 owners included in this investigation were 
provided to a four-member expert panel (see Appendix). Panel members were selected 
based on private sector and academic experience, and their skillsets covered a range of 
salient topics such as technology, business and corporate strategy, legal representation of 
athletes, sport marketing, and sport economics. Each panelist was asked to read the 
career synopses and then rank-order owners’ functional experience into as many as four 
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of Canella, Park, and Lee’s (2008) nine categories: production and operations, R&D and 
engineering, accounting and finance, management and administration, marketing and 
sales, legal, human resource management, real estate, and technology. Last, and in line 
with prior work (Canella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Carpenter &Fredrickson, 2001; Michel & 
Hambrick, 1992), the investigation’s primary investigator also completed the functional 
rank-ordering exercise to provide a robustness check. Therefore, each owner’s functional 
career experience was rated by five content experts in total.  
 To determine whether an owner had significant experience with marketing, the 
rank-order given by each of the five panelists was examined. First, an owner received a 
‘point’ when a panelist rated that owner’s marketing experience as either a 1 or 2. Only 
owners with at least four out of five possible points were considered as having 
significant functional experience in marketing (Table 3.3). Using this process, five 
marketing-centric owners were identified with an average inter-rater reliability of .96. 
This process was reviewed and approved by a second independent content expert in 
order to further ensure reliability and validity. Last, an indicator variable assuming the 
value of 1 was used in each PSF-year where the owner had significant experience in 
marketing. 
Attendance 
 The dependent variable in Hypothesis 1 was measured as that season’s aggregate 
attendance for a PSF in the observation year. 
Fan Digital Media Consumption (FDMC) 
 This variable was computed for each PSF in each observation year using the 
number of internet search terms pertaining to each PSF. Given a specified search term 
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and including several possible parameters, Google Trends produces a chronological 
track of that search term’s popularity. A search term containing the PSF name was first 
specified for the ten-year time span of our analysis (i.e. all web searches for “Texas 
Rangers” between 01/01/2006 and 12/31/2015). Then, a geographic parameter was 
applied for that PSF’s MSA (i.e., all web searches for “Texas Rangers” between 
01/01/2006 and 12/31/2015 within the Dallas-Ft. Worth MSA). Finally, a topic context 
for ‘sports’ was specified in order to eliminate web searches that related to other topics 
(i.e., “Texas Rangers” could refer to both the MLB PSF and the well-known 19th century 
paramilitary troops). The scores were calculated as a percentage of PSF j's maximum 
search popularity during the time period examined. A score of 45 for year t would mean 
that year t saw only 45% as many search terms for PSF j compared to PSF j’s most 
popular year. 
Other Variables 
 Based on the extant literature on TMTs in sport management, as well as aspects 
of the sport economics literature investigating determinants of attendance and consumer 
behavior, several control variables were collected at different levels of analysis that are 
thought to affect one of the two outcome variables.  
 At the owner level, tenure, age, and education are included. Tenure is measured 
as the number of years the majority owner has owned the PSF, and is included on the 
basis that – similar to a new head coach or star player – new ownership can stimulate 
fans’ interest and lead to increased attendance (Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017). On 
the other hand, longer tenure can lead to the accumulation of knowledge about the PSF 
and MSA, which can be leveraged into more optimal marketing campaigns. Age is 
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calculated as the age in years of each owner in year t, and is included because some prior 
research has suggested that younger members of a TMT are likely to employ innovative 
and progressive strategies, while older TMT members could be likely to employ legacy 
strategies, even in the face of dynamic market environments (Juravich, Salaga, & 
Babiak, 2017). Last, education is an ordinal variable capturing the highest level of 
education attained by the owner, where 1 represents high school, 2 represents bachelor’s 
degree, 3 represents master’s degree, and 4 represents terminal degree. This variable is 
included in line with previous research hypothesizing an effect of TMT education on on-
field outcomes, where more-educated TMT members are better-suited to optimizing 
PSF-related outcomes (Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017; Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 
2015). In addition to the linear terms, quadratic terms for ownership tenure and age are 
included in the model to determine whether there are any curvilinear relationships 
present. Prior research has documented inverted-U shaped effects of age and tenure—
that is, after a given inflection point, the positive effect of age and/or tenure becomes 
negative (Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017; Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 2015).  
 At the PSF level, team performance, fan cost index (FCI), operating margin, PSF 
tenure, stadium age, capacity, and stadium value were included. Team performance is 
operationalized as winning efficiency, computed by dividing the logarithmic value of a 
PSF’s total regular season wins by the yearly-normalized dollar amount spent on payroll 
(Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017). It is included because on-field performance has been 
documented to be an important predictor of attendance specifically (Ahn & Lee, 2014) 
and fan interest in general. An advantage of this approach in particular is that it captures 
relative performance as opposed to outright performance. That is, fans of teams with 
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lower payrolls (and, as an eventuality, a lower number of total wins) can still be 
incentivized to attend games and consume online content when the PSF is performing 
comparatively well to what ‘should be expected’ based on what the team elects to spend 
on payroll (Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017). From a practical standpoint, the vast 
increase of available data and PSF-specific content makes it easier for fans to interpret 
and appreciate the relative performance of their teams as opposed to considering merely 
the raw number of wins. From this, we also derive a lagged value and include it in the 
model on the basis that prior PSF on-field performance can either induce or dissuade 
attendance. This lagged value is simply the value of a PSF’s winning efficiency in the 
year prior to the observation year. FCI is calculated as the total cost for a family of four 
to attend a MLB game in PSF j's venue in year t. FCI includes the total cost of two 
average price adult tickets, two average price child tickets, four small soft drinks, two 
small beers, four hot dogs, two programs, two adult size caps, and parking. It is included 
to capture the ancillary costs associated with attending a contest. Operating margin was 
collected from Forbes’ yearly MLB team valuations publication. It is calculated as 
operating income divided by revenues for PSF j in year t, and is included because, at 
least conceptually, PSFs with greater operating margins have more resources at their 
disposal to devote to drumming up attendance, fan interest, and other sources of local 
revenue. PSF tenure is computed as the number of years the franchise has resided within 
the current MSA. This is included to account for historical effects, as teams with longer 
tenure tend to have a more solidified and respected place in the community, translating 
to increased demand for the PSF’s product (Tainsky, 2010). The last three variables 
pertain to characteristics of the stadium, and are included due to the documented positive 
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relationship between stadium quality and demand (Ahn & Lee, 2014). Stadium age is 
computed as the chronological age of the PSF’s stadium. Stadium capacity is the total 
number of seats (including box suites). Last, stadium cost is the total appraised cost to 
construct the stadium (plus the value of renovations and reinvestments) in 2015 USD. It 
was computed by summing the initial cost to construct the stadium, obtained from 
www.ballparksofbaseball.com, with any additional costs of renovations, which were 
obtained from various press releases and news reports. 
 At the MSA level, PSF competition is an ordinal variable that represents the 
number of other ‘Big Four’ PSFs in the focal-PSF’s MSA, where ‘Big Four’ denotes the 
four largest North American sport leagues (MLB, National Football League, National 
Hockey League, and National Basketball Association). This variable is included in order 
to account for effects attributable to market competition, since fans often consider the 
number of available entertainment alternatives when making purchase decisions. 
 At the league level, total MLB revenue and the amount of MLB digital media 
consumption (MLBDMC) are included. League revenue and, consequently, league 
revenue sharing practices, generate many financial aftereffects at the PSF level (Blair, 
2012). An important implication of MLB revenue is that league revenue can be used to 
stimulate consumer behaviors. Relating to this, overall interest in MLB consumption 
could have spillover effects at the PSF-level. This variable is computed in a similar 
fashion as FDMC, where we specify a ‘sport’-related search term (“Major League 
Baseball”) during the study’s time frame (01/01/2006 – 12/31/2015) across a geographic 
area (North America). 
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Models and Specifications 
 For both Hypotheses, the outcome variable is surmised to be the result of the 
predictor of interest and a set of control variables as shown below in Equation 3.2: 
(3.2) Yjt = β0 + β1marketingjt + βk[OWNERjt] +βk[PSFjt] + βk[MSAjt] + 
 βk[LEAGUEt] + εjt 
Where Yjt is the outcome, β1marketingjt is the presence or absence of an owner’s 
marketing expertise, βk[OWNERjt] is a vector of owner-level control variables, βk[PSFjt] 
is a vector of PSF-level control variables, βk[MSAjt] is a vector of MSA level controls, 
βk[LEAGUEt] is a vector of league-level controls, and εjt is a random disturbance term. 
 In order to investigate the relationships in H1, the unbalanced panel dataset will 
be analyzed using fixed- and random-effects models with robust standard errors. Being 
unbalanced, the dataset does not contain all elements for every year in the dataset—that 
is, some of the data is missing. Robust standard errors are included to address concerns 
relating to heteroskedasticity. This approach requires the inclusion of year and PSF fixed 
effects, modifying Equation 3.1 to create Equation 3.3 as follows: 
(3.3) Yjt = β0 + β1marketingjt + βk[OWNERjt] +βk[PSFjt] + βk[MSAjt] + 
  βk[LEAGUEt] + τj + ϒt + εjt 
Where τj and ϒt are PSF and year fixed effects, respectively. First, a two-stage 
regression model is specified as outlined by Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008) and as 
employed by Juravich, Salaga, and Babiak (2017). These models are necessary due to 
the endogeneity between attendance and payroll –that is, PSFs can stimulate attendance 
by acquiring expensive, big-name players. Therefore, a first-stage regression model is 
specified for H1 as follows in Equation 3.4: 
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(3.4) Payjt = β0 + β1MSAPopjt + β2MSAIncjt +  εjt 
 In Equation (3.4), payroll is surmised to be a function of the MSA’s population 
and the per-capita income of the MSA’s residents. The residual from this equation is 
then used as a predictor in the model which estimates attendance in Equation 3.5 (shown 
below). In order to estimate attendance, another unbalanced panel regression model is 
specified, where attendance for PSF j in year t is surmised to be a function of an owner’s 
experience as a marketer (or lack thereof) and the specified control variables. 
(3.5) Attjt = β0 + β1Marketingjt + β2Otenure jt + β3Oage jt + β4Oedu jt + β5WE jt + 
β6LagWE jt  + β7FCI jt +  β8OpMargin jt + β9PSFtenure jt + β10StadAge jt + 
β11StadCap jt + β12StadVal jt + β13Comp jt + β14FSResidual jt +  τj  + ϒt + εjt 
 To investigate H2, a different approach was specified due the way FDMC was 
computed. Recall that FDMC was a PSF-specific variable, meaning each score 
represented the percentage of search traffic relative to that PSF’s maximum during the 
study time frame. So, a score of 50 for one PSF likely relates to a different number of 
raw searches than another PSF with a score of 50. Therefore, scores on the variable 
produce variance that is only useful in a within-firm context. Additionally, current 
values of FDMC likely depend on past values of FDMC. So, a system Generalized 
Methods of Moments (system-GMM) specification was used to investigate H2. The 
system-GMM approach was first articulated in conjunction by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The approach dramatically improves the 
efficiency of prior specifications made popular by Arellano and Bond (1991). A 
complete review of this family of specifications is provided by Roodman (2006). 
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 The model used to investigate H2 is presented in Equation (3.5). In Equation 
(3.5), fan digital media consumption (FDMC) for PSF j in year t is gathered to be a 
function of an owner’s experience as a marketer (or lack thereof) and the specified 
control variables. Note that in Equation (3.5), certain variables from Equation (3.4) are 
excluded on the basis that they do not directly or indirectly affect the propensity for fans 
to consume online content. For example, aspects of the stadium like capacity, age, and 
the presence of upgrades have little to do with this outcome of interest. However, MSA 
residents’ access to internet is introduced into the model on the basis that as internet 
access becomes more prevalent in an area, more online consumption will naturally 
result. Next, there is some endogeneity to be expected between FDMC and payroll, since 
payroll is an indication of team quality, and since blockbuster contracts tend to drive the 
distribution of online content related to the team. Therefore, the residual from Equation 
(3.3) predicting payroll from MSA population and MSA income is also included in 
Equation (3.5). Last, in accordance with the dynamic panel approach described above, 
Equation (3.6) below contains lagged values of FDMC. 
(3.6) FDMCjt = β0 + β1Marketingjt + β2Otenure jt + β3Oage jt + β4Oedu jt + β5WE jt + 
β6LagWE jt + β7Payroll jt  + β8OpMargin jt + β9PSFtenure jt + β10Pop jt  + 
β12Comp jt + β13MLBrev jt + β14MLBDMC jt + β15FSResidual jt + β16IntAcc jt 
+ β17LagFDMCjt + τj  + ϒt + εjt  
Results 
 First, summary statistics for all second-stage variables are provided in Table 3.4. 
Average yearly attendance was just over 2.5 million fans per PSF, which equates to 
30,864 fans per regular season home game. FDMC averaged about 18%, meaning in any 
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given year for any given PSF, FDMC was about 18% of the PSF’s maximum during the 
study’s ten-year time frame. Also of note is that owners had a marketing-centric career 
background in 13% of the observations. Owner tenure (M=11.41, SD=8.5) ranged 
between 1 and 39 years, and owner age (M=64.7, SD=11.9) ranged between 39 and 93. 
A majority of owners had attained at least a bachelor’s degree. Bivariate correlations for 
all variables are produced in Table 3.5. 
 Table 3.6 shows the results of the second-stage fixed effects model investigating 
H1. In this analysis, the Hausman test rejected the use of random effects models (X2(19) = 
691.49; p=.0000), so the use of the FE model was specified and are reported here. 
Overall, the attendance model showed significant predictive power (R2 Total = .322; 
Wald X2(22) = 499.21; p = .0000). Therefore, examining the individual coefficients within 
the model is warranted. The effect of an owner having a predominantly marketing 
background is positive and significant (β = 616965.6; z = 2.429; p=.013). This means 
that given an owner with predominately marketing experience and another without, the 
one with marketing experience will be associated with, on average, 616,966 additional 
attendees per season, ceteris paribus. This would equate to roughly 7617 fans per regular 
season home game. In a different context, this value represents a nearly 24% increase 
over the grand mean attendance. Thus, there is support for Hypothesis 1. 
 Table 3.7 shows the results of the investigation of H2. The overall model is 
significant (X2(28) = 2548.12; p = 0.000). The tests for an autoregressive process present 
in the DV revealed that FDMC was influenced by its values in t-1, but not in t-2; 
therefore, only lagged values of FDMC for t-1 were included in the model. As with the 
attendance model, examining the individual coefficients is justified. In the FDMC 
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model, the effect of owners with marketing backgrounds is also positive and significant 
(β = 10.01; z = 6.24; p<.000). This means that given an owner with predominately 
marketing experience and another without, the one with marketing experience will be 
associated with, on average, just over 10% more online search traffic relative to that 
PSF’s maximum expected search term traffic. Therefore, there is support for Hypothesis 
2 as well. 
Discussion and Implications 
 As it relates to the complete model of strategic resource utility, the results of this 
study are consistent with the outlined propositions. These propositions first highlighted 
the importance of intangible resources. Learned career experience and organizational 
knowledge certainly fit the bill as intangible resources (Hall, 2002), and in this study 
they were shown to have a positive effect on firms’ performance. However, Chapter I 
also proposes that the way in which intangibles are operationalized– tacitly or explicitly 
– should have an effect on performance. In this scenario, learned career experiences tied 
to marketing expertise is an intangible resource that is explicitly operationalized. That is, 
learned career experiences can be documented, standardized, and communicated, which 
is at least partly evidenced by the plethora of industry-specific best practices textbooks 
(see Czinkota, 1999; Goldblatt, 1997; Poon, 1993; Seguin, Teed, & O’Reilly, 2005). In 
the complete model, it was proposed that tacitly-operationalized intangible resources are 
more generative of competitive advantage than explicitly-operationalized intangible 
resources because the key to unlocking the intangible’s potential is not easily 
communicated. As Wernerfelt (1984) suggests, resources that can be obtained and then 
protected are more indicative of performance advantages than resources that can move 
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between firms easily. Therefore, to give this current work more context, future work will 
need to be done that assesses the impact of tacitly-operationalized intangibles. 
 As it pertains to characteristics of TMT members, this manuscript highlighted 
multiple consistencies with previous work in sport (Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017; 
Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 2015) and in traditional management contexts (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991; Hambrick, 1995). First, these analyses suggest that greater tenure in an 
organization does not have significant effects for firm level outcomes. In both models, 
ownership tenure was not a significant predictor, suggesting a lack of knowledge accrual 
about how to attract fans to the venue and/or engage them online. Likewise, other owner 
characteristics such as age do not significantly predict PSF level outcomes, bolstering 
previous findings about general managers and head coaches (Juravich, Salaga, & 
Babiak, 2017). Specifically, this analysis suggests that those authors’ findings could be 
extended to ownership as well.  
 Unlike previous work that has established a relationship between TMT education 
and PSF level outcomes (Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017; Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 
2015), this investigation finds no such link, even when operationalized in an identical 
way to the prior work. The divergent findings in this analysis suggest the existence of an 
interesting, albeit intuitive, caveat to the education- performance relationship.  One does 
not require a specific type or amount of education in order to own a PSF, but managers 
in the upper echelon are almost exclusively hired based on career and/or academic 
pedigree. 
 As it pertains to owner functional background, the focus of this investigation, a 
background in marketing was consistently positive and significant in both models. This 
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means that marketing backgrounds were associated with increases in attendance and 
FDMC. These findings extend previous work in sport (Juravich, 2012; Juravich, Salaga, 
& Babiak, 2017) by first investigating the impact of functional experience in a new 
context (i.e., owners vs. managers), and second by providing a more in-depth 
operationalization of functional experience. Given that prior work has not found an 
association between functional backgrounds of managers on PSF outcomes, this 
investigation provides a degree of nuance to the discussion of TMTs in sport. 
Specifically, the findings question the assumption that specific technical skills matter 
less for managerial success at higher levels of a firm’s hierarchy (Peeters, Salaga, & 
Juravich, 2015). In this analysis, a clear linkage was observed between a set of technical 
skills possessed by the owner and positive outcomes related to that skillset. 
 Within a larger theoretical context, the above findings provide an avenue forward 
for the discussion of agency theory in sport. In general, agency theory is focused on 
examining the explicit and implicit contractual relationships between an owner (i.e., 
principal) and the managers hired to run the owner’s firm (i.e., agents) (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Mason & Slack, 2005). While owners are incentivized to recoup the firm’s 
purchase costs as quickly as possible by adopting aggressive strategies, managers are 
incentivized to use more conservative strategies that shelter the firm from failure in order 
to secure their job (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, one of the key streams in agency research 
concerns assessing the aligning mechanisms firms can use to ‘match’ owners’ incentive 
structures to those of their managers. In this paper, a clear connection is documented 
between an owner’s expertise – naturally, the owners’ preferred strategic focus – and the 
success of those strategic foci (i.e., greater attendance and FDMC). Implicit in this 
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relationship is the notion that the mangers hired by the owner (a) must share the same 
marketing-related strategic focus, or (b) are being over-ridden by the owners when it 
comes to day-to-day strategic execution. Uncovering which situation is most common, 
and how each manifests across PSFs, will be important for the further development of 
agency theory in sport. Further, assessing the costs of failing to align incentives in the 
case of situation ‘b’ will be highly pertinent to this line of research. 
 Importantly, these results come with some qualifications. First, the coefficients 
for team performance and prior team performance in the attendance model were positive 
and significant, implying that fans are also motivated to attend games when the team is 
performing well relative to expectations, and when that success has been sustained over 
multiple seasons. These findings are in line with prior work (Ahn & Lee, 2014), and 
cannot be discounted—ultimately, efforts to market the team and incentivize 
consumption will be exacerbated or hindered by how the team performs on the field. In 
other words, the coefficient reported in the models are merely average treatment effects. 
Overall, the results here suggest that owners with marketing expertise can better leverage 
on-field success than their non-marketing counterparts—not that they are capable of 
generating jumps in attendance and FDMC irrespective of on-field success. 
 In the fan digital media consumption model, similar dynamics are also the case, 
with FDMC subject to other influencers. In this model, performance and payroll were 
both positive and significant. Payroll influences fans’ online behavior as more news 
outlets devote attention to the financial and strategic moves PSFs make. Every season, a 
crop of new blockbuster contracts and contract extensions are signed, and often the sheer 
magnitude of such spending directs more online traffic to the teams and players 
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involved. Also, the coefficient for MLB revenue was significant in the FDMC model, 
indicating that as the MLB generates more revenue, more online traffic can be 
expected—potentially due to an increase of league-wide marketing spend. Again, the 
implications here are that owners with functional experience in marketing can perhaps 
make better use of fortuitous on-field circumstances than non-marketers. 
Limitations 
 The findings from this analysis come with some limitations worth noting. First, 
this study focuses only on the role of owners’ marketing backgrounds (or the lack 
thereof). This approach was theoretically and practically important, as sport is a service 
industry predicated on effective marketing (Filo, Lock, & Karg, 2015; Abeza et al., 
2015). However, other functional backgrounds, and corresponding PSF level outcomes, 
are certainly worth investigating. It could be interesting to examine, for example, if an 
owner’s functional background in operations and logistics might generate positive 
outcomes related to the PSF’s ‘back of house’ optimization efforts. Similarly, an owner 
with a background in human resources may have positive impacts on the PSF’s front 
office talent pool management. Also, the results from a study by Peeters, Salaga, and 
Juravich (2015) suggest that younger and more educated GMs are associated with 
greater strategic innovation. The basis for this is that younger and more highly-educated 
GMs are more analytically-minded. These findings could be ripened by applying this 
hypothesis to ownership. Likewise, scholars could investigate not just the amount of 
education completed (i.e., undergraduate degree versus master’s degree), but the type of 
degree received. For example, the results of the present analysis would suggest that TMT 
members with a degree in finance might run a professional franchise differently than a 
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TMT member who studied technology, marketing, journalism, or supply chain 
management.  
 Second, this analysis assumes implicitly that owners are in fact directly involved 
with the marketing efforts of their PSF. Naturally, the degree to which owners are 
responsible for formulating and implementing marketing strategy varies between PSFs. 
Thus, as prior authors have suggested, more research is needed to decipher the extent 
and degree with which owners become involved with functional-level strategies 
(Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017). Various qualitative efforts would be most 
appropriate for this task. 
 Last, this study assumes that PSF owners are the ones solely responsible for 
making strategic decisions at the PSF. This assumption is present in similar studies 
(Juravich, Salaga, and Babiak, 2017). However, other research highlights the influence 
of group dynamics when enacting PSF level decision making and outcomes, especially 
since better managers are more likely to cooperate (Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 2015). 
Conceptually, functional-level strategic decisions could be made by the owner, minority 
owners, GM, and other mid-level managers in conjunction with one another. While some 
majority owners can and probably do reserve final judgment over these decisions, others 
might be more likely to be persuaded by other TMT members and thus enact policies 
that do not align directly with their functional expertise. Therefore, future research 
should look to (a) uncover the extent to which collaboration is used by various PSFs 
TMTs and (b) investigate the impact of TMTs in aggregate as opposed to the impact of 
single members. Specifically as it relates to (b), Peeters et al. (2015) concludes that an 
educational mismatch between GM and head coach corresponds to decreased firm 
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performance. However, it would be interesting to explore how a TMT’s education (or 
functional experience, etc.) in aggregate impacts firm level outcomes. 
 While not related to a limitation of this study, some of the findings in this 
analysis would seem to contradict previous scholars, who found support for the notion 
that technical skills matter less for managerial success at higher levels of a firm’s 
hierarchy (Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 2015). In a nutshell, Peeters and colleagues 
(2015) suggest that managers at higher levels of a firm’s hierarchy tend to have a more 
generalized skillset. This assumption is consistent with other investigations outside of 
sport (Ferreira & Sah, 2012). Inasmuch, it would be interesting to investigate whether or 
not that assumption holds for non-owner TMT members when the operationalization of 
prior career experience is done at more granular level (as was done here). In other words, 
would a GM with prior experience in sales generate greater ticket sales and attendance in 
the same way as an owner does? Moreover, would the existence of an owner-GM dyad 
wherein both members had marketing backgrounds enhance those effects? Such an 
investigation would also help further define prior researchers’ suggestion that matching 
of personal characteristics is important for PSF level outcomes (Peeters, Salaga, & 
Juravich, 2015). 
 Finally, this line of research could be expanded altogether to include 
characteristics of PSF TMTs that are more subjective, but equally illuminating and 
salient. For example, are owners with a lack of experience in socially-responsible 
industries likely to manage a PSF in ways that are fiscally or environmentally 
deleterious? Moreover, future scholars could investigate whether certain TMT 
personality and career traits are associated with the likelihood of a PSF encountering 
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public relations skirmishes. Last, future scholars could examine how TMT personality 
and career traits impact the public funding of sport venues in the PSF’s MSA. These 
kinds of outcomes are especially salient for many groups of stakeholders including 
governments and lobbyists, fans and citizens, parent companies and strategic partners, 
and owners of firms that operate in sport-adjacent industries. Finally, as it relates to sport 
entrepreneurship, it would be interesting to assess the influence of owners’ personal 
networks. The positive outcomes of network effects in entrepreneurship are well 
documented (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Johannisson, 1987), so it would be interesting to 
assess what positive outcomes PSFs can realize from an owner with a rich network of 
personal contacts in the sports industry or in sports-adjacent industries. Relatedly, the 
positive effects of a personal network are perhaps best operationalized by engaging in 
effective strategic alliances with external groups. It would also be interesting to assess 
whether or not owners with a track record of engaging in strategic alliances can generate 
measurable differences related to externally-dependent outcomes such as venue 
financing, broadcast agreements, and local legislation. 
Conclusion 
 Using UET as a theoretical framework and prior work in sport as a guide, this 
study has theorized about the importance of ownership characteristics in generating PSF 
level outcomes. The results of the ensuing empirical analysis suggested that owners with 
marketing experience are responsible for positive marketing-related outcomes, such as 
attendance and FDMC. The results in part extend the findings of prior TMT research in 
sport to the context of ownership, outlining how owners’ tenure, age, and education have 
little impact on PSF level outcomes. Additionally, the results extend findings in this 
 96 
 
 
stream of research by using a deeper operationalization of ‘functional background’ to 
show that functional background is positively and significantly associated with function-
specific PSF level outcomes. Finally, an overview of the limitations of this study is 
provided and suggestions for future research are made. 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 3.1. Majority Owner Functional Experience  
   
Functional Experience Freq. Percent Cum. %
Operations & Logistics 22 7.33 7.33
Accounting & Finance 78 26 33.33
General Management 68 22.67 56
Marketing 38 12.67 68.67
Legal 20 6.67 75.33
Real Estate Mgmt 34 11.33 86.67
Technology 40 13.33 100
Total 300 100
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Table 3.2. Variable names and descriptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviation Description
1 Attendance Att Aggregate regular season attendance for PSF j  in year t
2 Fan Digital Media Consumption FDMC
Percentage of PSF j 's maximum search popularity during the time period 
examined in year t
3 Marketing Marketing
Indicator =1 if owner's  career experience was predominantly marketing-
related for PSF j  in year t
4 Own Tenure Otenure Number of years the majority owner has owned PSF j  in year t
5 Own Age Oage Age in years of the majority owner of PSF j  in year t
6 Own Education Oedu
Ordinal variable capturing the highest level of education attained by the 
owner; 1=high school, 2=bachelor’s degree, 3=master’s degree, & 
4=terminal degree
7 Payroll Pay Total payroll for PSF j's opening day roster in year t
8 Win Efficiency WE
Deviation score for the logarithmic value of PSF j 's total regular season 
wins divided by the normalized dollar amount spent on payroll in year t
9 Fan Cost Index FCI
Total cost for a family of four to attend a MLB game in PSF j 's venue in 
year t
10 Operating Margin OpMargin Operating income divided by revenues for PSF j  in year t
11 PSF Tenure PSFtenure
Number of years the franchise has resided within the current MSA in year 
t
12 Stadium Age StadAge Age of PSF j's stadium in year t
13 Stadium Capacity StadCap Capacity of PSF j 's stadium  in year t
14 Stadium Value StadVal Dollar amount spent to construct PSF j 's stadium  in year t
15 Competition Comp
Ordinal variable that represents the number of other ‘Big Four’ PSFs in 
PSF j 's MSA in year t
16 MLB Revenue MLBRev Amount of revenue generated by the MLB in year t
17 MLB difital media consumption MLBDMC
Percentage of MLB's maximum search popularity during the time period 
examined in year t
18 Internet Access IntAcc Percentage of households with internet access in the MSA in year t
19 Disposable Income DisInc
Average houshold disposable income after taxes and other mandatory 
payments in the MSA in year t
20 Average Wage Wages
Average houshold disposable income after taxes and other mandatory 
payments in the MSA in year t
21 MSA Population MSApop Actual of projectecd population of MSA in year t
22 MSA Income MSAinc Per-capital income in the MSA in year t
Note: all dollar values are in 2017 USD
Variable
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Table 3.3. Expert Panelists’ Career Functional Ratings 
 
 
 
 
Owner ID Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5 IRR
1
2
3 x 0.2
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 x x x x 0.8
12 x 0.2
13
14 x 0.2
15
16
17 x x x x x 1
18
19
20 x x x x x 1
21
22
23
24
25
26
27 x x 0.4
28
29 x x x x x 1
30 x x 0.4
31 x 0.2
32 x 0.2
33
34 x x x x x 1
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
Mean IRR = .96
Expert Panel
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Table 3.4. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Att 300 2500843 668881.20 1165120 4298655
FDMC 300 18.30 12.01 0 56.41667
Marketing 300 0.13 0.33 0 1
Otenure 300 10.72 7.77 1 37
Oage 297 64.12 12.09 39 93
Oedu 296 2.58 0.86 1 4
Pay 300 9.85E+07 4.14E+07 1.70E+07 2.82E+08
WPP 300 99.98 31.77 43 255
FCI 300 197.37 51.15 114.24 410.88
OpMargin 300 0.08 0.09 -0.2761092 0.352459
PSFtenure 300 64.63 45.05 2 405
StadAge 300 23.06 24.92 1 103
StadCap 300 44312.66 5333.80 31042 57333
StadVal 300 4.15E+08 3.09E+08 6034678 1.81E+09
Comp 300 4.06 1.59 1 7
MLBRev 300 6.50 0.99 5.11 8.39
MLBDMC 300 38.64 12.38 28.5 64.25
IntAcc 300 76.97 7.04 68.9 88.5
DisInc 300 37576.80 2616.83 33591 42094
Wages 300 19.08 1.32 16.74 21.03
MSApop 300 5913780 4.67E+06 1523907 2.01E+07
MSAinc 300 49155.93 8684.78 34867 79206
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Table 3.5. Bivariate Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1 Att 1.00
2 FDMC 0.01 1.00
3 Marketing 0.14 0.33 1.00
4 Otenure 0.10 0.14 -0.01 1.00
5 Oage -0.05 0.16 0.02 0.42 1.00
6 Oedu -0.05 -0.05 -0.16 0.26 0.15 1.00
7 Pay 0.58 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.08 -0.04 1.00
8 WE -0.45 0.18 0.06 -0.18 -0.04 -0.07 -0.46 1.00
9 FCI 0.45 0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.00 -0.08 0.69 -0.47 1.00
10 OpMargin -0.24 -0.01 -0.02 -0.24 -0.03 0.02 -0.38 0.53 -0.17 1.00
11 PSFtenure 0.34 0.05 -0.03 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.42 -0.29 0.43 -0.20 1.00
12 StadAge 0.22 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.20 0.30 -0.25 0.43 -0.08 0.25 1.00
13 StadCap 0.38 -0.20 -0.12 0.16 -0.19 -0.05 0.16 -0.25 -0.04 -0.19 -0.17 0.04 1.00
14 StadVal 0.16 -0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.07 0.13 0.36 -0.17 0.26 -0.20 0.00 -0.46 0.21 1.00
15 Comp 0.32 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.07 -0.10 0.37 -0.31 0.35 -0.09 0.01 0.26 0.29 0.05 1.00
16 MLBRev -0.07 0.49 0.00 0.08 0.10 -0.08 0.30 0.01 0.24 -0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.13 0.08 -0.01 1.00
17 MLBDMC 0.08 -0.25 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.21 0.01 -0.24 0.10 -0.08 0.01 0.13 -0.10 0.00 -0.64 1.00
18 IntAcc -0.05 0.48 0.02 0.09 0.10 -0.09 0.26 0.01 0.20 -0.08 0.06 0.03 -0.10 0.06 -0.01 0.90 -0.39 1.00
19 DisInc -0.07 0.49 0.00 0.07 0.09 -0.08 0.29 0.01 0.24 -0.09 0.08 0.02 -0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.98 -0.68 0.87 1.00
20 Wages -0.08 0.46 -0.01 0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.29 0.00 0.26 -0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.15 0.10 0.00 0.96 -0.82 0.79 0.96 1.00
21 MSApop 0.45 -0.02 0.15 0.12 0.03 -0.10 0.50 -0.41 0.46 -0.23 0.16 0.22 0.35 0.35 0.69 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 1.00
22 MSAinc 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.35 -0.20 0.50 -0.01 -0.03 0.23 0.12 0.24 0.45 0.38 -0.20 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.24 1.00
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Table 3.6. FE model specification for Attendance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable β SE z p>z
Marketing 616965.6 247958 2.49 0.013
Otenure -11521.81 28667.56 0.4 0.691
Oage 99159.84 54950.14 1.8 0.082
Oedu 182550.5 185287.8 0.99 0.333
Otenure
2
-897.5721 694.1938 1.29 0.206
Oage
2
-493.6786 382.3326 1.29 0.207
WE 3738.538 931.2393 4.01 0
Lagged WE 2631.643 902.6827 2.92 0.007
FCI 7743.614 1957.54 3.96 0
OpMargin -523010.6 491205.9 1.06 0.296
PSFtenure -550.6922 811.1752 0.68 0.503
StadAge -11648.19 13550.32 0.86 0.397
StadCapacity -3.460649 27.91537 0.12 0.902
StadValue -0.0020857 0.0011529 1.81 0.081
Comp
Residuals 15733.43 13656.5 1.15 0.259
Year Fixed Effects
PSF Fixed Effects
Constant -4393706 3775423 1.16 0.254
N 264
F(22, 29) 46.58
Prob > 0.0000
R
2
 within 0.3803
R
2
 between 0.0194
R
2
 Total 0.0028
Omitted
Attendance (FE)
Included
Included
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Table 3.7. System-GMM specification for FDMC 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable β SE z p>z
LagFDMC 0.11 0.06 1.97 0.05
Marketing 10.01 1.60 6.24 0.00
Otenure -0.07 0.21 -0.4 0.72
Oage 0.68 0.42 1.61 0.11
Oedu 0.01 0.55 0.02 0.99
Otenure
2
0.01 0.01 0.83 0.40
Oage
2
0.00 0.00 -1.4 0.15
WE 0.01 0.02 0.32 0.75
Lagged WE 0.04 0.02 2.23 0.03
Pay 0.00 0.00 1.85 0.06
OpMargin 6.54 7.85 0.83 0.40
PSFTenure -0.01 0.01 -0.7 0.48
MSApop 0.00 0.00 -2.3 0.02
Comp 0.65 0.40 1.63 0.10
MLBRev
MLBDMC -0.28 0.07 -4.3 0.00
Residuals -0.54 0.26 -2.1 0.04
IntAcc 0.46 0.16 2.91 0.00
Year Fixed Effects
PSF Fixed Effects
Constant
N 264
Wald X
2
(28) 2548.12
Prob > 0.000
Test for AR(1) -6.9 0.000
Test for AR(2) -.13 0.899
Included
Included
Omitted
FDMC
Omitted
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CHAPTER IV 
TACITLY-OPERATIONALIZED INTANGIBLE RESOURCES: 
 OWNERS’ POLITICAL AFFILIATION 
Synopsis 
 This manuscript builds on prior work in this dissertation by trying to uncover the 
relationships between PSF owners’ political affiliation (PA) and the way they manage 
their respective professional sport franchises (PSFs). PA is a tacit form of personal and 
institutional knowledge, and as such offers a unique view into how owners 
operationalize resources using tacit knowledge. The manuscript utilizes the UET 
literature in sport as a foundation, and the political discourse in sport as inspiration for a 
series of five hypotheses. A sample of 300 PSF-year observations tied to 42 unique 
owners was used to investigate the proposed relationships. The results do not support the 
idea that an owner’s political leanings impact how the PSF is managed. In one instance, 
the effect was significant but opposite of what was hypothesized based on the literature. 
Despite these initial findings, it is likely that politics will continue to be embroiled in 
modern sport discourse, so increased attention to this line of inquiry will be required 
now and in the future. 
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Introduction 
 The influence of professional sport franchises’ (PSF) top management teams 
(TMTs) is garnering increased attention in academia and in the popular press. Applying 
upper echelon theory (UET), recent scholarship in sport management has begun to tap 
into the wealth of management knowledge that can be gleaned by examining this 
stakeholder group more closely (Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017; Rhode & Breuer, 
2018; Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 2015; Wong & Deubert, 2010). This body of research 
has shown that TMT characteristics in sport are related to organization-level 
performance outcomes. Characteristics like technical knowledge (Juravich et al., 2017), 
amount of education (Juravich et al., 2017; Peeters et al., 2015), knowledge of human 
resources (Peeters et al., 2015), and the degree of similarity between a top manager and 
the organization (Peeters et al., 2015) were all notable predictors of an organization’s 
performance. Rhode and Breuer (2018) document the effects of ownership structure, 
showing that private majority ownership and foreign majority ownership tend to temper 
performance. In parallel, the politics of TMTs and of the sport industry’s other power 
brokers are the subject of increased scrutiny in academia (Allison, 1993; Barney, Wenn, 
& Martyn, 2002; Newman & Giardina, 2010; Sage, 2015; Tomlinson & Sugden, 2013) 
and the popular press alike (Badenhausen, 2017; Duffy, 2016; Grahm, 2016; Khalek, 
2011; Solomon, 2016). Collectively, these groups are often criticized for donating to 
politicians and political action committees (PACs) on both sides of the aisle, as well as 
for using their positions of power to stack the sport industry’s regulations in their favor. 
Given the intertwined and tumultuous history of sports and politics, it should not come 
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as a surprise that sport consumers wonder whether the management of their favorite PSF 
is affected by its majority owner’s political orientation (Houlihan, 2007; Riordan, 2002).  
 Despite the recent attention being paid to PSF TMTs and the proliferation of 
political discourse in sport, little has been done in the way of empirically investigating 
these two phenomena together. The UET research in sport has focused on assessing the 
role of general managers and head coaches. While perhaps the most public-facing 
entities of a PSF’s TMT, they are mainly responsible for strategic decisions that relate 
directly to on-field performance. Moreover, the predictors and outcomes in these 
analyses often focus on managerial inputs (i.e., knowledge, experience, etc.) and 
performance outcomes that are couched in the contexts of strategy and finance. Another 
group—ownership—has a much broader range of decision-making rights. Owners, after 
all, pay professional managers to run their firm and are ultimately responsible for all 
decisions at a PSF (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), including those tinged with political 
undertones.  
 Therefore, the purpose of this manuscript is to empirically assess the role that 
ownership’s political leanings have when predicting politically relevant outcomes. In so 
doing, the manuscript makes multiple contributions to sport management research. First, 
the manuscript sheds light on the role that owners play in the management of their PSFs. 
Do they affect firm outcomes in a measurable way, or are they merely a figurehead with 
a bankroll? If the former, how do they affect the decision making process? That is, how 
do their personal traits and viewpoints manifest? A second contribution of this 
manuscript is that it investigates the role of owners’ political affiliation specifically—a 
characteristic that is subjected to increased scrutiny by the popular press and academics. 
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In as much, the manuscript is intended to help inform the public debate about PSF 
owners, their political orientations, and any potential PSF-specific outcomes thereof. 
 The manuscript is organized as follows. First, a literature review is provided that 
covers the topics of UET broadly and in sport management, as well as the role of politics 
in sport. Next, several hypotheses are formulated based on prior research and relevant 
theoretical frameworks. Following that, the methods of this study are detailed, including 
an overview of the data and variables and a section about the model specifications used. 
Next, the manuscript states the results of the analysis, and discusses their implications. 
Last, the paper makes note of the limitations of the study and makes some suggestions 
for future research. 
Literature Review 
Upper Echelon Theory (UET) 
 In a general sense, organizations make effective use of their resource base by 
accruing and managing internal knowledge flows (Grant, 1996; 2002). Further, 
employees are the vessels in which much of a firm’s knowledge resources reside 
(Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001). One of the most influential sets of employees within a 
firm is the upper echelon, defined as the firm’s most senior management and ownership 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The interaction of managers and owners is important 
because agency theorists have argued that the formation and execution of strategic 
moves is tied to the pending approval of ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 Because of the influential nature of upper echelons and the cognitive- and 
knowledge-based resources they provide, Hambrick & Mason (1984) suggested that 
characteristics of a firm’s upper echelon can be a significant predictor of firm-level 
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outcomes. This proposition has been shown to hold empirical merit. TMT demographics 
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), level of heterogeneity (Carpenter, 2002; Hambrick, Cho, & 
Chen, 1996), and previous experience (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregerson, 2001) have 
been shown to influence firm outcomes. On an individual level, some have studied how 
CEO traits relate to strategy implementation and corporate performance. Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007) demonstrated how CEO narcissism may contribute to strategic 
dynamism and volatile firm performance. Additionally, Taylor, Machado and Peterson 
(2008) and Nadkarni and Herrmann (2010) empirically confirmed that a CEO’s positive 
psychological traits (i.e., hope, optimism, and resiliency) correlate with strategic 
flexibility. 
 UET is in the beginning phases of being applied to the sport industry. Wong and 
Deubert (2010) first provided an exploratory overview of the role of general managers 
(GMs) in professional baseball. Building on this, Peeters, Salaga, and Juravich (2015) 
investigated the role of upper and middle level managers on MLB team performance. 
These authors found that middle managers (head coaches) and upper level managers 
(general managers) both have modest impacts on team performance. For middle 
managers, a deep working knowledge of the team members is important, while 
education from a top tier university was most impactful for upper level managers. These 
findings are consistent with the ideas that middle managers need to know more about the 
personnel they are directly responsible for, while upper-level managers are more 
concerned with forming and implementing strategic initiatives. A follow up examination 
by Peters, Salaga, and Juravich (2015) added that accounting for organization-person 
match quality is important when predicting managerial impact. Specifically, these 
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authors’ results reinforced the idea that better managers tend to work at more efficient 
firms. Moreover, they found that more talented managers tend to work with other high 
quality managers and be more cooperative. Last, they documented that when upper level 
managers are much more educated than their midlevel counterparts, firm performance 
suffers. Thus, communication might be especially difficult in these situations. Also, 
Juravich, Salaga, and Babiak (2017) found similar trends in a sample of National 
Basketball Association teams and general managers. Most recently, Chapter III of this 
manuscript delved deeper into the role of functional experience. This work found that 
PSF owners who have significant career experience in marketing and sales are 
associated with higher levels of marketing-related outcomes, such as greater attendance 
and more online media consumption. On the whole, these studies have been helpful in 
building a bridge between sport management and the upper echelons perspective. 
Political Affiliation and Politics in Sport 
 While business-specific aspects of an upper echelon are intuitively predictive of 
business performance, another important (and more exogenous) class of personal 
characteristics concern an upper echelons’ political orientation. Upper echelon members’ 
political affiliation has been shown to be a driver of a diverse set of firm level outcomes 
across a varied set of industries (Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014; Chin & Semadeni, 
2017; Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, and Graffin, 2015; Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014; 
Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2015; Francis, Hasan, Sun, & Wu, 2016). Liberal CEOs have 
been found to be associated with more employee activism (Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick, 
2014), more egalitarian compensation structures (Chin and Semadeni, 2017), and more 
tax avoidance than their conservative counterparts (Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, and 
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Graffin, 2015). Likewise, conservative TMTs have been linked to conservative financial 
management strategies (Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014), and a greater propensity for 
civil rights, labor, and environmental litigation (Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2015). Highly 
partisan CEOs on both sides of the aisle are also more associated with corporate tax 
sheltering compared to their moderate counterparts (Francis, Hasan, Sun, & Wu, 2016). 
Similarly, favorable political ties have been shown to enable firms to peruse more 
challenging diversification efforts and to make more shrewd investment decisions 
(Wellman, 2016; Zhu & Chung, 2014). 
 In this context, the term ‘political affiliation’ characterizes the extent to which 
someone identifies with one end of the conservative-progressive ideological spectrum. 
Political affiliation is surely a fluid construct (McCloskey & Zaller, 1984), but political 
parties in the United States (US)—and in most developed nations—are erected on 
distinct sets of moral fundamentals that produce differences in ethical norms (Hutton, 
Jiang, & Kumar, 2014). Several topics represent areas where these differences are most 
profound: economic individualism and opportunity, civil rights, societal tolerance and 
inclusion, free enterprise, and environmental conservation (Rokeach, 1973; Feldman, 
1988; Goren, 2005; Goren et al., 2009). 
 Politics and the notion of political affiliation hold a significant place in the hearts 
and minds of sport industry stakeholders. The industry as a whole has long operated at 
the nexus of culture, society, and political economy. As such, sport is interwoven with 
societies to a degree that is unmatched by other industry sectors (Smith & Westerbeek, 
2007). For example, Jesse Owens was dissuaded from competing in the 1936 Berlin 
Olympic Games on the grounds that an African American should not help promote the 
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racist Nazi political regime. Likewise, at the 1968 Summer Olympic Games in Mexico 
City, Tommie Smith and John Carlos engaged in a human-rights inspired silent 
demonstration during their medal ceremony, which was intended to bring attention to 
poverty and racial inequality. Recently, professional American football players have 
taken to protesting the playing of the United States’ national anthem at the beginning of 
games in an effort to show displeasure with institutional and socio-economic forces they 
perceive as problematic for African Americans in the US. 
 In between these iconic, race-driven intersections of sport and politics, more 
varied examples abound. Global sport properties have been chastised on the grounds that 
the mega-events they distribute to the world are economically unfruitful at best and 
debilitating at worst (Matheson, 2006). The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and 
the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) have been billed as 
predatory for hosting these contests in developing nations that have no hope of 
recouping the immense costs involved. Decades worth of accusations levied at FIFA 
concerning financial mismanagement and administrative corruption also abound. 
Moreover, professional sport franchises (especially in North America) have been 
lambasted for shouldering their respective municipalities with the costs of facility 
upgrades and new construction. Finally, sports wagering and daily fantasy websites are 
part of a multibillion dollar industry at the center of an intense national public policy 
debate. Undergirding all of this, social media outlets have enabled athlete activism and 
philanthropic activity at unprecedented levels (Ratten, 2018). Athletes can engage at the 
microeconomic level and in real time, enhancing their brand and solidifying their place 
as cultural and political influencers. 
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  Despite the strong connection between sport and politics, little research has been 
done in the way of exploring how the political affiliation of sport’s most influential 
stakeholders manifests at larger levels of analysis. If sport stakeholders can better 
understand sports industry influencers’ political ethos, they can better understand the 
fiduciary, economic, and socio-cultural outcomes that are likely to result. 
Hypothesis Development 
Operating Margin 
 In general, political conservatives are more risk averse and prefer strict financial 
management doctrines that protect against excess business hazards (Christensen et al., 
2015; Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014). In these analyses, the result of political 
conservatism manifesting as financial conservatism is that firms with more conservative 
CEOs tended to be more profitable. In line with these findings, the following hypotheses 
is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: More conservative ownership will be positively related to a PSF’s 
operating margin. 
 However, operating margins can only offer a high-level snapshot of a PSF’s 
complete financial landscape. To delve deeper, it can be helpful to consider both revenue 
and cost structures. Intra-league PSF revenues are held relatively constant by sets of 
revenue sharing tactics (Blair, 2012). However, team-level differences in revenue are 
often accrued at the local and regional level from attendance. On the cost side, 
examining a PSF’s financial commitment to labor is most important to the resulting 
operating margin. Each of these components is discussed in more detail below. 
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Cost of Attendance 
 Attendance, merchandise, concessions, and other game-day related costs 
represent a significant and widely available data point concerning local-level revenue 
generators for PSFs. In the context of generating and preserving larger profit margins 
(Christensen et al., 2015; Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014), conservative managers should 
favor increasing revenue streams from all of these lines of business. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: More conservative ownership will be positively related to a PSF’s Fan 
Cost Index. 
Labor Relations 
 For decades, the relationship between PSF ownership and the athletes they 
employ has been a contentious issue. For most of professional sport’s history, athletes 
were awarded little or no collective bargaining rights and had virtually no control over 
which PSFs were able to bid for their services. These institutional norms kept labor costs 
artificially low. This dynamic has evolved quite a lot in recent decades to the point 
where labor relations are much more equitable. Now, many avenues exist for athletes to 
leverage their talents, which likewise allows owners to adopt varying cost structures 
when filling out their rosters. While some owners focus on building efficient payrolls 
(lower-paid rosters that win more games than might be expected), other owners are 
comfortable spending exorbitant amounts of money to acquire the league’s best and 
most established athletes. In line with this, Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2014) found that 
firms with a conservative TMT are more likely than their liberal counterparts to be sued 
for a set of reasons that included labor relations—that is, favoring financial optimality 
 119 
 
 
over workers’ best interests. This manuscript posits that (a) lower wages, (b) greater 
production efficiency, and (c) high turnover are indicative of ownership’s reluctance to 
spend freely on labor costs. Given these findings, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 3: More conservative ownership will be negatively related to total payroll. 
Hypothesis 4: More conservative ownership will be positively related to winning 
efficiency. 
Hypothesis 5: More conservative ownership will be positively related to the likelihood 
of a fire sale. 
Method 
Sample and Data 
 Secondary data were collected on the 30 PSFs that comprise MLB during the ten-
season period from 2006-2015.  For clarity, variables and their descriptions appear in 
Table 4.1, and summary statistics appear in Table 4.2. Variables are available publically 
from a range of credible sources, and were collected at four levels of analysis: the owner, 
the PSF, the PSF’s Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and the league. While Tables 1 
and 2 were produced in the interest of brevity, more detailed explanations of the most 
pertinent variables are discussed here. 
Baseline Model  
 Scores on the dependent variable of interest will be estimated as a function of the 
political affiliation independent variable, and four vectors of control variables as 
delineated in Equation (4.1): 
(4.1) Yjt= β0 + β1PAjt + βk[OWNERjt] +βk[PSFjt] + βk[MSAt] t + βk[LEAGUEt] + εjt 
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Where Yjt is the outcome of interest, β0 is a constant term, and β1PAjt is the value 
of an owner’s political affiliation for PSF j in year t. OWNERjt represents the vector of 
owner-level control variables for PSF j in year t, PSFjt is the vector of PSF-level control 
variables for PSF j in year t, , MSAt is the vector of variables corresponding to each 
PSF’s Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in year t, LEAGUEt is the vector of league-
level control variables in year t, and εjt is a random disturbance term. 
Political Affiliation 
 To measure the independent variable, the manuscript follows the conventions 
first employed by Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), and subsequently used by others 
(Christensen et al., 2015, Hutton et al.,2014; 2015). First, political donations made by 
each primary owner in every year of the analysis were gathered from the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC), which publically documents donations over $200. 
Following prior researchers, donations to political action committees (PACs) and other 
intermediary pools were excluded from the analysis, as these organizations commonly 
distribute funds to both parties according to issue-specific platform items. All donations 
made directly to local, state, and federal campaigns were included in the analysis. 
 Once gathered, the measure was computed by taking the dollar value of an 
owner’s contributions to the Republican Party in a given year minus the dollar value of 
the owner’s contributions to the Democratic Party in the same year. That value was then 
divided by the dollar value of the owner’s total contributions to both parties. This 
produced a continuous measure of political orientation bounded between +1 and −1.  A 
value of +1 indicates that all contributions were made to the Republican Party, and a 
value of −1 indicates that all contributions were made to the Democratic Party. To 
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account for opportunistic swings in donations made across multiple years, a two-year 
rolling average was produced by generating the mean of an owner’s political affiliation 
score in year t and in year t-1. 
Operating Margin 
 Operating margin is a measure of profitability, typically expressed as a 
percentage. Here, it is computed as PSF’s j's operating income divided by revenue in 
year t. Because most PSFs in North America are privately owned, these values were 
obtained from Forbes’ yearly team valuations, which use proprietary data to estimate 
financial components of a PSF’s balance sheet. 
Fan Cost Index 
 In the spirit of assessing gross cost of attendance, FCI is calculated as the total 
cost for a family of four to attend a MLB game in PSF j's venue in year t. FCI includes 
the cost of two average price adult tickets, two average price child tickets, four small soft 
drinks, two small beers, four hot dogs, two programs, two adult size caps, and parking. 
Payroll 
 Payroll is the sum of all Opening-Day roster player’s salaries for PSF j in year t. 
Winning Efficiency 
 Winning Efficiency is computed by dividing the logarithmic value of a PSF’s 
total regular season wins by the normalized dollar amount spent on payroll (Juravich, 
Salaga, & Babiak, 2017). An advantage of this approach in particular is that it captures a 
team’s performance relative to what should be expected based on payroll, as opposed to 
raw performance. 
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Fire Sales 
 In sports, the term ‘fire sale’ refers to the practice of trading away a team’s 
veteran players (especially expensive star players) to other teams for less expensive and 
typically younger players. Naturally, the most obvious financial incentive for this 
practice is a significant reduction of payroll expenses. This paper operationalizes a fire 
sale as an indicator variable taking the value of 1 when a PSF’s payroll decreases by 
more than 20% from year t-1 to year t. 
Fan Digital Media Consumption (FDMC) 
 This variable is estimated to be a significant control variable in the analysis. It 
was computed using Google Trends for each PSF in each observation year using the 
number of internet search terms pertaining to the PSF. Given a specified search term and 
including several possible parameters, Google Trends produces a chronological track of 
that search term’s popularity. A search term containing the PSF’s name was first 
specified for the ten-year time span of our analysis (i.e. all web searches for “Texas 
Rangers” between 01/01/2006 and 12/31/2015). Then, a geographic parameter was 
specified that bounded the results to all searched within that PSF’s MSA (i.e., all web 
searches for “Texas Rangers” between 01/01/2006 and 12/31/2015 within the Dallas-Ft. 
Worth MSA). Finally, a topic context for ‘sports’ was specified in order to eliminate 
web searches that related to other topics (i.e., “Texas Rangers” could refer to both the 
MLB PSF and the well-known 19th century paramilitary troops). The scores are 
presented as a percentage of PSF j's maximum search popularity during the specified 
time period. For example, a score of 45 for year t would mean that year t saw only 45% 
as many search terms for PSF j compared to PSF j’s most popular year in the time frame. 
 123 
 
 
Model Specifications 
 In order to investigate Hypotheses 1-4, the unbalanced panel dataset will be 
analyzed using fixed and random-effects models with robust standard errors. This 
approach requires the inclusion of year and PSF fixed effects, as shown in Equation (4. 
2): 
(4.2) Yjt = β0 + β1PAjt + βk[OWNERjt] +βk[PSFjt] + βk[MSAjt] + βk[LEAGUEt] + τj 
+ ϒt + εjt 
 Where τj are PSF fixed effects and ϒt are year fixed effects. The fixed-effects 
model, it should be noted, does not include PSF fixed effects, τj, as they do not vary over 
time. 
For the equation investigating Hypothesis 1, Operating Margin (OMjt) is 
predicted using an owner’s political affiliation (PAjt) and a set of controls, which are 
included based on prior research and basic accounting principles. Other owner 
characteristics are included based on prior upper echelon research in sport (Juravich, 
Salaga, & Babiak, 2017; Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 2015), such as age, age squared, 
tenure, tenure squared, and education. The squared terms are included to investigate the 
potential curvilinear effects of age and tenure.  
Then, PSF-level variables that expressly determine revenue and cost structures 
are included. Cost-side variables in the model include payroll and the percentage of 
stadium financed by the team. Revenue-side variables at the team level include 
attendance, FCI, gate revenue, stadium capacity, and FDMC. FDMC is important 
because it gives an indication of fans’ interactions with team-specific content outside of 
a stadium environment. On-field performance has also been documented as an important 
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predictor of patronage and fan interest in general (Ahn & Lee, 2014). Therefore, games 
won and winning efficiency are included in the model. These two variables are related 
conceptually in that the latter hinges on the value of the former. However, the specific 
computation of winning efficiency described earlier reduced the two measure’s co-
dependence and allowed for the inclusion of both variables in the model (r = -.019). 
 Next, the team’s tenure in the city and the age of the stadium (measured in 
years since a new stadium was built or since the last major renovation project was 
finished) are included in the model. Following that, five MSA-level controls are 
included. The first is the MSA’s per capita income. The second is the number of other 
PSFs in the MSA. It is included as a measure of competitive rivalry because 
entertainment consumers typically must make zero-sum tradeoffs given a set of available 
options. Next, the MSA’s population, the MSA’s income tax rate, and the MSA’s 
unemployment rate are included. Then, because PSF values are largely determined by 
redistributed league-level revenue, total MLB revenue in the observation year was 
included in the model.  
At the macroeconomic level, variables were included that are often seen as 
determinants of consumers’ willingness and/or ability to engage in experiential leisure 
products and services: the consumer price index, the federal funds rate, the US dollar 
exchange rate, and the average US wage for hourly workers Thus, Hypothesis 1 was 
investigated using Equation (4. 3): 
(4.3) OMjt = β0 + β1PAjt + β2Oagejt +β3Otenurejt + β2Age2jt +β3Tenure2jt + 
β4Oedujt + β5Payrolljt + β5Privatejt + β6Attjt + β7FCIjt + β8Gatejt +β12Capjt + 
β13FDMCjt+ β10GWjt + β11WEjt + β14Ttenurejt + β15StAgejt + β16MSAPCIjt + 
 125 
 
 
β17Compjt + β18Popjt + β19Taxjt + β20Unempjt + β21MLBRevjt + β22CPIjt + 
β23FFRjt + β24USDjt + β25Wagesjt +  τj  + ϒt + εjt 
 To investigate Hypothesis 2, FCI will be predicted using an owner’s political 
affiliation and a set of pertinent owner-level control variables, as in the prior estimation. 
There is a comparative dearth of pricing-focused outcomes in the sport economics and 
sport marketing literatures (Drayer & Rascher, 2013). In this space, studies typically 
investigate pricing’s role in predicting demand, rather than investigating it as an outcome 
in and of itself. Furthermore, recent studies that do examine the pricing of sport products 
typically do so in the context of ticket prices alone (Popp, Shapiro, Walsh, McEvoy, 
Simmons, & Howell, 2018; Drayer & Shapiro, 2009; Rishe & Mondello, 2003; Salaga & 
Winfree, 2015). While ticket prices represent a piece of the FCI metric, these studies do 
provide some basic insight for the construction of this model. Rishe and Mondello 
(2003) lay a foundation when they isolate five factors that affect the pricing of tickets: a 
new stadium, prior season’s performance, fans’ income levels, the MSA’s population, 
and the ticket price rate of increase. By and large, these results have been bolstered by 
subsequent studies. Therefore, variables added to the model include the age of the 
stadium, lagged values for the team’s win percentage and win efficiency, the MSA’s per 
capita income, the MSA’s population, and the change in FCI from year t-1 to year t. 
Last, Salaga and Winfree (2015) delineated that the MSA’s unemployment rate was a 
predictor of personal seat license prices, so that variable is added to Equation (4.4) 
below. 
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(4.4) FCIjt = β0 + β1PAjt + β2Oagejt +β3Otenurejt + β2Age2jt +β3Tenure2jt + 
β4Oedujt + β15StAgejt + β10LagGWjt + β11LagWEjt + β16MSAPCIjt+ β18Popjt + 
β20Unempj + β10ΔFCIjt +  τj  + ϒt + εjt 
 Next, attention is given to the estimation of Payroll for the purposes of testing 
Hypothesis 3. Like prior equations, the political affiliation independent variable and the 
set of other ownership characteristics are included in the model. As it pertains to wages, 
a large portion of this research focuses on predicting individual players’ and positions’ 
salaries rather than PSF-level payroll (Baumer & Zimbalist, 2013; Brown & Jepsen 
2009; Burger & Walters, 2003; DeBrock, Hendricks, & Koenker, 2004; Hill & Jolly, 
2017; Magel & Hoffman, 2015; Scully, 1974). Across this line of research, important 
variables such as prior performance, market size, and regional income levels have been 
shown to affect wages at the individual level. Therefore, lagged measures of the team’s 
performance (winning percentage and winning efficiency), the MSA’s population, and 
the MSA’s per capita income are included in the model. Finally, it is surmised that the 
MSA’s income tax rate will also affect payroll, as employers in MSAs with larger tax 
rates commonly adjust salaries to accommodate higher (or lower) after-tax income. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is investigated using Equation (4.5): 
(4.5) Payrolljt = β0 + β1PAjt + β2Oagejt +β3Otenurejt + β2Age2jt +β3Tenure2jt + 
β4Oedujt + β10LagGWjt + β11LagWEjt + β18Popjt+ β16MSAPCIjt+ β19Taxjt +  τj  
+ ϒt + εjt 
 Following Payroll, Hypothesis 4 delineates a relationship between political 
affiliation and winning efficiency. This would suggest that more conservative owners are 
more concerned with minimizing resource deployment and thus optimizing the PSF’s 
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operational efficiency. Therefore, the estimation method and underlying logic from 
Hypothesis 3 is employed here, with a significant adjustment—winning efficiency is 
estimated from the political affiliation independent variable and the set of controls, 
which now includes payroll. Because of the endogeneity between payroll and winning 
efficiency, the modeling approach involves two stages. This approach is outlined by 
Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008) and is utilized by other researchers in this context 
(Juravich, Salaga, and Babiak, 2017). The first stage of the model involves estimating 
payroll as a function of a MSA’s population and per-capita income. This is shown by 
Equation (4.6): 
(4.6) Payjt = β0 + β1MSAPopjt + β2MSAIncjt +  εjt 
Where Payjt is a PSF’s total payroll in year t, β1MSAPopjt is the coefficient for 
the population of a PSF’s MSA in year t, β2MSAIncjt is the coefficient for the per capita 
income in a PSF’s MSA in year t, and εjt is a random disturbance term. Once estimated, 
the residual from Equation (6) is then included as a predictor in the model estimating 
win efficiency. Thus, Equation (4.7) is presented: 
(4.7) WEjt= β0 + β1PAjt + β2Oagejt +β3Otenurejt + β2Age2jt +β3Tenure2jt + β4Oedujt 
+ β10LagGWjt + β11LagWEjt + β18Popjt+ β16MSAPCIjt+ β19Taxjt + FSRjt +  τj  
+ ϒt + εjt 
Where FSRjt corresponds to the residual from Equation (4.6). 
 Last, Hypothesis 5 indicates that there will be a relationship between an owner’s 
political conservativeness and the likelihood that he will initiate wage reductions using a 
fire sale. Given the binary nature of the outcome, a logistic regression technique is used. 
In Equation (8) below, predictors are included according to the following logic. First, as 
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with all other models in this paper, the political affiliation predictor and owner-level 
control variables are included. Because individual personnel decisions are often based on 
prior performance, lagged values of wins and winning efficiency are included. Naturally, 
operating margin is included in the vector of predictors since this free cash flow can be 
used to accommodate wage surges, while a lack of operating capital can initiate a 
reduction in payroll expenses. Next, there is a significant role of the PSF-fan relationship 
that should be explored for this model. In service industries like professional sport, there 
is a distinct relationship between PSF’s upper echelons and the fans that patronize them 
(Funk & James, 2006; Funk, 2017). As this research has outlined, fan loyalty (or lack 
thereof) is an important influencer of strategic decision making for PSF owners and 
upper managers (Depken II, 2000; Depken & Craig, 2001; Schmidt & Berri, 2006). As 
opposed to the idea of ‘brand image’, which is a short-term evaluation of a brand’s 
qualities (Gray & Balmer, 1998), fans’ loyalty is the result of positive perceptions of 
reputation—a long term assessment of a brand or organization. Therefore, the vector of 
controls includes measures of the team’s tenure in the city, with the implication being 
that longer-tenured teams may benefit from a deeper connection to their fan base. To 
ensure robustness of this concept, lagged attendance and lagged FDMC is also included 
in the model. Because employees’ age has been shown to play a role in the personnel 
management strategies of sport and non-sport firms (Krautmann & Ciecka, 2009; Sims 
& Addona, 2014; Virtanen et al., 2006), the average age of each team’s 40-man roster in 
this model. Last, the vectors of controls at the MSA level, league level, and 
macroeconomic level are included. Thus, the estimation of the likelihood of a fire sale is 
expressed using Equation (4.8): 
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(4.8) FireSalejt = β0 + β1PAjt + β2Oagejt, + β3Otenurejt + β4OAge2jt + β5OTenure2jt 
+ β6Oedujt + β7LagGWjt + β8LagWEjt + β9OMjt + β10Ttenurejt + β11LagAttjt + 
β12LagFDMCjt + β13LagBAgejt + β14MSAPCIt + β15MSAPopjt + β16Taxesjt + 
β17Unempjt + β18MLBRevjt + β19CPIjt + β20FFRjt + β21USDjt + β22Wagesjt + εjt 
 Finally, the last step in the methodological process was to address the influence 
of individual-level preferences for political activism amongst owners. Determinants of 
individuals’ political activism are numerous and commonly intertwined (Sandovici & 
Davis, 2010). For example, Sandovici & Davis (2010) delineate how men and senior 
citizens are less inclined to be politically active than women and young people. 
Moreover, psychological traits have also been shown to affect political participation and 
efficacy (Vecchione & Caprara, 2009). Finally, research has also indicated that, at the 
firm-level, political donations can be influenced by a number of strategic imperatives. 
Hadani and Schuler (2012), for example, found that corporate political giving was 
positively associated with performance for firms that compete in highly-regulated 
industries. 
 To address these issues, two additional predictors were entered into each of the 
prior model specifications as a robustness check: the sum of each owner’s political 
donations in each year (measured in 2015 USD), and a count of the number of donations 
made by each owner in each year. Together, these two variables were intended to 
provide insight about each owner’s individual preferences towards political giving. 
However, in all models, the predictors were not statistically significant and did not 
materially affect other predictors of interest. Therefore, they were omitted from the final 
analyses. 
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Results 
 For reference, summary statistics for all the variables are provided in Table 4.2. 
The mean for PA was close to zero, (M = -.067, SD = .56) indicating that across the 
entire sample, owners’ donations were relatively balanced to both parties. Next, bivariate 
correlations are presented in Table 4.3. A subsequent examination of the VIFs showed 
that none exceeded a value of 10, and the mean was well below 5, two recommended 
cutoffs suggested by Hair et al (2009). Results from all five specifications – the focus of 
this section – are presented in Table 4.4. Coefficients and their accompanying robust 
standard errors are presented. 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that more conservative owners would be associated with 
larger operating margins due to their fiscal conservatism. The coefficient for owners’ 
political affiliation is negative and not statistically significant (β = -.026; z = -1.45; 
p=.146). Therefore, the model specification does not find support for Hypothesis 1. 
 Next, Hypothesis 2 stated that more conservative owners would be associated 
with larger FCIs. In this model specification, the coefficient for political affiliation was 
negative and significant (β = -9.44; z = -1.73; p=.085). This means that given two PSFs 
with owners who differ on political affiliation by one standard deviation, the PSF with a 
conservative owner was associated with, on average, a reduction of FCI by $9.45, ceteris 
paribus. This finding does not support Hypothesis 2, but it does showcase the need for 
additional discussion and speculation as to future research in this particular area of 
inquiry. 
 Third, Hypothesis 3 stated that more conservative owners would be associated 
with lower payrolls. The results of this analysis showed a coefficient that was negative 
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but not statistically significant (β = -5210080; z = -0.85; p=.397). Therefore, there is no 
support for Hypothesis 3. 
 Hypothesis 4 predicted that there would be a positive relationship between 
conservative ownership and winning efficiency. Because Hypothesis 3 speculated that 
conservative owners would spend less on payroll, Hypothesis 4 was intended to siphon 
out whether there was an underlying emphasis on production efficiency as opposed to 
merely a blind reduction of payroll costs. The results of this analysis show a Wald X2 
that was not statistically different from zero (X2 = 4.82; p = .94), meaning the model as a 
whole was not helpful in predicting winning efficiency.  Beyond that, the coefficient for 
political affiliation was positive but not statistically significant (β = 56.51; z = .64; 
p=.523). Thus, the analysis finds no support for Hypothesis 4. 
 Last, Hypothesis 5 forecast that more conservative owners would be more likely 
to engage in aggressive payroll reductions, known in baseball as a ‘fire sale’. The results 
of a logistic regression investigating this premise returned a model that, statistically, 
could not be deemed to be significantly different from the null model (Wald X2(21) = 
13.75; p = .879; LL = -81.58). Therefore, the results of this analysis did not find support 
for Hypothesis 5.  
Discussion and Implications 
 As it relates to the model proposed in Chapter I, the findings in this manuscript 
only tangentially support the idea that intangible resources are associated with firm-level 
outcomes. Owners’ PA did not manifest at the PSF-level in the hypothesized ways, and 
the only significant relationship was opposite to what was hypothesized. While Chapter 
III documented significant and positive relationships between explicitly-operationalized 
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intangibles and performance, this follow-up analysis did not find positive relationships 
between a tacitly-operationalized intangible resource like PA. Indeed, more work on 
tacitly-operationalized resources is needed in order to make comparative judgments 
about the two resource typologies. 
 To build upon this manuscript, the focus of future work could be placed on 
understanding the political affiliation of PSF ownership in relation to other important 
stakeholders. As such, future work should seek to build upon the research showing that 
favorable political ties between TMT members and important external actors are 
associated with performance advantages for the firm (Wellman, 2016; Zhu & Chung, 
2014). Supporting this, other research in sport has drawn attention to the importance of 
TMT members’ characteristics ‘matching’ that of their peers (Peeters, Salaga, & 
Juravich, 2015). Specifically, it could be proposed that congruence between a PSF 
owner’s political affiliation and the political affiliation of the MSA’s congressional 
representative or state representative will predict PSF-level outcomes. 
 Taken together, the results of the five model specifications suggest that PSF 
owners’ political affiliation has little to no effect on how they manage the organization’s 
strategic initiatives. The results of the models investigating Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5 
found no clear or consistent link between political conservatism and fiscal conservatism. 
Additionally, the analysis investigating Hypothesis 2 documented the opposite effect of 
what was hypothesized—that is, each standard deviation increase of owners’ political 
conservatism was associated with an FCI that was almost $10.00 cheaper, on average 
(and holding all else constant). Traditional thinking about fiscal conservatism and the 
empirical analyses that followed have shown that politically conservative members of a 
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firm’s upper echelon tend to be more risk-averse and, as such, focus on enhancing profit 
margins (Christensen et al., 2015; Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014). This does not appear 
to be the case in this sample of firms and owners. 
 These results are salient given the current political climate of the sports and 
entertainment industry, as social justice issues – and the political tinges they carry with 
them – continue to dominate news cycles and academic discourse. Their preeminence is 
being exacerbated as principal owners become increasingly influential pieces of the 
PSF’s overall brand strategy. Further, the unique structures in place in the professional 
sport industry incentivize and enable profit maximization. Leagues and franchises 
engage in economic cooperation off the field by enacting labor market restraints, 
engaging in geographic product market limitations (Szymanski, 2003), and reducing 
product saturation throughout the calendar year. Economists have long highlighted the 
financial windfalls these structures generate (Fort & Quirk, 1995; Vrooman, 1995). 
Given all of this, it is not surprising that sport and entertainment consumers remain 
skeptical of ownership’s intentions. On the heels of that skepticism, it is only natural for 
sport and entertainment consumers to wonder whether the political affiliation of a PSF 
owner might come into play when the owner makes decisions about the organization’s 
financial and strategic initiatives. Based on this analysis, these stakeholders’ natural 
skepticisms appear to be unfounded, as there was no documentable relationship found 
between owners’ political leanings and the way they managed their PSFs. 
 The findings in this manuscript have implications for academicians and 
practitioners. For academics, they provide a boundary condition for the theory that top 
managers’ political conservatism tends to influence how they manage the financial state 
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of the firm (Christensen et al., 2015; Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014). It could be, for 
instance, that certain industries are immune or exempt from this phenomena due to their 
dependence on co-creating value alongside consumers (Jones, 2017), hyper-focus on 
service (Woratschek, Horbel, & Popp, 2014), and plethora of diverse consumer touch 
points (Funk, 2017). Collectively, these industry conditions necessitate that PSFs’ 
ownership and executives be more responsive to consumer input. In short, firms that 
compete in publically-facing, service- and relationship- dependent industries are vastly 
different than ‘traditional’ business sectors. In these industries, managers and owners 
likely have much less latitude to enact policies that reflect their own personal 
preferences when stakeholders’ feedback is (a) so highly valued and (b) ubiquitous. Now 
and in the future, these competitive environments will continue to become the norm 
(Funk, 2017; Oh, Fiore, & Jeoung, 2007; Pine & Gilmore, 1998). Therefore, the seismic 
cultural shifts governing the way firms and consumers interact will likely require a 
revisited examination of the very tenants of UET (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 
2007). 
 This work also opens the door for follow-up research related to other politically-
salient PSF-level outcomes. PA can manifest in a number of ways related to the financial 
and economic management of the PSF. One of the major policy debates in sports 
concerns the public financing of PSFs’ facilities. The construction of new facilities and 
renovations to existing facilities represent a sizable expense for modern day PSFs in all 
leagues (Fort, 2006; Blair, 2012). This is because sport consumers’ preferences have 
evolved rapidly over the prior two or three decades (Shank & Lyberger, 2014). Modern 
PSFs are tasked with providing much more than an on-field contest; they are responsible 
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for creating an entire sport servicescape (Wakerfield & Blodgett, 2016), complete with 
dozens of experiential touch points (Funk, 2017). To provide such an atmosphere and 
experience for sport consumers, PSFs have turned to expensive facility upgrades and 
redevelopment. Tax-payers and municipalities are estimated to shoulder as much as 80% 
of these costs on average (Long, 2005), so understanding whether PA can motivate 
certain owners to seek more public funding should be important for future research in 
this area. 
 For league-level practitioners in sport, the results of this analysis should reinforce 
the irrelevancy of owners’ political affiliation. Within the context of new and growing 
leagues especially, there is a need to conduct thorough due diligence on new and 
prospective franchise owners. Being able to predict what kind of owners they are likely 
to be—profit maximizers or win maximizers—is important for establishing trust with 
consumers and building relationships with sponsors. This article has empirically shown 
that owners’ political affiliation, despite what the popular press and some academic work 
implies, has virtually no bearing on a PSF’s financial and strategic management. In some 
cases, the effect of political conservatism is opposite of what is implied by these sources. 
That being said, public opinion has historically been shaped by news and journalism 
(Protess & McCombes, 2016; Iyengar & Simon, 1993)—so while owners’ political 
stances have little bearing on how they manage PSFs in a scientific sense, leagues should 
always be mindful of the public relations and agenda-setting implications of certain 
ownership groups. Owners are becoming an increasingly important and visible 
component of a PSF’s brand story, therefore considering how owners’ political track 
record may affect public sentiment should still be paramount. 
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Limitations 
 It should be noted that the findings in this manuscript come with some 
limitations. Due to the complexities of measuring political orientation, this manuscript 
used the most common and accepted operationalization. But, the measurement of 
political orientation is certainly a foreboding exercise given its multidimensional nature. 
Many other legitimate operationalizations abound. For one, it would be interesting to 
track owners’ contributions to PACs that have a consistent liberal or conservative lean. 
Another operationalization would involve analyzing unstructured verbal data scraped 
from interview transcripts, press conferences, social media posts, and other public 
statements. This would likely benefit from use of latent semantic analysis (Dumais, 
2004) or latent Dirichlet allocation (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003) to minimalize researcher 
bias. While perhaps more technical from a methods standpoint, this operationalization 
would also likely provide the most in-depth knowledge about an owners’ political 
leanings. 
 In line with the former limitation, the next one relates to the fact that this 
manuscript assumes that PSF owners’ political contributions are representative of their 
actual political ideologies. In practice, the determinants of political contributions are 
multifaceted and can stem from the industry-, region-, firm-, and individual-level 
(Guptra, Briscoe, & Hambrick, 2016; Harrigan, 2017; Shirodkar, Beddewela, & Richter, 
2018; Sandovici & Davis, 2010). As it relates to individual public choice, research has 
shown evidence that specific individual-level traits can impact the form of one’s political 
activism – whether it be campaign donation, boycotting, or boycotting. In such 
instances, individuals engage in a given category of political activism with the intention 
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of influencing politically-salient outcomes. However, at the firm-level, empirical work 
has generally incited skepticism for the notion that firms engage in political donations 
with the intent of accruing political influence in return (Aggarwal, Meschke, &Wang, 
2012). In the context of owners, the conceptually important question for future research 
becomes: do they view their political contributions as representations of themselves as 
individuals, or on behalf of their PSF as a regional and national brand? 
 Third, the framework of this analysis assumes inadvertently that PSF owners are 
directly involved with contract negotiating, product pricing, and margin management. 
The degree to which an owner can be involved in each business function is completely 
unregulated by most professional leagues, so it is fair to expect a fair amount of variance 
in this regard. Some owners likely do involve themselves with those decisions in a direct 
way, while others prefer a more hands-off approach. Still others operate somewhere in 
the middle. In line with this, future work should aim to assess PSF owners’ actual degree 
of involvement with various functions like marketing, contract negotiation, or 
technology implementation. In line with this assumption (and mirroring other research in 
this area, Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017), the study assumes that PSF owners are 
solely responsible for those decisions. Likely, differing levels of teamwork and 
cooperation are used to reach strategic decisions within the PSF’s TMT. Because some 
classes of managers (i.e., ‘better’ managers) are more likely to cooperate (Peeters, 
Salaga, & Juravich, 2015), there should be a fair amount of variance expected in this 
regard too. 
 As it pertains to cooperation and group involvement in decision making, it would 
be interesting for future research to investigate whether a matching of political 
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affiliations results in certain types of PSF-level outcomes. Recent research in this area 
has drawn attention to the importance of matching managers with organizations and co-
workers on an education and experience basis (Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 2015). But, a 
difference in political orientations between CEOs and their non-CEO TMT counterparts 
has been shown to affect upper echelons’ perceptions of fairness, which can in turn 
affect organization performance (Chin, 2014). It would, therefore, be interesting to 
investigate these phenomena in a sport context—an environment where TMT quibbling 
is a public affair versus one conducted largely behind closed doors. Examples of these 
interactions abound, and might include the falling out between Jerry Jones and Jimmy 
Johnson of the Dallas Cowboys, or Jim Harbaugh and Jed York of the San Francisco 
49ers. 
Conclusion 
 This manuscript attempted to uncover the relationships between PSF owners’ 
political affiliation and the way they manage their PSF. The manuscript utilized the UET 
literature in sport as a foundation, and the political discourse in sport as inspiration, to 
propose a series of five hypotheses. The results do not support the idea that an owner’s 
political leanings impact how he manages his PSF, which should be reassuring to 
multiple stakeholder groups. Despite the findings, the intersection of politics and sport 
will continue to flourish, so attention to this line of inquiry will be required now and in 
the future.
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Figures and Tables 
Table 4.1. Variables, abbreviations, and descriptions 
 
 
 
Variable Abbreviation Description
Political Affiliation PA
The dollar value of an owner’s contributions to the Republican Party in year t 
minus the dollar value of the owner’s contributions to the Democratic Party in 
year t, all divided by the dollar value of the owner’s total contributions to both 
parties. A value of +1means all contributions were to the Republican Party, 
and a value of −1 means that all contributions were made to the Democratic 
Party. Computed as a two-year rolling average.
Owners' Age Oage Age in years of the majority owner of PSF j  in year t
Owners' Tenure Otenure Number of years the majority owner has owned PSF j  in year t
Owner's Age squared Oage2 Age in years of the majority owner of PSF j  in year t squared
Owner's Tenure squared Otenure2 Number of years the majority owner has owned PSF j  in year t  squared
Owner's Education Oedu
Ordinal variable capturing the highest level of education attained by the 
owner; 1=high school, 2=bachelor’s degree, 3=master’s degree, & 
4=terminal degree
Operating Margin OM Operating income divided by revenues for PSF j  in year t
Payroll Expenses Payroll Total payroll for PSF j's opening day roster in year t
Stadium Private Funding Private
Percentage of a PSF's stadium (or most recent significant rennovation) paid 
for with private funds
Attendance Att Aggregate regular season attendance for PSF j  in year t
Lagged attendance LagAtt Aggregate regular season attendance for PSF j  in year t-1
Fan Cost Index FCI
Total cost for a family of four to attend a MLB game in PSF j 's venue in 
year t
Change in FCI ΔFCI Percentage increase or decrease in a PSF's FCI from year t-1  to year t
Gate Revenues Gate Gate revenues for PSF j  in year t
Stadium Capacity Cap The capacity of PSF j 's stadium in yeat t
Fan Digital Media Consumption FDMC
Percentage of PSF j 's maximum search popularity during the time period 
examined in year t
Lagged FDMC LagFDMC
Percentage of PSF j 's maximum search popularity during the time period 
examined in year t-1
Games Won GW Raw number of games won by PSF j  in year t
Lagged Games Won LagGW Raw number of games won by PSF j  in year t-1
Winning Efficiency WE
Deviation score for the logarithmic value of PSF j 's total regular season wins 
divided by the normalized dollar amount spent on payroll in year t
Lagged Winning Efficiency LagWE
Deviation score for the logarithmic value of PSF j 's total regular season wins 
divided by the normalized dollar amount spent on payroll in year t-1
Team Tenure Ttenure Number of years the franchise has resided within the current MSA in year t
Stadium Age StadAge Age of PSF j's stadium in year t
Fire Sale FireSale
Indicator variable assuming the value of 1 if PSF j's payroll decreased by 
greater than 20% from t-1  to t ; 0 otherwise
Batters' Age BAge
Weighted average age of players who made at least one plate appearance for 
PSF j  in year t
Lagged Batter's Age LagBAge
Weighted average age of players who made at least one plate appearance for 
PSF j  in year t-1
MSA Per Capita Income MSAPCI Per-capital income in the MSA in year t
Competition Comp
Ordinal variable that represents the number of other ‘Big Four’ PSFs in PSF 
j 's MSA in year t
MSA population Pop Actual or projectecd population of MSA in year t
MSA income tax rate Tax Income tax rate for residents in a given MSA
MSA unemployment Unemp Rate of unemployment in a given MSA
MLB Revenue MLBRev Amount of revenue generated by the MLB in year t
Consumer Price Index CPI
A weighted average of the price of a number of consumer goods and 
services in year t ; average of 12 monthly values
Federal Funds Rate FFR
Interest rate at which banks can lend funds to one another in year t ; average 
of 12 monthly values
US Dollar exchange rate USD Average hourly take-home pay for US workers in year t
Wages Wages
Average houshold disposable income after taxes and other mandatory 
payments in the MSA in year t
Dispisable Income DisInc
Average houshold disposable income after taxes and other mandatory 
payments in the MSA in year t
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Table 4.2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PA 300 -0.06637 0.555963 -1 1
Oage 297 65.367 11.12475 42 93
Otenure 300 11.27667 8.552814 1 39
Oedu 296 2.736486 0.908428 1 4
OM 300 0.083381 0.085238 -0.27611 0.352459
Payroll 300 9.85E+07 4.14E+07 1.70E+07 2.82E+08
Private 300 37.08667 35.04568 0 100
Att 300 2500843 668881.2 1165120 4298655
FCI 300 197.3694 51.15456 114.24 410.88
Gate 300 74.17333 49.86983 16 319
Cap 300 44312.66 5333.804 31042 57333
FDMC 300 18.3025 12.00894 0 56.41667
GW 300 80.99 10.73035 51 103
WE 300 45.66857 614.8473 -498.256 10360.28
Ttenure 300 63.63333 40.5724 2 139
StadAge 300 23.06333 24.91509 1 103
FireSale 300 0.113333 0.31753 0 1
BAge 300 28.754 1.316763 25.4 33.7
MSAPCI 300 49155.93 8684.78 34867 79206
Comp 300 4.063333 1.594091 1 7
Pop 300 5913780 4669308 1523907 2.01E+07
Tax 300 6.383133 4.316449 0 13.3
Unemp 300 6.96 1.837295 4.4 9.9
MLBRev 300 6.497 0.992706 5.11 8.39
CPI 300 221.7946 11.7466 201.558 236.987
FFR 300 1.282 1.932378 0.09 5.02
USD 300 77.78167 5.333647 70.8724 90.9737
Wages 300 19.081 1.315987 16.74 21.03
DisInc 300 37576.8 2616.825 33591 42094
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Table 4.3. Bivariate Correlations 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
1 PA 1.00
2 Oage -0.26 1.00
3 Otenure -0.16 0.44 1.00
4 Oedu -0.15 0.14 0.32 1.00
5 OM -0.02 -0.09 -0.18 -0.02 1.00
6 Payroll -0.13 0.08 0.20 -0.05 -0.38 1.00
7 Private -0.04 -0.18 -0.17 -0.22 -0.08 0.46 1.00
8 Att -0.12 -0.09 0.08 -0.08 -0.24 0.58 0.53 1.00
9 FCI -0.15 0.00 0.06 -0.12 -0.17 0.69 0.45 0.45 1.00
10 Gate -0.15 -0.10 0.05 -0.14 -0.20 0.77 0.50 0.72 0.82 1.00
11 Cap -0.04 -0.06 0.20 0.12 -0.19 0.16 -0.04 0.38 -0.04 0.14 1.00
12 FDMC 0.00 0.13 0.19 -0.11 -0.01 0.20 -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.20 1.00
13 GW -0.04 0.02 0.11 -0.06 -0.13 0.27 0.16 0.45 0.13 0.34 0.22 0.41 1.00
14 WE 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 1.00
15 ttenure -0.01 0.00 0.13 -0.01 -0.15 0.39 0.30 0.30 0.43 0.41 -0.25 0.07 0.13 0.11 1.00
16 Ttenure 0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.21 -0.08 0.30 0.45 0.22 0.43 0.32 0.04 -0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.21 1.00
17 StadAge 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 1.00
18 FireSale -0.16 0.14 0.10 0.08 -0.22 0.50 0.26 0.30 0.39 0.41 0.12 0.10 0.23 0.06 0.30 0.21 -0.17 1.00
19 BAge -0.11 0.03 -0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.35 0.15 0.14 0.50 0.36 0.12 0.10 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.23 -0.05 0.26 1.00
20 Comp -0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.22 -0.09 0.37 0.16 0.32 0.35 0.43 0.29 0.05 0.15 -0.09 -0.04 0.26 -0.03 0.11 0.45 1.00
21 Pop -0.11 0.03 0.10 -0.12 -0.23 0.50 0.24 0.45 0.46 0.58 0.35 -0.02 0.20 -0.05 0.10 0.22 -0.03 0.24 0.24 0.69 1.00
22 Tax -0.12 -0.02 -0.15 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.30 0.07 0.18 0.29 -0.08 0.16 -0.02 -0.09 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.48 0.37 0.26 1.00
23 Unemp -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.04 -0.18 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.18 -0.03 -0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00
24 MLBRev 0.04 0.12 0.13 -0.06 -0.08 0.30 -0.07 -0.07 0.24 0.13 -0.13 0.49 -0.02 0.07 0.10 0.02 -0.04 0.18 0.38 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.16 1.00
25 CPI 0.02 0.10 0.12 -0.06 -0.11 0.29 -0.07 -0.08 0.26 0.14 -0.14 0.47 -0.02 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.36 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.95 1.00
26 FFR 0.03 -0.07 -0.09 0.02 0.09 -0.22 0.05 0.09 -0.24 -0.16 0.14 -0.26 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 0.01 -0.10 -0.13 -0.21 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.60 -0.68 -0.80 1.00
27 USD 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.06 0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.62 0.39 0.10 0.18 1.00
28 Wages 0.02 0.11 0.13 -0.05 -0.10 0.29 -0.07 -0.08 0.26 0.15 -0.15 0.46 -0.02 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.35 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.10 0.96 0.98 -0.84 0.16 1.00
29 DisInc 0.03 0.11 0.12 -0.07 -0.09 0.29 -0.07 -0.07 0.24 0.13 -0.13 0.49 -0.02 0.06 0.10 0.02 -0.03 0.18 0.39 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.12 0.98 0.98 -0.70 0.27 0.96 1.00
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Table 4.4. The effect of owners’ PA on specified PSF-level outcomes 
 
 
Variable OM SE FCI SE Pay SE WE SE Fire SE
PA -0.026 0.02 -9.445* 5.47 -5210080 6.1E+06 56.51488 88.4483 0.593 1.01
Oage 0.000 0.00 0.034 0.27 -356543.9 3.5E+05 21.82142 17.0202 0.010 0.02
Otenure -0.001 0.00 0.174 0.35 552897.8 3.7E+05 0.9695403 5.09567 -0.042 0.04
Age2 0.000 0.00 0.001 0.02 -21462.66 2.1E+04 -0.1262034 0.11927 -.0002 0.00
Tenure2 0.000 0.00 0.022 0.02 -9560.74 2.5E+04 -0.2410896 0.20119 -.001 0.00
Oedu 0.011878* 0.01 6.124 4.31 -3738090 3.6E+06 45.61439 37.4594 -0.115 0.29
OM -1.075 3.10
Payroll -1.1E-09*** 0.00
Private 1.8E-04 0.00
Att -5.8E-09 0.00
LagAtt -3.19E-07 0.00
FCI 2.5E-04 0.00
ΔFCI 65.358*** 7.02
Gate 0.000738** 0.00 0.609*** 0.10
Cap 7.7E-07 0.00 0.000 0.00
FDMC 0.0011162* 0.00 -0.337 0.22
LagFDMC -0.004 0.03
GW -0.0019355** 0.00 -0.196* 0.12
LagGW 784488.7*** 1.4E+05 6.018972 5.35914 0.016 0.03
WE 0.0016519** 0.00
LagWE 81237.75 7.3E+04 -6.72E-04 6.23E-02 0.006 0.01
Ttenure 1.2E-04 0.00 0.190** 0.08 -0.001 0.01
LagBAge -0.291 0.20
FireSale
StAge 5.1E-05 0.00 -0.114 0.23
MSAPCI 4.0E-07 0.00 0.002** 0.00 1734.938*** 6.1E+02 -1.02E-03 1.75E-03 -1.10E-06 0.00
Comp 7.3E-03 0.00 0.063 3.30
Pop -2.0E-09 0.00 0.000 0.00 3.709676*** 1.4E+00 -6.09E-06 6.82E-06 3.09E-08 0.00
Tax 8.6E-04 0.00 -2.022** 0.98 -1576023 1.2E+06 -6.343611 5.11856 0.015 0.06
Unemp -4.4E-03 0.01 13.694*** 4.26 4.903 19.08
MLBRev 0.1429006** 0.06 30.876*** 9.13 15.097 65.95
CPI -1.2E-02 0.01 3.659*** 0.79 1.091 4.61
FFR -8.3E-03 0.02 17.972*** 5.61 5.272 21.82
USD -0.0077565** 0.00 -0.319 1.66
Wages -7.8E-03 0.04 -6.457 29.92
FSR
DisInc -3.9E-06 0.00 -0.015*** 0.00 -0.004 0.02
Constant 2.541054** 0.98 -501.439*** 163.50 -4.44E+07 3.4E+07 -86.220 297.21
R
2 
Within 0.3411 0.694 0.2641 0.003
R
2
 Between 0.7145 0.7887 0.463 0.1449
R
2
 Total 0.4928 0.7753 0.3923 0.0197
N 252 224 224 224 2.24E+02
Wald X
2
1124.35 1419.4 60.29 4.82 13.75
Prob > X
2
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.8799
LL -81.58
Outcomes & Robust SEs
*=p<.1; **=p<.05; ***=p<.01  
Omitted
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS, CONTRIBUTIONS, &  
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Synopsis 
 This final chapter aims to accomplish two objectives: (1) to recount the results, 
important takeaways, and implications of the preceding four Chapters, and (2) to outline 
a future research agenda for the investigation of firms’ resources. The takeaways from 
the empirical analyses in Chapters II, III, and VI highlight that intangible resources are 
more generative of competitive advantage than tangible resources. They also indicate 
that explicitly-operationalized intangible resources can be generative of competitive 
advantage, while tacitly-operationalized intangible resources are not positively 
associated with competitive advantage. These takeaways are interesting in the context of 
the complete model because they provide support for some of the proposed relationships 
while indicating support for the antithesis of other proposed relationships. 
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Introduction 
 The work presented herein first illustrated a complete model of strategic resource 
utility. Following the proposition of this framework, it has empirically explored some 
key tenants of the model. In Chapter I, the theoretical model was proposed based on a 
comprehensive review of prior literature in strategic management. This model showed 
the interdependencies between resource tangibility/intangibility, the use of knowledge to 
operationalize resources, and the need for resources to be dynamic across time. Then, in 
Chapter II, I investigated the roles of tangible and intangible resources in predicting firm 
success. The results indicated that intangible resources are associated with better 
performance for firms in the sport, entertainment, and leisure industries. In Chapters III 
and IV, I investigated how cognition and knowledge can help operationalize resources. 
In Part I, this final installment recounts each Chapter’s main takeaways, contributions, 
limitations, and future research. Then, in Part II, a course is charted for future research 
that relates to the complete model of strategic resource utility as a whole. 
Part I: Summary of Results and Discussions 
Chapter I. Proposing a Complete Model of Strategic Resource Utility 
 Despite the helpful contributions of many perspectives over the years, strategic 
management requires a more thorough examination of resources. Despite avid attention 
to the idea of resources and resource combination first articulated by Wernerfelt (1984), 
the concept of a ‘resource’ was still in an embryotic stage over ten years later 
(Wernerfelt, 1995). As such, Wernerfelt (1995) specified a need for strategy scholars to 
map out the resource space in greater detail—a call that has been left largely unattended 
to. 
 154 
 
 
 In a general sense, resources are commonly thought of as the building blocks of 
competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984). The concept of a resource is wide-ranging, 
and can include capital, physical infrastructure, digital communications and technology 
networks, knowledge, and political clout. Resources are unevenly distributed to firms in 
an industry, and firms are incentivized to protect and optimize their resource bundles – 
making them imperfectly mobile between firms. Since these initial contributions, 
scholars have proposed increasingly complex frameworks in order to explain how 
resources generate competitive advantages (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Teece & Pisano, 1994; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; 
Trigeorgis, 1996). While theoretically contributory to the literature base, the conceptual 
complexity of these frameworks pose little practical utility for the working manager; a 
sentiment conveyed by Wernerfelt (1995) when he asserts that resources “… remain an 
amorphous heap to most of us” (p. 172). 
 The purpose of Chapter I was, therefore, to organize and chart the resource space 
in a way that incorporated many of the prevailing contributions in strategic management. 
From a thorough investigation of prior literature, a cognitive model was proposed that 
separated resources into eight categories based on three important resource 
characteristics: (1) the resource’s tangibility (Galbreath, 2005; Godfrey & Hill, 1995; 
Hall, 1992, 1993; Villalonga, 2004), (2) the knowledge requirements of the resource 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; 1996; Nonka, 1994), and (3) the resource’s dynamism (Teece 
& Pisano, 1994; Teece, Pisano, & Schuen, 1999). An implication of this model was that 
none of the resource characteristics alone can give significant insight about the 
likelihood that the resource will help generate a competitive advantage. Rather, the role 
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of the three resource characteristics should be interpreted in conjunction with one 
another and in the context of the specific industry within which the firm operates. This 
model should prove helpful on two salient fronts. First, the model is helpful for 
executives, employees, and other stakeholder groups in that it can be the foundation for a 
shared cognitive model of resources. Scholars have documented the importance of 
utilizing a common method for ingesting, interpreting, and communicating enigmatic 
concepts in a business setting (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 
2000). Second, it is helpful for academicians in that Chapter I also proposes a set of 
testable propositions relating to some of the model’s resource typologies. These 
propositions can be investigated in a formal, rigorous way using qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. 
 A natural limitation of the model relates to the inherent subjectivity of the above 
listed resource characteristics. Due to this limitation, future work in this area should be 
robust as authors work to disentangle the conceptual components of resource tangibility, 
knowledge requirements, and dynamism. Some of this work will rely on already-
available lines of empiricism, such as work relating to resource tangibility and 
intangibility. For example, scholars have routinely quantified a firm’s intangible 
resources using a handful of approaches such as human resource accounting (HRA), 
economic value-added (EVA), the balanced scorecard, intellectual capital audits (Bontis, 
1998; Bontis et al., 1999), Tobin’s q Ratio (Villalonga, 2004), McDougall and 
Snetsinger’s (1990) tangibility scale, and Kaplan and Norton’s (2004) Strategic 
Readiness Report for Intangible Resources. Other resource characteristics (e.g., 
dynamism and the concepts of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge), will require a 
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more delicate and long-term approach. These resource characteristics will likely lean on 
theoretical and methodological contributions from disciplines outside the direct purview 
of management. 
Chapter II. Testing the Complete Model of Strategic Resource Utility: An Inception 
 Testing the complete model of strategic resource utility proposed in Chapter I 
will likely require the extended application of many viewpoints, methodologies, and 
theoretical sub-frameworks. As a foray into this line of research, Chapter II investigated 
the role of tangible and intangible resources in predicting firm performance for N=243 
sport, entertainment, and leisure firms over a 24-year period. The empirical specification 
applied the ‘hybrid’ approach first proposed by Alison (2005), which allowed for the 
partitioning out of within- and between-firm effects. This analysis provided an extended 
degree of clarity for interpreting the results. This was the case since fixed effects models 
generate results using only within-firm variance and random effects models generate 
results from the combined within-and between-firm variance (Certo, Withers, & 
Semadeni, 2017). In this case, the hybrid model was particularly helpful because the 
study’s theoretical foundations were multilevel in nature (i.e., contingency theories of 
management: see Donaldson, 2001). Being able to isolate industry-level effects from 
firm-level effects is pertinent when proposing hypotheses speculating about both levels 
of analysis. 
 Results from the estimation procedure were supportive of two out of the six 
Hypotheses. First, firms with more intangible resources than the industry mean were 
associated with better performance. Second, while having a greater proportion of 
tangible resources was also associated with performance improvements, the effect size 
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was weaker. However, the effects of competing as a differentiator (i.e., at the firm-level) 
and sector growth (i.e., at the industry-level) were not significant predictors of firms’ 
ROA. In the case of sector growth, the opposite of the hypothesized effect was found: as 
firms amassed more intangible resources during a time of sector growth, performance 
suffered. 
 In the aggregate, the results reinforce the importance of intangible resources like 
brand equity, image, reputation, fan identification, and ambiance for firms in the sport, 
entertainment, and recreation industries. The results also suggest that because 
differentiation did not help the sample of active sport consumption products experience 
performance increases, the door remains open to compete as a cost-leader in these 
sectors specifically. This suggestion is important for the theoretical development of sport 
entrepreneurship. Sport entrepreneurship can manifest in a variety of ways – from 
encouraging innovation and new product development within large sport organizations, 
to developing new sport technologies, to providing sport-for-development programs 
(Ratten, 2018). In all of these cases, success of the sport product hinges on the sport 
manager’s ability to think creatively, re-invent business models, and accommodate risk: 
the cornerstones of entrepreneurship (Hayduk & Walker, 2018). 
 To make this link concrete, consider the proliferation of digital platform 
technologies that offer sport related products, services, and experiences to fans. Many of 
the things offered by this product category are intangible, which means they require little 
or no raw materials for manufacture, little equipment beyond a personal computer to 
build, and a minimal physical footprint. It is not uncommon for these digital platforms to 
garner valuations in the millions or billions of dollars with little front-end investment. 
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These valuations are not being driven by high product quality, finely-tuned distribution 
networks, or economies of scale. Rather, these businesses have been successful by 
providing a constantly evolving product tied to a trusted and relatable brand that 
consumers want. For incumbent sport organizations expanding into these new markets, 
savvy extensions of their current brand qualities are what drive this success 
(Apostolopoulou, 2002). The opportunistic leveraging of intangible brand qualities is 
enabled by a culture that values innovation, encourages the re-examination of old 
business models, and is risk-friendly (Hayduk & Walker, 2018). Similarly, successful 
sport startups rely almost exclusively on excellent brand building to generate consumer 
awareness and trust (Bresciani, & Eppler, 2010; Centeno, Hart, & Dinnie, 2013). 
 Because of the proliferation of ‘intrapreneurial’ large sport organizations and 
sport startups – and the influx of venture capital they have attracted, the importance of 
intangible resources will continue to grow for sport managers and sport entrepreneurs. 
However, knowing how to operationalize intangibles using optimal knowledge, while 
pre-engineering them to be dynamic and evolutionary, will represent a significant 
challenge for sport startups and large sport brands looking to expand their product 
offerings. 
 Chapter II detailed the trends that influence the sport, entertainment, and 
recreation sectors as opposed to the traditionally-examined sectors of collegiate and 
professional sport organizations. The results implied that intangible resources are 
especially important across both sets of sport sectors, that differentiation was not 
necessarily a precondition to compete in the sectors represented by the sample of firms, 
and that sector growth mattered little to these firms’ success. In the future, more meso- 
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and micro-level investigations will be pertinent for the development of this research 
stream. Namely, a wider range of methodological approaches will be needed that rely on 
qualitative and/or psychometric investigations. Structured and semi-structured 
interviews of employees and executives and sport entrepreneurs at these firms will aid 
researchers in understanding the mechanisms for how certain outcomes manifest. 
Accordingly, these efforts would focus on understanding how these stakeholders 
conceptualize resources, and their approach to managing tangible and intangible 
resources. From these data, a number of quantitative psychometric investigations could 
flesh these relationships out in more detail.  
Chapter III. Explicitly-Operationalized Intangible Resources: Learned Career 
Experiences 
 In this Chapter, I investigated the role of knowledge in predicting firm 
performance. Theories of knowledge often differentiate between into two types: (1) 
explicit and (2) tacit (Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1996; Polanyi, 1966). Explicit knowledge 
is more easily communicated from person to person than tacit knowledge, which is more 
esoteric, qualitative, and reliant upon subjective judgments. As the primary vessels 
containing knowledge, employees (i.e., specifically those that are the highest up in the 
firm’s hierarchy) represent a focal component to the investigation of a firm’s knowledge 
management process. Upper Echelon Theory (UET) is a basic framework that 
accentuates this, which posits that firms as a whole tend to be a reflection of their top 
managers and ownership (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). I gathered a 
sample consisting of 43 owners tied to 30 professional sport franchises (PSF) over a ten 
year span (2006-2015), which yielded N=300 PSF-year observations. 
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 The results from this investigation showed that owners with a career history 
consisting primarily of marketing functions are associated with, on average, better 
marketing-specific outcomes at their currently owned PSFs. First, switching from a non-
marketing owner to a marketing owner was associated with an increase of roughly 7800 
fans per game. Second, switching from a non-marketing owner to a marketing-centric 
owner was associated with an increase of fan digital media consumption (FDMC) by 
about 10%. An important caveat of these findings was the significant role of the team’s 
on-field performance, which positively influenced both outcomes. This result suggests 
that owners with marketing expertise can perhaps better leverage on-field performance, 
not that they can generate greater attendance and more online consumption in the face of 
average or poor performance. 
 The results were also consistent with prior sport management literature by failing 
to find significant effects of owner tenure and age on PSF-level outcomes (Juravich, 
Salaga, & Babiak, 2017). It was surmised that as owners spent more time connected to 
the team and the MSA, they would accrue knowledge about local idiosyncrasies that 
could inform marketing strategies, thereby increasing attendance and online 
consumption. However, that was not the case in this sample. This research also 
countered prior work that has found a significant effect of education on PSF level 
outcomes (Juravich, et al., 2017; Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 2015).  Despite being 
divergent from prior work, this is somewhat of an intuitive finding given the context. 
While managers are typically hired based on educational pedigree, there are no such 
requirements for ownership other than to be wealthy enough to afford purchasing the 
team. Further, this investigation also built upon the construct of ‘functional experience’, 
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in that it was operationalized in a more specific way than in prior work (Juravich, 2012; 
Juravich et al., 2017). Having found a significant relationship while prior work has not, 
there is reason to suggest that a more specific operationalization such as the one used 
here will be most useful moving forward. With this added specificity, this project also 
implied that functional skills and knowledge do matter at higher levels of a firm’s 
hierarchy, despite what has been gleaned from prior work. In a broader sense, these 
findings have implications for the study of agency theory, and specifically, 
understanding the impact of personal and professional alignment between principal and 
agent. Agency theory is focused on exploring the contractual relationships between an 
owner (i.e., principal) and the managers hired to run the owner’s firm (i.e., agents) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Mason & Slack, 2005). While owners are incentivized to recoup the 
firm’s purchase costs as quickly as possible using more aggressive strategies, managers 
are incentivized to use conservative approaches that shelter the firm from failure in order 
to secure their job (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, one of the key streams in agency research 
concerns exploring the legal and managerial tools that can be used to align owners’ 
incentive structures to those of their managers. Prior work in sport has already spoken to 
the importance of matching personal characteristics for success (Peeters, Salaga, & 
Juravich, 2015). By extension, this research implies that other kinds of aligning and 
matching tools are required between owners and their subordinates. 
 This study’s findings also have implications for sport entrepreneurship theory 
and development (see Ratten, 2011; 2014; 2018). Sport entrepreneurship can manifest in 
a variety of ways, including the enablement of innovative and opportunistic ideation 
within large sport organizations (Ratten, 2018). Moreover, the term ‘sport entrepreneur’ 
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is similarly broad and can refer to those who design new sport technology, volunteers 
who build sport-for-development programs, athletes who advocate for social progress 
using innovative means, and those who encourage innovation within the structure of a 
large sport organization (Ratten, 2018). Because PSF owners shoulder risk and act 
opportunistically to purchase PSFs with the intent of increasing the value of their 
investment (Blair, 2012), they should be thought of as sport entrepreneurs. As such, 
future research in sport entrepreneurship should explore the confluence of PSF 
ownership and sport entrepreneurship. Future work could examine the degree to which 
PSF owners think of themselves as entrepreneurs and the ways they encourage (or 
inhibit) innovation, creativity, and risk-taking behavior within the structure of their 
organization. 
 Overall, being able to tie marketing knowledge to positive marketing outcomes is 
helpful for leagues, current PSF owners, municipalities, and aspiring PSF owners. 
However, for future research, more exogenous and tacit types of knowledge should be 
investigated. For example, political orientation is formed tacitly over a period of many 
decades, and as such, it is more exogenous to the way owners manage a particular 
investment. Despite this exogeneity, many studies have shown clear links between an 
upper echelon’s political orientation and firm performance (Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 
2014; Chin & Semadeni, 2016; Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, and Graffin, 2015; 
Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014; Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2015; Francis, Hasan, Sun, & 
Wu, 2016). This phenomenon would be interesting to investigate in the context of sport, 
an industry that operates at the nexus of society, culture, and politics to a greater degree 
than any other industry (Smith & Westerbeek, 2007). Moreover, the sport industry is 
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predicated on an intimate relationship between firm and consumer. Service-dominant 
logic and relationship marketing guide much of the strategic thinking in these sectors 
(Woratschek, Horbel, & Popp, 2014), so it would be interesting to assess whether top 
managers and owners can let their political leanings shine through in the management of 
their sport enterprise. 
Chapter IV. Tacitly-Operationalized Intangible Resources: Owners’ Political Affiliation 
 Chapter IV examined the relationship between PSF owners’ political orientation 
(PA) and a set of politically noteworthy outcome variables. Understanding PA’s role in 
the management of PSFs is important due to the strong linkage between politics and 
sport (Houlihan, 2007). Sport and politics are historically intertwined, and typically on 
an international scale—as evidenced by significant cultural events taking place at the 
1939 Berlin Olympic Games, the 1968 Summer Olympics in Mexico City, the 1972 
Summer Olympics in Munich, and the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta. The popular 
sport press and scholarship in academia reinforces the importance of the sport-politics 
discourse, as well. There are a number of political issues relevant to sport (Houlihan, 
2007), but a common theme relates to understanding disparate power structures and 
concentrated circles of influence in sport (Tomlinson & Sugden, 2013). In general, this 
debate is not unlike the labor-relations issues most ‘traditional’ industries have faced for 
over a century.  
 In some circumstances, journalists and academics alike have suggested the 
existence of contrasting social values between conservative power elites and liberal 
players’ unions, fans, and other stakeholder groups (Black, Black, & Nauright, 1998; 
Bort, 2017; Green & Houlihan, 2004; McGowan, 2014). Imbedded in the discussion of 
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power and influence in sport is often the insinuation that there are connections between 
wealthy professional sport franchise (PSF) owners’ political affiliation (PA) and the way 
they manage their organizations and leagues (Badenhausen, 2017; Duffy, 2016; Grahm, 
2016; Khalek, 2011; Solomon, 2016). However, despite the deep connection between 
sports and politics, little has been done in the way of empirically investigating whether 
this is the case. 
 Prior research in upper echelon theory (UET) and sport management was used 
(Juravich, Salaga, & Babiak, 2017; Rhode & Breuer, 2018; Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 
2015; Wong & Deubert, 2010) to hypothesize about PA’s influence on five outcomes, 
each of which has politically-salient implications: operating margin, fan cost index 
(FCI), payroll management, production efficiency, and involuntary turnover. In order to 
explore the outlined relationships, the manuscript uses a dataset of N=300 PSF-year 
observations tied to 43 unique owners. Each owner’s PA was calculated using prior 
research as a guide (Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012). 
 The results of the five models indicate that PA has little to no effect on how PSF 
owners manage these politically salient outcomes. Operating margin, payroll, production 
efficiency, and involuntary turnover were not affected significantly by PA. The results 
did show a significant and negative association between a PSF owner’s PA and FCI, 
suggesting that more conservative owners were associated with reductions in gross cost 
of attendance. This would seem to run counter to news media and academic discourse 
that has billed powerful PSF owners as profit maximizers at the expense of fans’ 
enjoyment and athletic competitiveness (Quirk & Fort, 1999). 
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 The findings provide implications for academics and practitioners. In the context 
of the complete model of strategic resource utility explained in Chapter I, this study 
would seem to disaffirm some of the propositions – specifically those that relate to 
tacitly- and explicitly-operationalized intangible resources. The results of Chapter III 
implied that explicitly-operationalized intangibles were positively associated with 
competitive advantage, but it was determined that the examination of tacitly-
operationalized intangibles was still required in order to make comparative judgments 
about the two resource categories’ ability to generate performance advantages. As an 
intangible resource that is tacitly-operationalized, PA was not shown to be a strong 
predictor of competitive advantage, as was proposed in Chapter I. 
 To investigate this further, future research should look to operationalize PA in a 
more interactive way. That is, it would be beneficial to examine an operationalization of 
PA that accounts for its relationship to other important stakeholders. An owner’s PA that 
is drastically different from that of local political representatives, voters, and cultural 
influencers, may drive a wedge between the PSF and the community, effectively 
preventing the attainment of performance advantages. But, when an owner’s PA aligns 
with that of other stakeholders, such congruence might enable the owner’s PA to 
manifest and flourish at the team level. This extension is justified given that favorable 
political ties between TMT members and important external actors have been shown to 
be associated with performance advantages for the firm (Wellman, 2016; Zhu & Chung, 
2014), while other research in sport has drawn attention to the importance of TMT 
members’ characteristics ‘matching’ those of their peers (Peeters, Salaga, & Juravich, 
2015).  
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 Also relevant for academics, this manuscript uncovers a potential boundary 
condition for UET. While firms in traditional and non-consumer-facing industries can 
likely be managed in the image of their owners, industries that depend on co-creating 
value alongside consumers (Jones, 2017), hyper-focusing on service (Woratschek, 
Horbel, & Popp, 2014), and managing a plethora of diverse consumer touch points 
(Funk, 2017) are likely not able to be managed in the same way. Service- and 
relationship-dependent industries are vastly different than ‘traditional’ business sectors, 
and these industries likely do not allow managers and owners to have much latitude to 
enact policies that reflect their own personal preferences. Because these kinds of 
competitive environments are becoming the norm (Funk, 2017; Oh, Fiore, & Jeoung, 
2007; Pine & Gilmore, 1998), it is likely that management scholarship will need to 
revisit the ideas of UET (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
 This work also opens the door for research related to other politically-salient 
PSF-level outcomes. PA can manifest in a number of ways related to the financial and 
economic management of the PSF. One of the major policy debates in sports concerns 
the public financing of PSFs’ facilities. The construction of new facilities and 
renovations to existing facilities represents a banner expense for modern day PSFs (Fort, 
2006; Blair, 2012). Modern PSFs are tasked with providing much more than an on-field 
contest. To provide such an atmosphere and experience for sport consumers, PSFs have 
turned to extravagant facility upgrades and redevelopment. Tax-payers and 
municipalities are estimated to shoulder as much as 80% of these costs on average 
(Long, 2005), so understanding whether PA can motivate certain owners to seek more 
public funding should be paramount for future research. 
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 This study also generates implications related to the practice of PFS 
management. Multiple stakeholder groups are affected when a new owner buys a PSF, 
including fans, local residents, small business owners, local and regional politicians, and 
league management. Given the number of stakeholders affected, there is a need to 
conduct thorough due diligence on new and prospective franchise owners. Being able to 
predict what kind of owners they are likely to be—profit maximizers, win maximizers, 
or some combination of the two—is important for establishing trust with consumers and 
building relationships with sponsors. This article has empirically shown that owners’ 
PA, despite what the popular press and some academic work implies, has virtually no 
bearing on a PSF’s financial and strategic management. However, because public 
opinion is so heavily and consistently shaped by local news and sport journalism 
(Protess & McCombes, 2016; Iyengar & Simon, 1993), the aforementioned stakeholder 
groups should always be mindful of the public relations and agenda-setting implications 
attached to certain owners and ownership groups. Owners are increasingly a pillar of 
PSFs’ brand building process, so it is imperative to consider how owners’ political track 
record may affect public sentiment. 
Part II: Aggregate Future Research Agenda 
 Taken collectively, the results of Chapters II, III, and IV provide initial empirical 
support for the complete model of strategic resource utility proposed in Chapter I – 
specifically those relating to intangible resources. But, the model proposes sets of 
relationships between resource characteristics that will take more time to develop, 
evolve, and sharpen. Future work exploring the complete model can focus on three core 
areas: (1) using currently-available methodologies and tools to quantify the relationships 
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between resource tangibility and knowledge requirements, (2) establishing a discourse 
and research agenda specifically for resource dynamism (RD), and (3) testing the ability 
of different resource typologies to generate performance advantages. 
 As it relates to the first objective, work relating to the quantification of resource 
tangibility and intangibility will provide a foundation. For example, scholars have 
already quantified a firm’s intangible resources using a handful of approaches such as 
human resource accounting (HRA), economic value-added (EVA), the balanced 
scorecard, intellectual capital audits (Bontis, 1998; Bontis et al., 1999), Tobin’s q Ratio 
(Villalonga, 2004), McDougall and Snetsinger’s (1990) tangibility scale, and Kaplan and 
Norton’s (2004) Strategic Readiness Report for Intangible Resources. Other work has 
shed light on the nature of tacit and explicit knowledge. Kogut and Zander (1993) 
proposed three psychometric scales measuring knowledge codifiability, teachability, and 
complexity. Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, and Tihanyi (2004) also propose and utilize 
scales measuring tacit and explicit knowledge in the context of foreign expansion teams. 
Last, Insch, McIntyre, and Dawley (2008) purport to update a scale for tacit knowledge 
transfer in an academic setting. Given the multidimensionality of these two constructs, 
all of these scales should be awarded a degree of attention by sport researchers looking 
to operationalize and concretize these constructs. 
 In the future, work will need to be conducted that examines the nature of 
‘resource dynamism’ as it relates to the second objective outlined above. In a general 
sense, management scholarship has recognized the demanding nature of modern 
industries, where technological revolution and globalization have prioritized firms’ 
abilities to leverage uncertainty and unpredictability to their advantage (Hitt, Keats, & 
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DeMarie, 1998). In this new competitive landscape, innovation, agility, and dynamism 
have become paramount to success. Thus, resource dynamism (RD) is a model-specific 
term and was included to acknowledge the notion that individual resources can be 
favorable or unfavorable to rapidly-evolving market conditions. It is a term that is 
intended to help managers think about the resource acquisition, accumulation, and 
deployment process. Prior management scholars have alluded to similar constructs like 
resource flexibility (Sanchez, 1995; 1997). And, in a process-oriented view, dynamic 
capabilities have been proposed as a theoretically poignant and empirically 
authenticated driver of competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Winter, 
2003). Future work incorporating RD should first look to define the term in an 
appropriate way, differentiating it from similar constructs in management by focusing on 
the resource as the unit of analysis (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Sanchez, 1993, 1995; 
Winter, 2003).  
 Many theoretical frameworks native to other disciplines such as entrepreneurship 
can be useful for this process. Entrepreneurship, and especially entrepreneurship in sport 
contexts, is characterized by rapid successions of ideas, the prioritization of innovation 
and creativity, and feedback-enabled iteration (Ratten, 2018). Lean thinking (Ries, 2011; 
Womack & Jones, 2010) is a perspective within entrepreneurship that can provide some 
insight into the nature of RD, as lean thinking is a general concept that teaches 
entrepreneurs how to create the most benefit in the shortest amount of time, while 
reducing as much resource waste as possible. Implicit in the notion of reducing 
resources’ waste is the desire to increase resources’ efficiency. When a resource can 
retain efficiency of output in the face of exogenous market shocks and demand 
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fluctuations, the resource can be thought of as ‘dynamic’. One way to quantify efficiency 
in the context of production economics utilizes stochastic frontier analysis (Kumbhakar 
& Lovell, 2003). A related approach called data envelopment analysis (DEA) is rooted 
in the desire to incorporate the use of multiple inputs (i.e., resources) into an overall 
measure of production efficiency (Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu, 2004). Both of these 
approaches have been used in sport management research (Barros & Leach, 2006; 2007; 
Dawson, Dobson, & Gerrard, 2000; Hofler & Payne, 2006; Kahana, 2005), typically in 
the context of evaluating teams’ performance efficiency on the field of play. However, 
applying either of these empirical approaches to the context of a single resource could 
prove an interesting avenue for future work investigating RD. 
 Last, the third objective described above will require the incorporation of what 
was learned while pursuing the first and second objectives. Once a general consensus 
has been built around the concepts of resource tangibility, tacit knowledge, explicit 
knowledge, and RD in a sport setting, researchers can begin to classify resources into 
each of the eight typologies. Several empirical classification techniques can be used to 
accomplish this task such as multinomial logistic regression (Ballinger, 2004), linear 
discriminant analysis, and canonical discriminant analysis (Izenman, 2013). Moreover, 
the advancement of computing technology and statistical programs has given rise to 
increasingly complex and dynamic classification methods. Aggarwal (2015) provides a 
general overview of these methods, while Harrison and Bukstein (2017) and Miller 
(2016) are two sport-specific resources. Once categorized, resource typologies can 
subsequently be tested against one another to determine which categories are most 
associated with competitive advantage for a particular firm or industry. 
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Conclusion 
 Overall, the intention of this dissertation was to first outline why a complete 
model of strategic resource utility is needed in the sport context; and second, to 
empirically test pieces of the model in hopes of highlighting its utility to academics and 
practitioners. Chapter I first proposed a model of strategic resource utility that 
characterizes resources into eight typologies based on the resource’s tangibility, 
knowledge requirements, and dynamism. Chapter II tests the nature of intangible 
resources in sport, entertainment, and leisure firms, finding that intangibles for these 
sectors are similar in importance to ‘traditional’ sport sectors like collegiate and 
professional sport programs (with some noted caveats). Chapters III and IV examine the 
nature of knowledge in sport organizations using a sample drawn from PSFs and their 
owners’ personal characteristics. Results indicate that knowledge – perhaps especially 
explicit knowledge such as learned career experiences – can impact the operations of a 
PSF, while tacit knowledge – such as one’s political orientation – has less of an effect on 
management practices. Last, Chapter V offers a summation of these findings and 
implications, and outlines a cumulative research agenda pertaining to the complete 
model of strategic resource utility. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A. Information Sheet/Example Career Vignette 
INFORMATION SHEET 
This packet contains a series of short vignettes detailing the careers of 43 businessmen in North 
America. All identifying information including names, company names, and dates have been 
removed to ensure that each vignette is as anonymous as possible. First, identify up to four 
functional categories that best capture the business experience described in each vignette. Then, 
order them from (1) most applicable to (3) least applicable.  
For example, consider the following vignette: 
“He joined Firm A in 1960, working as a chemical engineer. He was eventually made VP and 
head of Firm A’s Plastics Division, where he oversaw production and marketing. He moved up to 
the head of Metallurgical and Chemical divisions, and was named head of strategic planning. He 
was then asked to become the head of Firm A’s Consumer Products and Services division. Last, 
he was made the Chairman and CEO of Firm A where he served in that capacity for 20 years.” 
 
First, this person was educated as an engineer. Second, the person accrued significant experience 
with production (a) and (b) marketing in the Plastics Division. Third, he gained resource allocation 
experience as a strategic planner and spent the latter phase of his career in C-level management. So, 
this person’s functional experience could be identified as follows: 
 
The primary functional experience described is: 
 Production, logistics & operations (2) 
 R&D/Engineering (3) 
 Accounting & Finance  
 Management (1) 
 Marketing and Sales (4) 
 Legal 
 Human Resources 
 Real Estate 
 Information Technology 
 
